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Category: Souvenirs et réflexions d’une aryenne (book)

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Holocaust Neanderthalism Savitri Devi Souvenirs et réflexions d'une aryenne (book)

Reflections of an Aryan woman, 23

In my first new contact with Europe, after the disaster of 1945, I wrote to a Hindu correspondent, after quoting Nietzsche’s phrase on the intermediate character of man, ‘a rope stretched between animality and superhumanity’. ‘The rope is now broken. There are no more men on this godforsaken continent; there is only a superhuman minority of true Hitlerians, and… an immense majority of apes’.

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Editor’s Note: What I call ‘the Neanderthals’.

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Such then was the contrast between the dazzling elite of the faithful, whom I exalted in the first of my post-war books[1]: ‘those men of gold and steel, whom defeat cannot deter, whom terror and torture cannot break, whom money cannot buy’—and the rest of the Europeans.

Since then, I have seen this precious minority gradually renew itself, while remaining profoundly the same—like the waters of a lake fed by a river. Many of the Alten Kämpfer (old militants) of the glorious years have died, and more than grew weary of waiting for the impossible return of the dawn—or of what they had so long taken to be ‘a dawn’—of the Aryan renaissance, and, without having died in the flesh, have sunk into the apathy of those who no longer hope, even though hope was indispensable to them. Only the Strong remained who had no use for hope because, while contributing through their activity (and by the magical fervour of their thought, when all action is forbidden to them) to the immemorial struggle against the Powers of disintegration, they have transcended Time. Only those who do not need to ‘believe’, because they know, are left standing.

And around these few survivors of the wreckage of the most beautiful of races, I have seen, in the course of this quarter of a century, a hard and silent elite of young people grouping—consciously known to each of them or not, it does not matter—an elite very few in number, no doubt, but oh joy! of a quality which the vast hostile world doesn’t suspect (and which it could not alter even if, one day, it suddenly imposed itself upon it). I have seen growing here and there, outside of what may seem to the historian our definitive ruin, the miraculous fruits of the unparalleled ordeal of boys and girls of twenty strong enough, already, to do without hope as well as success; intelligent enough to understand once and for all that Truth does not depend on the visible.

One of them[2] said to me in 1956, and others have repeated to me more than ten years later: ‘I oppose and will continue all my life to oppose the current of decadence, convinced as I am of the eternity of the Hitlerian ideal, although I know that we will not see, until the end of time, the equivalent of the Third German Reich. We must fight ceaselessly and without fail, even knowing in advance that we are overwhelmed; one must fight, because this is the duty—the function—of the Aryan of our time, and of all times to come’.

I then thought of Goebbels’ words uttered amidst all the horror of the disaster: ‘After the flood, us!’ Was it the nature of this disaster to bring forth to the continent for which the false civilisation is destined—and how precisely!—to be swept away, a few young people (mostly Germans, but not necessarily) whose spontaneous mentality, corresponding exactly to the teachings of the Bhagawad-Gita, matches that of the very prototype of the Arya of old? And was the resurrection, in our time, of the ethic of imperturbable serenity within untiring action—the wisdom of the Divine Warrior—to be the result of the Passion of Germany?

Perhaps. If so, it was worth surviving the disaster to witness this resurrection. It was worth wandering from year to year among all the apes of the ‘consumer societies’ to make sure, finally, that the spirit of the Leader and the Master would not disappear with the death of the last of the militants of the old guard, but would continue to animate, in its hardness and its purity, a spiritual as well as racial aristocracy, which had not been born in 1945.

This spiritual as well as racial aristocracy—this elite, conscious of the eternity of the basic principles of Adolf Hitler’s doctrine, and living according to them in all simplicity—is, for us, the true ‘man’: the man who strives for superhumanity through personal and collective discipline, through the selection of blood, through the cultivation of ancestral honour and divine indifference to all that is not essential; through the humility of the individual before the Race and before the eternity it reflects; through the contempt for all cowardice, all lies and all weakness.

And I repeat: if we find any of these characteristics elsewhere than in those who openly or secretly confess the same doctrine as we do; if we even find it in people who fight us and hate us, or think they hate us because they don’t know us, we salute, in those who have them, beings worthy of respect. They have in them the stuff of what they could and should be, but they don’t use it or misuse it. They are, in most cases, our own brothers of the race, or men of other races, among the most gifted. Something in them redeems them before the immanent and impersonal Justice which sends every being who, rightly or wrongly, professes to think, where he deserves to go, and which has hitherto prevented them—and will always prevent many of them—from slipping and sinking into that mass which neither feels nor thinks according to its law; the simian majority of mankind, which, like liquids or pasty substances, takes on the shape of the vessels that contain it, or the mark of the seal that has, once and for all, struck it.

During this quarter of a century, I have gradually rediscovered this category of people whom my atrocious shock with post-war Europe had at first withdrawn from my attention: the men of goodwill, the good people who keep their word and are capable of a good deed that brings them no profit; who, for example, would go out of their way to rescue an animal without, however, being capable of extreme sacrifice, even of sustained, daily, total action for the benefit of anyone.

They are not the Strong, and certainly not us. But they are not apes. In an intelligent sorting, they should be spared. Among their children, there could be future militants of Hitlerism—as their opposite. A reading, a conversation at the crucial moment, a small thing, can decide the evolution of each of them. One must be careful: not to despise what is healthy, but not to waste one’s time and energy in trying to hold back on the slope what, in any case, is predestined—condemned by nature—to sink into the mass of non-thinkers; a mass that is sometimes usable but never respectable and a fortiori never likeable.

He is not ‘man’ in the sense that we understand it, man, a valid candidate for true superhumanity; nor is he the ‘good man’, sound in body and soul, fundamentally honest and kind, well disposed towards all that lives, whom we ‘deny’. In other words, it is not to him that we deny more ‘dignity’ and hence more consideration than a simple thing; not to him, but to this caricature of man, increasingly common in the world in which we live. It is this that we refuse to include in the denotation of the concept of ‘man’, for the simple reason that it does not have the connotation, that is to say, it does not possess the essential qualities and capacities that quite naturally serve as attributes in possible judgements where the word ‘man’ is used as a subject.

