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Category: ‘Hitler’ (book by Brendan Simms)

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'Hitler' (book by Brendan Simms)

Hitler, 37

For the first eighteen months or so after his political emergence in 1919, Hitler seems to have conceived of the revival of Germany as a long-term process, in which he would play a supporting role, and which he might not live to witness himself. Even after his shift from Trommler to Fuhrer in mid 1921, he advocated a steady process of ideological transformation rather than an insurrectionary takeover. During this period Hitler was an attentiste, waiting for his propaganda and the march of events to turn the German population in his direction. ‘People are still far too well off,’ he remarked to Hanfstaengl, ‘only when things are really bad will they flock to us.’

In the second half of 1922, however, in the first of many temporal shifts in Hitler’s career, he began to envisage a much shorter timeline. A new urgency crept into his rhetoric and actions; evolutionary languor gave way to revolutionary fervour. Germany, he argued, needed a ‘dictator’, that is, ‘a man who if necessary can go over blood and corpses’. His regime ‘could then be replaced by a form of government similar to that of the Lord Protector’, which in turn could be followed by a monarchy. This recourse to English history, which gives a sense of Hitler’s range of historical reference, was a clever pitch for conservative backing for a coup which would give him dictatorial power, but held out the prospect of an evolution via a German Cromwell and a General Monk to the restoration of the monarchy. Driving this process was Hitler’s growing conviction not only that he alone could save the country, but that a perfect storm of domestic challenges and external threats made it imperative that he do so soon. Time was speeding up. Germany was out of joint, and Hitler was more and more convinced that only he could put things right.

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'Hitler' (book by Brendan Simms)

Hitler, 36

There was an important shift in Hitler’s spatial thinking around 1922, however. He came to see eastward expansion as the solution. ‘In terms of foreign policy,’ Hitler said in December 1922, ‘Germany should prepare for a purely continental policy’ and ‘avoid violating British interests’. ‘One should try to destroy Russia with the help of Britain,’ he continued. ‘Russia,’ Hitler went on, ‘would provide sufficient soil for German settlers and a wide area of activity for German industry.’ Though he had not yet alighted on the phrase Lebensraum, a further major plank of Hitler’s thinking, the need for territorial enlargement to the east in order to secure the food supply of the German people and staunch the haemorrhage of emigration, was now in place. This was a policy primarily driven by fear and emulation of Anglo-America rather than anxiety about eastern communism or a desire to eliminate the Jews living there…

Hitler had said much less than one might expect about the Soviet Union, and his fear of communism was dwarfed by that of capitalism. Even more remarkably, though there were some routine scatter-gun imprecations against the Poles in specific contexts to do with disputed territories in the east, he had shown no signs of a blanket hostility towards Slavs in general or the Russian people in particular. What later became the Lebensraum conception was visible, but only in outline. His intellectual formation was not yet complete.

His authority in the party, by contrast, was now well established.

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'Hitler' (book by Brendan Simms)

Hitler, 35

Hitler sometimes liked to say that the hard part was reviving Germany domestically; thereafter, dealing with her foreign enemies would be easy. In reality, he was under no illusions.

A nationalist revival would make Germany ‘capable of making an alliance’ again, but this was only a necessary, not a sufficient condition to secure her position in the world. That would require actual allies. Temperamentally, Hitler was not averse to a Russian alliance, preferably without the communists, but if necessary with them. ‘We must try to connect to the national [and] anti-Semitic Russia,’ he demanded, ‘not to the Soviets.’

That said, in August 1920, nineteen years before the Hitler-­Stalin Pact, he remarked that he would ‘ally not only with Bolshevism but even with the devil in order to move against France and Britain’. He feared, however, that this attempt to break free through a Russo-German pact would simply be crushed by the British and French. A British alliance was far more desirable, if that country could be kept out of the hands of the Jews.

