We are accused of ‘denying man’ by placing the last of the healthy animals, the smallest healthy plant—the last of the dandelions, perfect on its level—above the human waste, the mentally retarded, let alone the idiot, and the animal or plant aristocracy, above the Untermensch, even the apparently ‘normal’; the raceless and characterless human being, smug and cowardly; petty; incapable of thinking for himself, and essentially selfish.
We are reproached for advocating the physical suppression of the demented, the profoundly retarded, the idiots and monsters who, at taxpayers’ expense, clutter up the asylums of ‘civilised’ countries, and the sterilisation of people afflicted with dangerous heredity.
We are reproached, perhaps more than anything else, for having allowed German physiologists and doctors to experiment on human enemies of the Reich, taken from the concentration camps, even though they were forbidden to use animals; in other words, for having shown more consideration for the animal than for the actual or even potential ideological enemy. Above all, this is what most of our adversaries, stuffed with ‘denazifying’ propaganda for more than twenty-five years, have in mind when they declare that we ‘deny man’.
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Editor’s Note: Anti-Nazi chutzpa has no limits. The so-called Ringworm affair was a scandal involving approximately twenty thousand immigrated Jews who were mistreated between 1948 and 1960 with ionizing radiation on the head and neck area in Israel.
The idea was to poison and eventually dispatch Sephardic children, considered inferior by the Ashkenazi caste at the founding of their New Jerusalem. Israeli activists in our century consider the X-rays that these children suffered to the point of sterilisation as the most prominent example of injustices in the 1950s. But I don’t even blame them: I blame an astronomically imbecile US whose evangelicals believe they are the chosen people.
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The first step would be to agree on the connotation (and hence the denotation) of this concept of ‘man’, of which so much is made. It is, apparently, the connotation they give it that interests our detractors the most. They call ‘man’ any upright primate capable of articulate speech, to whom they automatically attribute ‘reason’ and, if they are Christians, an immortal soul created in the image of god. But it is the upright posture and the articulate language, traits that are obvious, that inform these friends of man, about the (less obvious) presence of other characteristics. What they do with all living things that exhibit these two distinctive features—what am I saying?—even of those who are completely deprived of them but who possess the human form… because our adversaries place the idiot above the most beautiful of beasts!
Here we see, once again, how true it is that the denotation of a concept is in inverse proportion to its connotation. What gives our opponents the persistent impression that we ‘deny man’ is that we are much more demanding than they are concerning the connotation of this term, and that, consequently, its denotation, in our eyes, narrows accordingly.
It is not enough for us to grant a primate the name of man, and the respect that is attached to it in cultivated languages, that this creature stands preferably on its hind legs, and is capable of emitting articulated sounds that have, for it and others, a meaning. It is not enough for us, all the more so, that it should have, without even presenting these two characters, a silhouette vaguely similar to that of one of us.
We want him to possess that minimum of intelligence which will enable him to think for himself, and that minimum of nobility will make him incapable of certain reactions to obstacles, inaccessible to certain ‘temptations’, impervious to certain debasing influences, and a fortiori incapable of petty or cowardly acts, ugly acts. We do want, if not to ‘love’, at least to respect ‘all men’ in the same way as we respect all beautiful living beings, animals and plants, in which we feel more or less attenuated reflections of the divine, the eternal.
But for this to happen they must be ‘men’ in the strongest sense of the word. We are ready to respect, as individuals, even the people, ideological adversaries, even racial enemies, whom we fought collectively yesterday, and whom we will fight again tomorrow—to respect them if, taken separately, they respond to what we expect of ‘man’: if they combine, with a non-enslaved intelligence, the qualities of character which (statistically) distinguish the races I call superior—and first of all, of course, our Aryan race and even the exceptionally noble individual from the statistically inferior races.
This will not prevent us from fighting them, if they are ideologically dangerous; all the more dangerous because they have more intrinsic value. In other words, we respect as ‘men’ those who, if they are not already ideologically ours, would be worthy of becoming so in our eyes.