Any judgment in which a concept is used as a subject is necessarily a hypothetical judgment. To say that ‘man thinks’, or that he is a ‘thinking being’, is to say that if any individual is ‘a man’—if he possesses upright posture, speech—it follows that he is also capable of thinking. In case he is not able to do so, the upright posture and the articulate word, and the other features which accompany these, are insufficient to define him—and do not oblige anyone to treat him as ‘a man’.

Now, a person does not think if he tells you, in all seriousness, that a piece of information is ‘certainly correct’ because it was transmitted to him by his television set, or especially that a value judgement must ‘certainly’ be accepted because he has read the statement in a newspaper, magazine book, or on a poster, wherever it is printed. It does not ‘think’ any more than does a gramophone whose needle faithfully follows record grooves. Change the record, and the machine will change its language or its music.

In the same way, change the television broadcasts, which millions of families watch every night with ear and eye; change the radio programs; pay the press to print other propaganda, and encourage the publication of other magazines and books, and in three months you will change the reactions of a people—of all peoples—to the same events, to the same political or literary figures, to the same ideas. Why, great Gods, should we treat as ‘men’ those millions of gramophones of flesh and blood who do not ‘think’ any more than their metal and Bakelite colleagues?

The latter cannot think, and it would be absurd to ask them to. They have neither brains nor nerves. They are objects. The individual—the two-legged mammal—who comes to me and insists that ‘six million’ Jews, men, women and children, died in the gas chambers of the German concentration camps, and who gets angry if I show him that this number has one (or perhaps two) extra zeros, is worse than an object.
 

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Editor’s Note: Today the internet exists, and we can see images that from 1915 to 1938 (before the so-called Jewish holocaust began), the Jewish press was already talking about 6 million dead Jews!
 

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He has a brain, but does not use it, or uses it only to dumb himself down more and more, refusing any opportunity to exercise what little critical thinking he still possesses after more than forty years of anti-Hitler conditioning. This kind of propaganda started already before 1933: between 1920 and 1930. I was in Europe then and remember it—and how!

Moreover, he dares to find in others, or in the men of old, blind faith, absolute trust in a teaching or a teacher. He blames (or mocks) the people of the Middle Ages for believing without question everything the Church told them and everything written in the Gospels, as if the authority of the Church and the Gospels were not equal to that of television or the magazine. He refuses to admit, because the propaganda he has ingested has told him otherwise, that we are not and have never been ‘conditioned’—at least, those of us who count.

Why, then, should I give him more ‘respect’ than to an object—especially since, precisely because of his nearly perfect indoctrination, he has become for me, for the cause I serve, totally useless? What if, moreover, he is not even good?—if I know, having seen him in action, that he would not hesitate to tear off a tree branch that is in his way, or to throw a stone at a dog? Why—in the name of what—should I feel obliged to prefer him to the dog he once injured, or the tree he mutilated in passing? In the name of his ‘human dignity’?

What dignity is that of a living, evil, dangerous gramophone, capable of inflicting gratuitous suffering and creating ugliness! I deny this ‘dignity’ there. Should I love him ‘because he is my brother’? The tree and the dog and all living beings, beautiful and innocent, who at least have no ideas, neither their own nor those of television, are my brothers. I do not, in any way, sense that this individual is more my brother than any of them. Why should I give him priority over them? Because he walks, like me, on his hind legs?

I don’t think that’s a good reason. I don’t care about standing upright when it doesn’t go hand in hand with real thought and a superior man’s character: a character from which all meanness, all smallness is excluded. And when the articulated word serves only to express ideas which had not been created by the one who thinks he has them, but merely received them—and false ideas to boot—, I prefer, by far, the silence of animals and trees.
 

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Editor’s Note: I find it impressive that what Savitri wrote when I was a child resonates so strongly with my own philosophy. That’s why I am now calling myself a priest and Savitri a priestess…

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[1] Gold in the Furnace, written in 1948-1949.

[2] Uwe G., born on 21 July 1935.

Categories
Eugenics Israel / Palestine Neanderthalism Savitri Devi Souvenirs et réflexions d'une aryenne (book)

Reflections of an Aryan woman, 22

We are accused of ‘denying man’ by placing the last of the healthy animals, the smallest healthy plant—the last of the dandelions, perfect on its level—above the human waste, the mentally retarded, let alone the idiot, and the animal or plant aristocracy, above the Untermensch, even the apparently ‘normal’; the raceless and characterless human being, smug and cowardly; petty; incapable of thinking for himself, and essentially selfish.

We are reproached for advocating the physical suppression of the demented, the profoundly retarded, the idiots and monsters who, at taxpayers’ expense, clutter up the asylums of ‘civilised’ countries, and the sterilisation of people afflicted with dangerous heredity.

We are reproached, perhaps more than anything else, for having allowed German physiologists and doctors to experiment on human enemies of the Reich, taken from the concentration camps, even though they were forbidden to use animals; in other words, for having shown more consideration for the animal than for the actual or even potential ideological enemy. Above all, this is what most of our adversaries, stuffed with ‘denazifying’ propaganda for more than twenty-five years, have in mind when they declare that we ‘deny man’.

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Editor’s Note: Anti-Nazi chutzpa has no limits. The so-called Ringworm affair was a scandal involving approximately twenty thousand immigrated Jews who were mistreated between 1948 and 1960 with ionizing radiation on the head and neck area in Israel.

The idea was to poison and eventually dispatch Sephardic children, considered inferior by the Ashkenazi caste at the founding of their New Jerusalem. Israeli activists in our century consider the X-rays that these children suffered to the point of sterilisation as the most prominent example of injustices in the 1950s. But I don’t even blame them: I blame an astronomically imbecile US whose evangelicals believe they are the chosen people.

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The first step would be to agree on the connotation (and hence the denotation) of this concept of ‘man’, of which so much is made. It is, apparently, the connotation they give it that interests our detractors the most. They call ‘man’ any upright primate capable of articulate speech, to whom they automatically attribute ‘reason’ and, if they are Christians, an immortal soul created in the image of god. But it is the upright posture and the articulate language, traits that are obvious, that inform these friends of man, about the (less obvious) presence of other characteristics. What they do with all living things that exhibit these two distinctive features—what am I saying?—even of those who are completely deprived of them but who possess the human form… because our adversaries place the idiot above the most beautiful of beasts!