Instead, Hitler looked further afield, at least conceptually. He hoped that he could confront the forces of international financial capitalism with the united front of the ‘International of the productive’, to mobilize ‘voices for the defence of the rights of the productive peoples’. Germany would spearhead this effort, by purifying itself first. Hitler demanded no less than a pan-Aryan international anti-Semitic front. Inverting the Communist Manifesto’s famous slogan, he announced: ‘not proletarians of all countries unite, but anti-Semites of all countries unite!” Aryans and anti-Semites of all peoples,’ he elaborated, ‘unite to fight against the Jewish race of exploiters and oppressors of all peoples.’ He repeated these injunctions in various forms on many occasions throughout the early 1920s, and indeed beyond. Though Hitler never suggested that Nazism was ‘for export’, he was clear from the beginning that his programme required a high degree of international cooperation among international anti-Semites to compensate for Germany’s weakness.

In the long run he believed that none of this would make any difference unless Germany solved the question of ‘space’.

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'Hitler' (book by Brendan Simms) Benito Mussolini

Hitler, 34

[Hitler] enthused about Italy, where Mussolini and his fascists seized power in late October 1922 through his iconic ‘March on Rome’. Shortly after, Hitler remarked coyly: ‘one calls us German fascists’, adding that he did not want to go into ‘whether his comparison is true’. He was soon more forthright, demanding ‘the establishment of a national government in Germany on the fascist model’. A year later, he told an interviewer from the Daily Mail that ‘If a German Mussolini is given to Germany, people would fall down on their knees and worship him more than Mussolini has ever been worshipped.’

Hitler now broke with the mainstream nationalist and revisionist consensus, which demanded that Italy surrender German-speaking South Tyrol. He argued that any new ‘national government’ would only be able to establish itself if it secured some major victories. These would be hard to achieve on the economic front, Hitler believed, and so the best bet was the incorporation (Anschluss) of Austria. This would require not only British but Italian approval. Moreover, Germany should align itself more generally with Mussolini’s Italy, ‘which has experienced its national rebirth and has a great future’. For both of these reasons, he condemned the ‘palaver’ about South Tyrol of the other nationalists in the strongest terms, emphasizing that ‘there are no sentiments in politics, only the cool calculation of interest’.

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'Hitler' (book by Brendan Simms) French Revolution Savitri Devi

Hitler, 33

Le Serment du Jeu de paume by Jacques-Louis David (c. 1791), depicting the Tennis Court Oath.

More immediately relevant to Germany’s predicament were the dramatic recent examples of national revival, where peoples had bounced back from decline or catastrophic defeat. Perhaps surprisingly, Hitler was open to inspiration from France. ‘The French Revolution was national and constructive,’ he argued, ‘whereas the German one wanted to be international and to destroy everything.’ Hitler took a similarly positive view of later French radicalism. ‘When France collapsed at Sedan,’ he wrote, ‘one made a revolution to rescue the sinking tricolour!’ ‘The war was waged with new energy,’ he continued, and ‘the will to defend the state created the French Republic in 1870’, thus restoring ‘French national honour’. This shows that Hitler’s fundamental objection was not to the ‘ideas of 1789’, which he hardly ever mentioned. His real trauma—to which we will return later—was the fragmentation of Germany beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

The way I quote from Brendan Simms’ book may seem strange. I read through it and, when I come across a passage that requires comment, I pause and comment on it here.

The passage above, for example, strikes me as remarkable because it shows us a young Adolf who was unaware that the egalitarian ideas of 1789 were already symptomatic of a cancer in which Christian ethics were secularised to be metastasised in subsequent centuries. Recall that the French had been inspired by the American Revolutionary War of 1775-1783 and that in turn these American ideals were inspired by Protestant ethics (those who haven’t read Tom Holland’s Dominion should at least read our excerpts now). The young Hitler, naturally, didn’t have all this in mind. He was first and foremost a politician, not exactly a philosopher and certainly not, to use my metaphor, a visionary who sees the remote past in a cave north of the Wall (for example, to realise that Protestantism is behind today’s mass psychosis if we psychoanalyse the West from the remote past).

One of the things that distinguishes me compared to the American organisation founded by George Lincoln Rockwell is that, unlike the Commander, I am convinced that National Socialism must be understood as an organism in continuous development. And NS is developing even in the darkest age of the West in which Savitri Devi used the metaphor of ‘gold in a furnace’, in the sense that all the chaff burns in the burning furnace and only the element gold, which being a chemical element cannot burn there, will survive it.