Here we see, once again, how true it is that the denotation of a concept is in inverse proportion to its connotation. What gives our opponents the persistent impression that we ‘deny man’ is that we are much more demanding than they are concerning the connotation of this term, and that, consequently, its denotation, in our eyes, narrows accordingly.

It is not enough for us to grant a primate the name of man, and the respect that is attached to it in cultivated languages, that this creature stands preferably on its hind legs, and is capable of emitting articulated sounds that have, for it and others, a meaning. It is not enough for us, all the more so, that it should have, without even presenting these two characters, a silhouette vaguely similar to that of one of us.

We want him to possess that minimum of intelligence which will enable him to think for himself, and that minimum of nobility will make him incapable of certain reactions to obstacles, inaccessible to certain ‘temptations’, impervious to certain debasing influences, and a fortiori incapable of petty or cowardly acts, ugly acts. We do want, if not to ‘love’, at least to respect ‘all men’ in the same way as we respect all beautiful living beings, animals and plants, in which we feel more or less attenuated reflections of the divine, the eternal.

But for this to happen they must be ‘men’ in the strongest sense of the word. We are ready to respect, as individuals, even the people, ideological adversaries, even racial enemies, whom we fought collectively yesterday, and whom we will fight again tomorrow—to respect them if, taken separately, they respond to what we expect of ‘man’: if they combine, with a non-enslaved intelligence, the qualities of character which (statistically) distinguish the races I call superior—and first of all, of course, our Aryan race and even the exceptionally noble individual from the statistically inferior races.

This will not prevent us from fighting them, if they are ideologically dangerous; all the more dangerous because they have more intrinsic value. In other words, we respect as ‘men’ those who, if they are not already ideologically ours, would be worthy of becoming so in our eyes.

Categories
Exterminationism Savitri Devi Souvenirs et réflexions d'une aryenne (book) Welfare of animals

Reflections of an Aryan woman, 21

Now, as I said above, man is the only living being on earth who has, even within the same race, elites, and physical, mental and moral dregs; the only one who, not being strictly defined by his species, can rise (and sometimes does rise) above it, to the point of merging (or almost merging) with the ideal archetype that transcends it: the overman. But he can also stoop (and does stoop, in fact, more and more, in the age in which we live) below, not only the minimum level of value that one would hope to find in his race, but below all animate creatures: those who, prisoners of a sure instinct and a practical intelligence placed entirely at the service of this instinct, are incapable of revolt against the unwritten laws of their being, in other words, of sin.
 

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Editor’s Note: This is extremely important. A group of killer whales that play with a bloody seal as if it were a ball, or an ugly monkey eating a little gazelle alive in front of her mother, probably cannot help but ‘sin’ because of their biological prison. But white Christians, like the idiot who recently argued with Jared Taylor, sin by proclaiming themselves Jew-wise and following, at the same time, the commandments that the bully called Yahweh ordered for them: not to distinguish between races, as that famous verse by Paul says. See what I said this morning about how I immediately lose love to one of these, be they Christian or atheist.
 

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We are reproached for preferring the healthy and beautiful beast—what am I saying?—the healthy and beautiful tree to the fallen man whether it is one who, born in an inferior race in the process of approaching more and more the monkey, has no chance of ascending to superhumanity, either for himself or his descendants; or whether it is about individuals or groups of individuals of a superior race, but to whom any possibility of such an ascension is prohibited, because of physical, psychic or mental corruption, or all three at once, which they have inherited from degenerate ancestors, or acquired as a result of the life they have led.

In the preface he wrote for the first French edition of the Tischgespräche attributed to Adolf Hitler, and published under the title of Libres propos sur la Guerre et la Paix (Free remarks on war and peace), Count Robert d’Harcourt recalls that the Führer ‘loved animals’ and that he, in particular, wrote pages of charming freshness about dogs.[1] The French academician compares this with the cynicism of the Head of State, in whose eyes political wisdom was ‘in inverse ratio to humanity’.[2] ‘Humanity towards beasts’, he says, ‘bestiality towards men: we have known this mystery of coexistence’. And he adds that those who, in the German concentration camps, sent their victims to the gas chambers ‘were the same ones who bandaged, with a nurse’s delicacy, the leg of a wounded dog’.

To these remarks of an opponent of Hitlerism I would add all that the Führer did for the animal (and the tree itself) in the spirit of the immemorial Aryan conception of the world: the banning of traps, as well as of hunting with hounds, and the restriction of hunting of any kind, as far as this was still possible in German society; the suppression of vivisection—that disgrace to man—as well as of all the atrocities connected with the slaughter of animals.[3]

The use of the automatic pistol was compulsory in all cases, including that of pigs, and I met a peasant woman in Germany who assured me that she had served a four-year sentence in a concentration camp for having killed a pig with a knife (out of treachery, so as not to have to pay the man to whom she should have entrusted the painless slaughter of the animal). I would add that Adolf Hitler, himself a vegetarian, dreamed of completely eliminating the horrible slaughterhouse industry, even if it was to be ‘humanised’, step by step ‘after the war’, as he declared to Goebbels on 26 April 1942.

Nonetheles, far from shocking me by their contrast with all the exceptional measures taken against human beings currently or potentially dangerous, these laws and projects appear, to me, as one of the glories of the Third Reich: and one more reason to be proud of my Hitlerian faith.

Count Robert d’Harcourt represents the public opinion of the West in general, both Christian and rationalist. His point of view is that of all those who fought against us, and even of a part of those who collaborated with us, collaborated for strictly political reasons despite our ‘negation of man’, not because of it, in the name of a common scale of values.

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[1] Libres propos sur la Guerre et la Paix, 1952 edition, Preface, p. xxiii.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Reichsjagdgesetz: the complete collection of laws enacted under the Third Reich concerning hunting.

Categories
Neanderthalism Nordicism Savitri Devi Souvenirs et réflexions d'une aryenne (book) Tree Welfare of animals

Reflections of an Aryan woman, 20

This is not to say that, statistically, the Aryan is not closer to the ‘idea of the perfect man’ than the man of the other races, even the noble ones, just as within the Aryan race itself the Nordic is statistically closest to the same ‘idea’, in the Platonic sense of the word. Warrior courage is perhaps one of the virtues most equally prevalent in both the purebred (or nearly purebred) Aryan and the non-Aryan.

But there are traits which, while not exclusive to the Aryan or more particularly to the Nordic, are undoubtedly more common in the latter than elsewhere. I will mention three of them: physical beauty, which counts as soon as one speaks of a visible being; the fact that he can be relied upon, that he doesn’t promise what he cannot give, that he doesn’t lie (or lies less than most nationals of other races) and finally, the fact that he has more respect than they generally have for the animal and the tree, and more kindness than they have towards all living beings.

And this last trait seems to me essential. I cannot, indeed, consider as superior any race—any human community, however outwardly beautiful and gifted it may be—if too large a percentage of the individuals composing it despise and treat ‘like things’ the beautiful living beings who, by nature, cannot take a stand for or against any cause, and whom, therefore, it is impossible to hate.

The superior man—the candidate for superhumanity—can not be the torturer or even the shameless exploiter of living nature. He will be the admirer—I would even say, the adorer; the one who, to use the words of Alfred Rosenberg, ‘sees the Divine in all that lives: in the animal; in the plant’.[1] He can be—indeed, he must be—merciless towards man, the enemy of this natural Order, with which he has identified himself, and whose beauty he is enamoured of.

But far from inflicting pain on an innocent creature, or allowing others to inflict it directly or indirectly, if he can prevent it he will, whatever is in his hands, ensure that every beast he meets lives happily; that every tree that grows in his path escapes, too, from the innate barbarity of the inferior man, ready to sacrifice everything for his own benefit, his own comfort, or for the benefit and comfort of his own, even of ‘humanity’.

Any overestimation of oneself is a sign of stupidity. All anthropocentrism is an overestimation of the collective ‘self’ of the two-legged mammal, all the more blatant as this self doesn’t exist; they are only collective selves each corresponding to more or less extensive and more or less homogeneous human groups. Hence it follows that all anthropocentrism is a sign of double stupidity, and generally of collective stupidity.

What are we reproached with when we say that we ‘deny man’? We are reproached for rejecting anthropocentrism. We are reproached for placing the notion of the elite—living aristocracy, human or non-human—above the notion of any man, and for sacrificing not only the sick to the healthy, the weak to the strong, the deficient to the normal individual or above normal, but also the mass to the elite. We are reproached for taking the elite of our Aryan race as the end, and the mass (all human masses, including those in our Aryan countries) as the means. And when I say ‘mass’ I do not mean people, but average and below-average humanity, not so much as to what its representatives know, but as to what they are: as to their character and their possibilities. Our Führer came from ‘the people’, but did not belong to ‘the mass’.

We are reproached for our disgust with the failed creature who has irrevocably turned his back on the ideal archetype of his race, our horror of the morbid, the quirky, the decadent, of everything that deviates without return from the crystalline simplicity of elementary form, absolute sincerity and deep logic. We are reproached for our militant nostalgia for the time when the visible order of the world faithfully reflected the eternal order, the divine order; for our fight for the reestablishment, at whatever cost, the reign of eternal values—our fight against the tide of Time.

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[1] Quoted by Maurice Bardèche in Nuremberg ou les faux-monnayeurs, first edition, p. 88.

Categories
Aztecs Savitri Devi Souvenirs et réflexions d'une aryenne (book)

Reflections of an Aryan woman, 19

So what are these values that make Hitlerism a ‘negation of man’ in the eyes of almost all our contemporaries? For it is, indeed, a negation of man as Christianity and Descartes and the French Revolution have taught us to conceive him. But isn’t this, on the other hand, the affirmation of another conception of man?

Philosophically, one could define or describe Hitlerism as the search for the eternal, in and through the love and service of tangible, living perfection. The perfection of a living species is the ‘idea’ of that species, in the Platonic sense of the word; or, if one prefers to use Aristotle’s language, it is its ‘entelechy’: what she ideally tends towards. The more complex a living species is—the more hidden possibilities it has—the more difficult it is to discover individuals, or groups of individuals, that are absolutely faithful to the ‘idea’ of this species, that is, perfect.

Of all the visible beings on our Earth, man is the one with the widest range of possibilities, and it is in him that perfection is the most difficult to find. And the criterion which allows it possible—statistically, of course; in this field all truth is statistical truth—is to speak about a natural hierarchy of human races, the extent to which each race can make the ‘idea of man’ a living reality; to present, in the face and body of its nationals, the harmony which is the very essence of beauty, and in their psyche, the virtues that distinguish the superior man, the one I have sometimes called ‘the candidate for Superhumanity’.

I insist that the idea of a ‘superior race’ is statistical. None of us has ever been so foolish as to believe that all specimens of one human race could be, merely by belonging to that race, necessarily ‘superior’ to all specimens of all other races. Some non-Aryans are clearly superior to some Aryans, even the ‘average’ Aryan. Hindu saints of low caste—such as Tukaram—or even below any caste—like Nandanar—were certainly closer to the eternal than many ‘twice-born’ Aryans, especially those Aryans of today, corrupted by the lust for material goods. Japanese heroes, such as Yamato Dake, or Yoshitsune, and so many others; Mongolian chiefs, such as Genghis Khan, the invincible genius, or his lieutenant, Subodai, the very incarnation of the highest military virtue at the same time as the most modest, the most unselfish of men; Mexican chiefs, such as Nezahualcoyotl, king of Tezcuco, at once warrior, engineer and poet, were also.

And what can we say about Tlahuicol, the Tlascaltec warrior from the middle of the fifteenth century, who, as a prisoner of the Aztecs and destined to be sacrificed during the Festival of Fire, refused the pardon and honours offered to him by Montezuma, who was amazed at the sight of his prowess, and preferred ‘to let the festival go on’, with all the excruciating consequences that it would entail for him, rather than accept to serve alongside the enemy chiefs against Tlascala? Confronted, according to custom, at the beginning of the ritual, alone, and without any other weapon than a wooden sword, with five of the best Aztec warriors, armed with stone swords, he had defeated and killed them—instead of being struck down by them—which had earned him the admiration of the prince and all the nobility of Tenochtitlan, whose welcome he rejected out of loyalty to his people. Was he not clearly superior to certain Christians of Aryan origin, his contemporaries in Europe, to a Commines, for example, a traitor to Charles the Bold, his benefactor?
 