Although Savitri came up with this metaphor at a time when the denazification of Germany was in full swing, in our time it could be said that the fire of that furnace has already burnt up all the chaff, except for people like us who continue to believe in Uncle Adolf’s ideals.

But Uncle Adolf couldn’t have known what we now know! His untimely death in 1945 prevented him from realising the levels of anti-white delirium to which the white man would fall after the decades-long process of trying to demonise NS throughout the West!

A mature NS man has to take into account the darkest hour for the white man and explain it. One oblique way to do this is to realise that American white nationalism has gone astray. It is at a dead end, as I said this morning in this thread.

It is high time to be humble; to retrace our steps from that alley, and return to the main avenue leading us to a National Socialism of the 21st and 22nd centuries. But I don’t see that humility anywhere on the racial right…

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'Hitler' (book by Brendan Simms)

Hitler, 32

Hitler was also increasingly interested in the United States, which he came to regard as the repository of (in his view) all the best European racial elements, including the supposedly better sort of Germans. He remarked that, unlike Germany, which admitted swarms of eastern Jews, ‘yellow people are not allowed to settle in America’. In August 1922 he was introduced to Kurt Lüdecke, who had spent some time on business in the United States and whom Hitler would later send as an emissary across the Atlantic. In the middle of that month, Rudolf Hess wrote on Hitler’s behalf to the legendary automobile manufacturer, and fervent anti-Semite, Henry Ford for support. Moreover, Anglo-America was also becoming interested in Hitler. He had appeared on the radar of the British Foreign Office as early as 1920, and by later 1922 he was firmly established in their minds as a figure to be reckoned with, but there was no attempt to make contact with him.

By contrast, the United States embassy, probably influenced by Mussolini’s coup in Italy, decided to take a closer look at this rising politician. In November 1922, the US assistant military attaché to Germany, Captain Truman Smith, came down from Berlin and met with Hitler on 20 November. Hitler argued that he was America’s best chance of keeping the Bolsheviks out of Germany, condemned monarchy as ‘an absurdity’, claimed that ‘dictatorship’ was the only answer, denied any plans for a war against France and railed against ‘the present abuse of capital’. To be sure, these were all things that the American wanted to hear—apart from the remarks on capitalism—but they also represented Hitler’s genuine views. One way or the other, the two men—both Wagnerians—seem to have hit it off. A ‘marvelous demagogue’, Smith wrote a few days later. ‘I have rarely listened to such a logical and fanatical man. His powers over the mob must be immense.’

It was Smith who put Hitler in touch with Ernst ‘Putzi’ Hanfstaengl immediately after their meeting. Hanfstaengl epitomized the relationship between Germany and the United States, which was to play such a central role in Hitler’s thinking and policy over the next twenty years or so. Hanfstaengl’s maternal grandfather, Wilhelm Heine, had emigrated to America as a liberal refugee from the failed 1848 revolution. He reached the rank of brigadier-general in the Union Army and served as a pallbearer at Lincoln’s funeral. Hanfstaengl’s father owned a large art business in Munich. Hanfstaengl himself was partly brought up in the United States, where he attended Harvard University and was personally acquainted with the young Franklin Delano Roosevelt. From 1912, he had run the New York branch of his father’s business. Hanfstaengl spent the war—which killed a brother fighting on the German side—in America. The business was ruined by the American entry into the conflict and the associated ‘Trading with the Enemy Act’. Hanfstaengl became an enemy alien: the insider had become an outsider.

Over the next year, Hanfstaengl and Hitler were in almost daily contact. Hanfstaengl impressed upon Hitler not only the immense industrial and demographic power of the United States, but the fact that every German had a close relative there or in some other part of the world, something of which Hitler was already well aware. He argued that the party needed to reach out to the world through a coordinated foreign press policy. Hanfstaengl now became effectively the NSDAP’s external media liaison officer. He also entertained Hitler with his piano, playing from a repertoire which included not only Wagner but Harvard football marches. Captain Mayr later recalled the ‘American methods of salesmanship’ used to push out the Nazi message. The United States thus increasingly became a model as well as a rival.