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Editor’s Note: I can’t be so sure how to see under this light all of the characters Savitri mentions above. But I’ll just disagree with her regarding one of the ones she mentions, and what better way to do that than to quote a passage from my Day of Wrath:

As implied above, my father feels an excessive admiration for the Indian world. On several occasions he has argued that the fact that the poetry of Nezahualcóyotl, the most refined representative of the Nahua culture, is so humane that it refutes the vision of the culture as barbaric. But poetry is no reliable standard. The basic, fundamental principle in psychohistory has childrearing as the relevant factor, and from this point of view even the refined monarch of Texcoco was a barbarian.

In a courtier intrigue Nezahualcóyotl consented using garrote to execute his favorite son, the prince Tetzauhpilzintli. The Nahua characters were seized with fratricide fits. Moctezuma I (not the one who received Cortés) ordered the killing of his brother and something similar did Nezahualcóyotl’s heir, Nezahualpilli: who also used capital punishment with his first born son and heir. Soustelle says that this family tragedy was one of the causes of the fall of the Mexican empire since the blood brothers that rose to the throne flipped to the Spanish side. But Soustelle’s blindness about what he has in front of his nose is amazing. Like León Portilla, for Soustelle ‘there is no doubt that the Mexicans loved their children very much’. But that is not love. Nezahualcóyotl’s mourning after letting his son be killed reminds me the ‘Pietà’ of my first book […].

Categories
2nd World War Marxism Savitri Devi Souvenirs et réflexions d'une aryenne (book)

Reflections of an Aryan woman, 18

It is precisely this anthropocentrism, common to Christianity and Communism, and to all ‘humanisms’, that served as the philosophical cement for the seemingly incongruous alliance of the Western, Christian or ‘rationalist’ world, and the Soviet Union during the Second World War.
 

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Editor’s Note: This is vital. Both American liberalism and Soviet communism are two branches of the same trunk: the vision of the world that emerged from the French Revolution. Oswald Spengler himself wrote that ‘Christian theology is the grandmother of Bolshevism’.
 

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It was, in the eyes of more than one Christian, quite painful to feel the glorious ally of atheistic Communism in the struggle against us, followers of Adolf Hitler. Moreover, many westerners, Christian or not, felt more or less confused that this alliance was, politically, a mistake: that their country, whatever it was, would have had more to gain, or less to lose, as a state by giving Adolf Hitler a hand (or accepting the hand the Führer held out to them), and by fighting at his side against Bolshevism. The voice of Germany’s leader, who was calling more and more desperately for them to ‘save Europe’, sometimes troubled them.
 

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Editor’s Note: Being Bolshevism and American capitalism two branches of the same trunk, we can see why neo-Marxism has now conquered the US; and capitalism, China. Savitri continues:
 

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And yet… it was not in the ranks of the Legion of French Volunteers or any similar organisation that they were finally found, but in those of the members of some ‘Resistance’, anti-German no doubt, but also and inevitably anti-Aryan. Their subconscious had warned them that by following the wisest political course of action they would have betrayed what was more important to them than politics: their world of values. He had told them what the post-war authors of the Resistance were soon to repeat over and over again for a quarter of a century (and who knows how much longer?): namely that Hitlerism, or Aryan racism in its modern form, is, like all racism based on the idea of a natural elite (not arbitrarily chosen by some all-too-human god), the negation of man.

Consequently, that this Europe which the Führer invited them to forge with him—the one which would eventually emerge from our victory—was not the one they wanted to preserve. And the atheistic Bolshevism, or simply the Bolshevism opposed to free enterprise and honest private property (of which our propaganda tried to frighten us) seemed to them, on balance, less frightening than the spirit of our doctrine.

But there is more. Very few of those who sincerely believed themselves to be our allies, and who fought and died with our people in the struggle against anti-Aryan values, understood the true meaning of the Führer’s message; of the call of the eternal Hero ‘against Time’, who returns from age to age, when all seems lost, to reaffirm the ideal of integral perfection that the unthinkable Golden Age of our Cycle lived. Most of the combatants of the Legion of French Volunteers were Christians who believed they were fighting for the accepted values of Western Christian civilisation. Robert Brasillach was profoundly Christian, and he realised that we were—and are—‘a Church’, and that this Church can only be the rival to the one that conquered Europe from the 4th to the 12th century.

Moreover, this type of man apparently preferred Italian, and especially Spanish, Fascism to German National Socialism. It was the social side of both—the comradeship, the mutual aid, the effective solidarity between people of the same country, independently of any philosophy— that attracted him. The enthusiasm which this national fraternity inspired in him made him close his eyes to the pagan character of Hitlerism. Even among us—the Germans who had followed the swastika banner from the beginning of the Movement—very few understood what was happening, not politically, but in terms of values.
 

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Editor’s Note: The transvaluation of all values advocated by Nietzsche!

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Few realised that a spiritual revolution—a negation of the anthropocentric values that had been accepted by almost everyone without question for centuries, and a return to the natural, cosmic values of a forgotten civilisation—was taking place before their eyes.

Some of them realised this, felt cheated in their early hopes, and left the Movement, like Hermann Rauschning, or betrayed it (with the tragic consequences that we know). Others—a minority—welcomed, and still do, in this revolution in values, precisely that to which they themselves had, more or less consciously, always aspired. Those are the rock on which the Hitler Church is built.

It will last if they last, that is, if they can pass on their blood and faith to an uninterrupted succession of Aryan generations, until the end of this Cycle.

Categories
Enlightenment Hinduism Marxism Savitri Devi Souvenirs et réflexions d'une aryenne (book)

Reflections of an Aryan woman, 17

No doubt all men have something in common, if only the upright posture and articulate language, which other living species do not possess. Every species is characterised by something which all its members have in common, and which the members of other species lack. The flexibility and purr of felines are traits that no other species can claim. We do not dispute that all human races have several features in common, simply because they are human. What we do dispute is that these common traits are more worthy of our attention than are the enormous differences between races (and often between human individuals of the same race), and the features that all living things, including plants, have in common.

In our eyes a Negro or a Jew, or a Levantine without a well-defined race, has neither the same duties nor the same rights as a pure Aryan. They are different; they belong to worlds which, whatever their points of contact may be on the material plane, remain alien to each other. They are different by nature—biologically Others. The acquisition of a ‘common culture’ cannot bring them together, except superficially and artificially, because ‘culture’ is nothing if it has no deep roots in nature.

Our point of view is not new. Already the Laws of Manu assigned to the Brahmin and the Soudra—and the people of each caste—different duties and rights, and very different penalties to the possible murderers of members of different castes. Caste is—and was in ancient India—linked to race. (It is called varna, which means ‘colour’, and also jat, race). Less far from us in time, and in this Europe where the contrasts between races have never been so extreme, the legislation of the Merovingian Franks, like that of the Ostrogoths of Italy, and the other Germans established in conquered countries, provided for the murder of a man of the Nordic race—of a German—penalties out of proportion to those incurred by the murderer of a Gallo-Roman or an Italian, especially if the latter was of servile condition.

No idea that is justified by healthy racism is new.

On the other hand, we do not understand this priority given to ‘man’, whoever he may be, over any subject of another living species, for the sole reason that ‘he is a man’. It is all very well for the followers of man-centred religions to believe in this priority and to take it into account in all the steps of their daily life. For them, this is the object of an article of faith, the logical consequence of a dogma. And faith cannot be discussed.

But that so many thinkers and so many people who, like them, do not belong to any church, who even fight against any so-called revealed religion, have exactly the same attitude and find the last of the human waste more worthy of concern than the healthiest and most beautiful of beasts (or plants); that they deny us the ‘right’ not only to kill without suffering, but even to sterilise defective human beings, when the life of a healthy and strong animal doesn’t count in their eyes, and that they will, without remorse, cut down a beautiful tree whose presence ‘bothers them’, is what shocks us deeply; what revolts us.

All these self-styled independent minds, all these ‘free’ thinkers, are, just as the believers of the man-centred religions and so-called human ‘dignity’, slaves of the prejudices that the West and a large part of the East. They have inherited it from Judaism. If they have rejected the dogmas and mythology of anthropocentric religions, they have retained their values in their entirety. This is as true of the eighteenth-century Deists as it is of our atheistic Communists. [Editor’s Note: The POV of this site about ‘neochristianity’ in a few words! Savitri continues:]

Although most anti-Communist Christians indignantly reject the idea, there is a profound parallelism between Christianity and Marxism. Both are originally Jewish products. Both have received the imprint of a more or less decadent Aryan thought: that of the subtle Hellenistic philosophy, overloaded with allegories and ready to accept the most unexpected syncretisms, in the case of the former—and of that ideology not of the true scientific spirit, which guards against error, but of what I will call ‘scientism’: the propensity to replace faith in traditional ideas by faith that is presented in the name of ‘Science’, in the case of the latter.

And above all, both are centred on the same values: on the cult of man, as the only being created ‘in the image and likeness’ of the god of the Jews, or simply as a being of the same species as the Marxist who glorifies him. The practical result of anthropo-centrism is the same, whatever its source.

Categories
Immanuel Kant Jean-Jacques Rousseau Savitri Devi Souvenirs et réflexions d'une aryenne (book)

Reflections of an Aryan woman, 16

But Kant—so independent and so strong in the field of criticism of knowledge—had a moral teacher, apart from the Christian teaching of his family: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose influence was still being felt throughout Europe at that time.

I can hardly imagine two men more different from each other than Rousseau, the perpetual wanderer, whose life was somewhat disordered, to say the least, and the meticulous Herr Professor Immanuel Kant, whose days and years were all alike, passing according to a rigorous schedule where there was not the slightest room for the unexpected or the whimsical.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau never misses an opportunity in his works to exalt ‘reason’ as well as ‘virtue’. But he seems to have had no rules of conduct other than his fantasy, or his impulses, with the result that the story of his life gives an impression of inconsistency, not to say imbalance. A poet rather than a thinker, he dreamed his existence; he did not live it—and especially not according to fixed principles.

The love he professed, whenever he could—on paper—for children, didn’t prevent him from putting his five children, one after the other, in the Assistance Publique on the pretext that the woman who had given them to him, Thérèse Levasseur, would have been incapable of bringing them up in the spirit he would have liked. And this abandonment, repeated five times, didn’t prevent him from writing a book about the education of children, and—what is worse—didn’t prevent the public from taking him seriously! He was taken seriously because, while believing himself to be highly original, he reflected the trends of his time, above all the revolt of the individual against Tradition in the name of ‘reason’.

It is not surprising that the enemy spirits of the visible traditional authorities, that is to say of kings and the clergy, should have chosen him enthusiastically as their guide, and placed the French Revolution, which they were organising, under his sign. It seems, at first sight, less natural that Kant should have been so strongly influenced by him.

But Kant was a man of his time, a time when Rousseau had seduced the European intelligentsia, partly by his poetic prose and paradoxes, partly by certain clichés, which come up everywhere in his work: the words ‘reason’, ‘conscience’ and ‘virtue’. It was these clichés that gave Kant’s limited imagination the opportunity for all the flight of which he was capable, and that gave the German philosopher the form of his morality.

The content of this morality—as indeed that of Rousseau himself and all the ‘philosophers’ of the 18th century and, before them, that of Descartes, the true spiritual father of the French Revolution—is drawn from the old foundation of Christian ethics, centred on the dogma of the ‘dignity’ of man, the only being created ‘in the image of God’, out of respect for this privileged being [red by Editor].

In other words, with meticulous honesty and quite Prussian application and perseverance, Kant tried to establish as a system the common humanitarian morality in Europe, because of Christian morality, which Rousseau had glorified in sentimental effusions: that morality which Nietzsche was one day to have the honour of demolishing with his pen, and which we were later destined to negate, by action.

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Editor’s note: By ‘later’ she probably meant during the Third Reich. Unlike the Nazis, American white nationalists continue to subscribe to Christian ethics, including atheists. Incidentally, why ‘Rousseau’s babble was utter nonsense’, as Revilo Oliver wrote, can be seen: here.

Does my audience begin to tell the difference between a common white nationalist and a priestess (or priest) of the 14 words?

Categories
Immanuel Kant Savitri Devi Souvenirs et réflexions d'une aryenne (book) Universalism

Reflections of an Aryan woman, 15

Kant and friends on table

Is there such a thing as objectivity in the field of values? [Editor’s note: formally known as ‘axiology’]. To this question I answer yes. There is something independent of the ‘taste’ of each art critic, which makes a masterpiece of painting, sculpture or poetry a masterpiece for all time. Behind every perfect creation—and not only in the field of art proper—there are secret correspondences, a whole network of ‘proportions’ which themselves ‘recall’ unknown but prescient cosmic equivalences. It is these elements that link the work to the eternal—in other words, that give it its objective value.