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'Hitler' (book by Brendan Simms) England

Hitler, 31

If Hitler saw Germany’s salvation in a domestic revival, this did not make him blind towards foreign models. Indeed, the international context within which all his thinking was embedded made him particularly interested in the strength of rival powers. Hitler’s principal model here was Britain. ‘The British,’ he admitted, ‘are entitled to feel proud as a people.’ Britain’s vitality was based on the ‘extraordinary brilliance’ of her population. They had the ‘British national sentiment which our people lacks so much’ and they had maintained ‘racial purity in the colonies’, by which he meant the general absence of intermarriage between settlers and colonial administrators and the native population .Unlike the belated German national state after 1871, Britain enjoyed ‘a centuries-long political-diplomatic tradition’. Unlike Germany, she had grasped the true connection between politics and economics. ‘England has recognized the first principle of state health and existence,’ Hitler argued, ‘and has acted for centuries according to the principle that economic power must be converted into political power’ and ‘that political power must be used to protect economic life’. ‘There are things that permit the British to exercise world domination,’ he explained: ‘a highly developed sense of national identity, clear racial unity, and finally the ability to convert economic power into political power, and political power into economic power’.

There were, however, two profound contradictions in Hitler’s thinking about Britain. First of all, he dubbed the country a ‘second Jewry’, which sat ill with his otherwise respectful attitude. Hitler regarded British Jews as primarily urban, and so well integrated ‘that they appeared to be British’, which prevented the growth of anti-Semitism there. If true, then this might—in Hitler’s reasoning—account for British hostility to the Reich, but he did not explain why this uniquely high level of Jewish penetration did not render her even weaker than Germany. This paradox at the heart of Hitler’s view of the United Kingdom was never resolved.

This is interesting and I feel I must give my opinion.

My view differs not only from the liberal (at its extreme pole, the Woke) or the common conservative (at its extreme pole, the white nationalist). It also differs from Hitler, as we can see from the masthead, ‘The Wall’, in the sense that discovering that Jesus didn’t even exist, but that one hundred per cent of the NT was Jewish literary fiction, takes us further away from even the northern side of the wall, to follow the masthead’s metaphor.

I still admire Hitler as the greatest politician Western history has ever produced, but I emphasise the anti-Christian Hitler who only revealed himself to his close friends and in some after-dinner talks (see Weikart’s book): not exactly the Hitler of his public speeches or Mein Kampf.

And that is the point. As Simms reveals throughout his book, Hitler’s thinking evolved from the basically monocausalist letter to Gemlich (i.e., like the Judeo-reductionism of the contemporary white nationalist) to a realisation of international chess: something like the realist John Mearsheimer school of international relations. (Besides having written a book on the immense power of the Jewish lobby, Mearsheimer understands international chess as well as Hitler did; though Mearsheimer does so from the American POV, not the German, let alone the racial one.)

Therefore, what Simms says requires a response. This academic, of course, is neither aware of the JQ nor the CQ and, like psychologist Richard Grannon about whom I spoke yesterday, Simms doesn’t give a damn about the current British Establishment promoting the interbreeding of English roses with orcs, as I witnessed a decade ago with the ubiquitous propaganda I saw on the streets, especially on billboards.

We could say that while it is true that before WW2 the English maintained to some extent the ethnic pride that Hitler saw, after 1945 the monsters from the Christian Id so overwhelmed that pride that it engendered an ethno-suicidal mania (remember that the first orcs were invited to the island by the ethno-traitor government in the second half of the 1940s). Hitler himself, had he survived the war, would have been shocked by this new twist of the collective Aryan unconscious, and would surely have revised his early views on England.

In other words, National Socialism is not a tightly closed system but continually evolving, even in our century, thanks to the post-1945 NS bequeathed to us by Savitri Devi. Simms continues:

Secondly, there was the apparent contradiction that Britain had risen to greatness under the parliamentary system he so despised. There are grounds for believing, however, that he believed representative government suitable for the British but not for the Germans. ‘If all Germans belonged to the tribe of the Lower Saxons [that is the tribe from which the English trace much of their descent—and the only one which Benjamin Franklin had considered fully white]’, he remarked, ‘the republican state form might be the most suited’ to enabling the state ‘to weather all storms and to draw on the best elements for running the country’. ‘Because that is not the case [in Germany],’ Hitler continued, ‘the German people will always need an idol in the shape of a monarch.’ It was an early indication of Hitler’s profound anxiety about German racial fragmentation in the face not so much of Jewry, as of the globally dominant Anglo-Saxons.