On the other hand, there is no universal scale of preferences. Even if one could penetrate the mystery of the structure of eternal creations, which are human only in name because the author has effaced himself before the Force (the ancients would have said: ‘the God’), who for a moment possessed him, and acted through it and by it—if one could, say, explain in clear sentences like those of mathematicians, why such creations are eternal, one could never force everyone to prefer the eternal to the temporary; to find a work which reflects something of the harmony of the cosmos, more pleasant, more satisfying than another, which reflects anything.

There is good and bad taste. And there are moral consciences that are more or less similar to those of a man with an objective scale of values. But there is no more universal consciousness than there is universal taste. There is no such thing, and there can be no such thing, for the simple reason that the aspirations of men are different, once they have passed the level of the most elementary needs. (And even these needs are more or less pressing, depending on the individual. Some people find life bearable, even beautiful, without comforts, pleasures or affections, the lack of which would make other people frankly unhappy.)

Different aspirations mean different preferences. Different preferences mean different reactions to the same events, different decisions in the face of the same dilemmas, and therefore different ways of organising lives that might otherwise have been similar. Never forget the diversity of human beings, even within the same race, let alone from one race to another. How can people who are so different from each other have ‘the same rights and the same duties’?

There is no more universal duty than there is universal consciousness. Or, if we absolutely want to find a formula that is true for all, we must say that the duty of every man—indeed, of every living being—is to be to the end, in his visible or secret manifestations, what he is in his deepest nature; to never betray himself.

But deep natures differ. Hence, despite everything, the diversity of duties, as well as of rights, and the inevitable conflict, on the level of facts, between those who have opposite duties. The Bhagawad-Gîta says: ‘Focus on fulfilling your duty (svadharma). The duty of another involves (for you) many dangers’.

And what, in practice, will decide the outcome of the conflict between people with opposing duties? Force. I can only think of it. If I don’t have it, I have to put up with the presence in the world of institutions that I consider criminal, given my own scale of values. I can hate them. I cannot remove them with the stroke of a pen, as I would if I had the power. And even those who have power can not—insofar as they need the collaboration of some men, if not of a majority, precisely to maintain the position they have conquered. But I shall speak to you later about force, the condition of any visible and sudden change, that is to say of any victorious revolution, on the material plane.

I will first tell you a few words about the fathers of ‘universal consciousness’ and the idea that derives from it: the idea of a ‘duty’ that would be the same for all. I will recall the names of only a few of them who, in fields other than morality, are distinguished by some preeminence: by the firmness of their thought or the beauty of their prose.

First, there is Immanuel Kant, to whom we must be infinitely grateful for having drawn the line between scientific knowledge and metaphysical speculation; between what we know, or what we can know, and what we can only speak about arbitrarily, knowing nothing about it, or not at all, the direct vision we have of it is incommunicable. The whole part of Kant’s work that deals with the subordination of thought to the categories of space and time, and with the impossibility of going beyond the sphere of ‘phenomena’ with our conceptual intelligence, is of exemplary solidity.

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Editor’s Note: Infinitely grateful? Exemplary solidity? Lol! As we saw in my previous post, ‘On Shelob’s lair’, on this issue Savitri errs. But she continues:

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The recipes given by the thinker to help every man discover ‘the duty’, which he believes to be the same for all, are less worthy of credence, precisely because they do not fall within the scope of what, according to Kant’s deductions, makes up the essence of the scientific mind.

We are here in the realm of values—not of ‘facts’, not of ‘phenomena’. The only ‘fact’ that could be noted in this connection is the diversity of value scales. And Kant takes no account of this. He believes he bases his notion of ‘duty’ on that of ‘reason’. And since reason is ‘universal’, the laws of discursive thought being so—two and two make four for the last of the Negroes, as well as for one of us—it seems that duty must be too.

Kant does not realise, as his values seem indisputable to him, that it is not ‘reason’ at all, but his austere Christian upbringing—pietistic, to be more precise—which dictated them to him; that he owes them, not to his ability to draw conclusions from given premises—an ability which he shares with all sane men, and perhaps with the higher animals—but to his spontaneous submission to the influence of the moral environment in which he was brought up. He forgets—and how many have forgotten before and after him, and still do!—that reason is powerless to set ends; to establish orders of preference; that, in the domain of values, its role is limited to highlighting the logical—or practical—link between a given end and the means that lead to its realisation.

Reason can tell an individual what his ‘duty’ will be in a specific circumstance if, for example, he loves all men, or better still, all living beings. Reason cannot force him to love them, if he doesn’t feel attracted to them. It can suggest to him what to do, or not do, if he wants to contribute to ‘world peace’. It cannot force him to want peace. And if he does not want it, if he finds it demoralising or simply boring, it will suggest to him, with equal logic, an entirely different course of action—just as it will direct the intelligent misanthrope to an entirely different course of action from that which it would command the philanthropist. It will always command each of those who think, the action that corresponds to the promotion of what he really loves, and deeply wants. How could it inspire duties, identical in content, to individuals who love different, even incompatible ideals, and who each want the revolution that their ideal implies? Or to individuals who love only people, and to others who love only ideas?

‘Always act’, says Kant, ‘as if the principle of your action could be set up as a universal law’.

How can this ‘rule’ be applied both to the conduct of one who, loving only his family and friends, far from sacrificing them to any idea whatsoever, will feel that it is ‘his duty’ to protect them at all costs, and that of the militant who, loving only a cause which goes beyond him, considers that it would be ‘his duty’, if necessary, to sacrifice him and his recent collaborators (as soon as he feels them weakening in terms of orthodoxy and becoming dangerous), and a fortiori his family, alien to the holy ideology, as soon as he sees one of its members, whoever he may be, making a pact with the hostile forces?

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Editor’s note: Remember Savitri’s words in my Friday’s post: ‘During the war, my mother—although 75 years old in 1940, 80 in 1945—joined the resistance movement in France. I did not know it naturally. There was no communication between Calcutta and Europe. She told me in 1946, when I visited her, and said also that if I had been present in France in 1944 and had actively worked against the resistance (as I then surely would have), she would have handed me over to the resistance’.
 