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'Hitler' (book by Brendan Simms) Racial right

Hitler, 30

Hitler therefore espoused ‘socialism’, but not as the Social Democrats, the Independent Socialists or the communists knew it. ‘National’ and ‘social’, he argued, were ‘two identical terms’. ‘True socialism teaches the most extreme performance of one’s duties,’ Hitler explained, ‘real socialism in the highest form of the Volk.’ ‘Marxism is not socialism,’ he claimed, ‘I shall take socialism away from the socialists.’ This was what the words ‘worker’ and ‘socialist’ in the party’s name meant. There was ‘no room’, Hitler said, for ‘class-conscious proletarians’ in the party, just as there was no place either for a ‘class-conscious bourgeois’. He repeatedly reached out to workers. All this explains Hitler’s ambivalence towards communists, whom he regarded not only as good men led astray, but as temperamentally more congenial than the lukewarm bourgeois who clove to the safe middle path.

This is indeed interesting, for it shows the gulf between German National Socialism and American white nationalism: something George Lincoln Rockwell didn’t understand because biographies like Simms’ didn’t exist in his time. (Although this English scholar is anything but a NS sympathiser, his prose portrays the ideals of the Führer better than the crude and simplistic propaganda that was circulated in the US in Commander Rockwell’s time.)

‘I would rather be strung up in a Bolshevik Germany,’ he averred, ‘than be made blissful in a French southern Germany.’ One observer noted that Hitler ‘was courting the communists’, saying that ‘the two extremes, communists and students, should be brought together’. The centre ground, he claimed, was full of useless ‘lickspittles’ (Schleimsieder), whereas ‘the communists had fought for their ideal with weapons and only been led astray’. They only need to be led towards the ‘national cause’. With German communists, Hitler hated the sin, but loved the sinner.

Alas, any attempt to imitate German NS on the other side of the Atlantic would run into formidable difficulties. Imagine how (almost) impossible it would be to convince the racial right that, for the fourteen words, capitalism is even worse than communism and that the worship of Mammon must be transvalued to these Hitlerian ideals if the sacred words are to be fulfilled (read the last page of The Fair Race’s Darkest Hour).

To boot, a century ago Hitler was referring to a Germany composed basically of Aryans. In today’s polluted America, such a transvaluation couldn’t even be preached without openly stating that the proposed socialism is solely for the benefit of Aryans. In other words, to implement Hitler’s ideals on this side of the Atlantic the dictators of the new state would first have to become Himmlers to achieve an ethnic cleansing similar to the Pierce Diaries.

Can you see why I no longer visit the sites of the American racial right? Almost all white nationalist information sources are cleverly written to pacify whites back into the Christian and neo-Christian fold. And it all has to do with what we on this site have called slaves of our parents’ introjects. I know no one understands me on this point but my autobiographical findings, or what I have written about mental disorders (for example what I said yesterday in my postscript about narcissism), provide the key to understanding how these introjects still hold the Aryan in bondage.

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'Hitler' (book by Brendan Simms) Democracy John Stuart Mill

Hitler, 29

Hitler rejected the ‘purely economic way of looking at things’, which he called the ‘greatest mistake of German policy in the past decades’. ‘The hoped-for peaceful seizure of [world] power through our economy,’ he continued, ‘has been a failure.’ ‘Industrialization [and] the peaceful capture of the world,’ Hitler claimed, were doomed to fail, because one ‘did not consider that there can be no economic policy without the sword [and] no industrialization without power’. ‘The economy,’ he explained, ‘is only of secondary importance.’ ‘The main thing,’ Hitler stressed, ‘is national pride, [and] love of country.’ The primacy of politics in Hitler’s thinking could not have been more clearly expressed.

Calvin Coolidge was born in Massachusetts, a state founded by English Puritans. Compare the above quote with that famous phrase by Coolidge, the 30th president of the US: ‘The business of America is business’ in the sense that his was the nation of pure materialism. I remember, when I lived in California in the 1980s, the words of President Ronald Reagan, who wanted a globalised world where ‘the market reigned supreme’.