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And what about the rule: ‘Always act in such a way that you take the human person as an end, never as a means’? In other words: ‘Never use a man’. And why not?—especially if, by using him, I am working in the interest of a Cause that is much greater than him, for example, the cause of Life, or the human elite (the elite of every living species) or simply that of a particular people, if this one has a more than human historical mission?

Man unscrupulously exploits the animal and the tree in favour of what he believes to be his own interest. And Kant apparently finds no fault with this. Why should we not exploit man—the ‘human person’ whose so-called ‘value’ we have been hearing about more than ever for the past quarter-century—in the interest of Life itself? What prevents us from doing so, if we do not have—like Immanuel Kant and so many others; like most people born and raised in a Christian (or Islamic, or Jewish, or simply ‘secular’) civilisation—a scale of values centred around the sacrosanct two-legged mammal?

Of myself, if I love ‘all men’, I won’t use any of them; I won’t take any of them ‘as a means’, for an end which is not him. You don’t exploit what you really love. This is a psychological law.

But no ‘reason’ can force me to ‘love all men’—any more than it can force most men to love all animals. Kant’s ‘reason’ ordered him not to exploit any human being, not because this is a universal commandment, but because he loved all men, like the good Christian he was. I, who do not love them all, do not feel that this ‘duty’ concerns me. It is not my duty. I refuse to submit to it. And if a man who finds the exploitation of animals and trees—and what exploitation!—quite natural, dares to come and preach me about ‘respect for the human person’, I would brutally send him to mind his own business.

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Editor’s Note: This is more than fundamental. If there is something that my work From Jesus to Hitler teaches, it is that we must stop loving the vast majority of humans to save the nymphs of the sidebar and the animals under the human yoke.

Categories
Newspeak Savitri Devi Souvenirs et réflexions d'une aryenne (book)

Reflections of an Aryan woman, 14

The more rigorous a reasoning is, impeccable from the purely logical point of view, the more its conclusion is false if the basic judgement from which it starts—the one expressed by its major premise, in the case of a simple syllogism—is itself false. This is clear. If I declare that ‘All men are saints’ and then I notice that the Marquis de Sade and all known and unknown sexual perverts, and all animal or child torturers, were or are men, I am forced to conclude that all these people were or are saints: an assertion whose absurdity is obvious.

Perfect logic only leads to a true judgement if it is applied based on major premises that are themselves true. The adjectives by which we characterise such rigour in the sequence of judgements depend on one’s attitude towards the judgement from which it starts. If one accepts it, one speaks of an irreproachable or admirable logic. If one rejects it vehemently, as Mr Grassot rejected the basic propositions of Aryan racism, in other words Hitlerism, one will speak of ‘appalling logic’. This does not matter, since judgements remain true or false, regardless of the reception, always subjective, that is given to them.

Now, what is a true judgment?

Any judgement expresses a relationship between two states of fact, between two possibilities, or between a state of affairs (and all psychological states fall under this category) and a possibility. If I say, for example, ‘The weather is fine’, I am relating a whole set of sensations that I am currently experiencing to the presence of the sun in the visible sky. If I say: ‘The sum of angles of a triangle equals the straight angle’ I am stating that, if a polygon has the characteristics which, mathematically, define the triangle, the sum of its angles will be, and can only be, equal to the straight angle; that there is a necessary relationship between the very definition of ‘triangle’, and the property to which I have alluded. If I say: ‘It is better to lose your life than to fail in honour’, I make a connection—no less necessary in principle—between my psychology and a possible situation in which I would have to choose either to live dishonoured, or to die saving honour.

The judgement is true if the relationship it expresses exists; otherwise, it is false. This is clear in the case of judgements—called ‘categorical’—which posit a relationship between two facts. If I say in broad daylight that ‘it is dark’, it is quite certain that there is no longer any connection between what my senses experience and what I say; the judgment is therefore false. If I say: ‘The sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to five angles’ I am saying an absurdity, because the connection I’m making here between the definition of the triangle and a property I attribute to it does not exist; the assertion contradicts the judgement that defines the triangle. (Even in non-Euclidean space with positive curvature, where the sum of the angles of a triangle ‘exceeds’ two right angles, that sum does not reach ‘five angles’.)

In the case of categorical judgements, which express a relation between two facts, as in the case of those perfect hypothetical judgements which are the theorems of mathematics, the ‘truth’ or ‘falsity’ are evident. No one will certainly accept what I am saying if I declare in broad daylight that ‘it is night’ for every healthy eye sensitive to light. As for mathematical theorems, they can all be proved, provided that one accepts, in the case of geometrical theorems, the postulates that define the particular space they concern.

The only judgements people argue about, until they go to war because of them, are value judgements: those which presuppose, in whoever emits them, a hierarchy of preferences. It is, in fact, always in the name of such hierarchy that we grasp a relation between a fact (or a state of mind) and a ‘possibility’ (future, or else conceived retrospectively, as what might have been). Facts can give rise to heated discussions, no doubt, but devoid of passion, and especially hatred.
 

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Editor’s Note: No longer in our time! when elemental facts—like saying that boys are boys and girls are girls; or that there are no grandmasters in chess tournaments who are black—can lead to such hatred that we may lose our jobs. To call ‘a spade a spade’ is now considered racist.

Some bien pensant censors are even suggesting that the expression ‘To call a spade a spade’ should be retired from modern usage! A newspeaker said: ‘Rather than taking the chance of unintentionally offending someone or of being misunderstood, it is best to relinquish the old innocuous proverbial expression all together’ (see: here).
 

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One does not really quarrel with one’s adversaries and, if one has the power to do so, one only cracks down on them, unless one considers the ‘facts’, which are the subject of the discussion, to be directly or indirectly linked to values that we love.

The Church has been hostile to those who maintained that our Earth is round and that it is not the centre of the solar system, insofar as the belief in these facts—in case they were proven and therefore universally accepted—negate not only of the letter of the Scriptures but, above all, Christian anthropocentrism. The biological facts which form the basis of all intelligent racism are denied by organisations such as UNESCO, which pride themselves on ‘culture’. They do it only because these organisations see, in a widespread acceptance of this premise, the threat of a resurgence of Aryan racism, which they detest.