The key question, Hitler stated, was not the state form itself, but what arrangement served the German people best in its quest to escape external subjection. Here there was remarkably little shift in his views throughout the early 1920s. The issue was not, he argued in April 1920, whether Germany should be ‘a monarchy or a Republic’, but rather ‘which state form was best for the people’. ‘We need a dictator of pure genius if we want to rise again.’ ‘We do not fetishize forms of government,’ he explained in November 1921, ‘the only thing that is decisive is the spirit which sustains it. The only consideration must be the welfare of the entire German people.

Compare this with the forums of American white nationalism, which endorse democracy and in recent years have suggested that their visitors vote for this or that candidate. And the racialists on the other side of the Atlantic are no better. At the only BNP rally I have attended I spoke to a couple of senior members, who informed me that their aims were strictly democratic, not fascist.

He called for the nationalization of the entire banking and financial system, and thus the ‘breaking of interest slavery’, a term he had borrowed from Gottfried Feder. His aim here was not so much public ownership in the Marxist sense, as national control over the levers of international financial manipulation. Hitler had not yet called for the physical destruction of world Jewry, but the elimination of German Jewry was already implicit, at least in the context of a future war, in case they might once again act as fifth columnists. In the Gemlich letter of September 1919, he had already called for the ‘complete removal of the Jews’, and in a letter of August 1920, one correspondent reports that Hitler believed that ‘the bacillus’ must be ‘exterminated’ in order to ensure the survival of the German people. One way or the other, his domestic policy was essentially foreign policy.

Compare this with the first American president, who stated that it would be bigoted, in the new nation, to discriminate against Jewry. So who caused their empowerment in today’s world?

Unlike the Judeo-reductionism in vogue in white nationalism and even the Gemlich letter of September 1919, the conceptual framework for understanding the West’s dark hour can already be gleaned from texts by Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill.

In On Liberty Mill concludes that in former times, when it was proposed to burn atheists, charitable people used to suggest their confinement in a madhouse. Mill said that he wouldn’t be surprised if they saw that in his day because of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ that Jefferson and Madison so feared: a tyranny that doesn’t tolerate eccentricity.

And this is the central problem, since egalitarian tyranny is based on the feelings of the majority, and that feeling was programmed in the Aryan collective unconscious since the time of Constantine, with those Pauline words that there is no longer a Jew or a Greek, etc.

In On Liberty Mill didn’t so much propose to defend the rights of the eccentric individual—an atheist in Victorian England for example—against the state. He proposed to defend his rights against society itself: a giant Leviathan. That is why the First Amendment has failed utterly, in the US, to defend us. The majority society, even without the arm of the state, can cancel the dissenter (as it cancelled the previous incarnation of The West’s Darkest Hour when it was hosted elsewhere).

For Mill, his great mission was to say what he thought of modern society, especially of the power of public opinion over the outsider. As in Christendom, the collectivist solution proposed by Rousseau and post-French Revolution Europe fears the Other and allows no edges. However, a homogeneous construct determined to establish a norm of equality is a form of despotism. Liberal collectivism is opposed not only to National Socialism but to Pindar’s ideal Become what you are!, realise yourself; and it is also opposed to the Romantic ideal of the individual’s right to unfold his full potential, exemplified in Goethe.

On social pressure (which, if we use the parable of the sower, prevents the National Socialist seed that Rockwell wanted to sow in the US from blossoming) Tocqueville wrote that the kind of oppression by which democratic nations are threatened is very different from what has ever existed. He added that we shall find no prototype of this in historical memory; that he sought in vain for an expression to convey the idea of this new socio-political animal, and that the old words ‘despotism’ and ‘tyranny’ were inappropriate. ‘We are faced with something new’, he wrote.

Tocqueville’s remarks left a deep imprint on the thinking that Mill would express later in On Liberty, who confessed that he had noticed that the aim of democracy wasn’t, as claimed, to protect the interests of everyone but simply the interests of the majority (what Voltaire called canaille, and I call Neanderthals).

Tocqueville and Mill noticed some unintended consequences of modern democracy. In democratic nations the political force of the majority, the canaille, has become a force that surpasses that of the old tyrannies; though the manner of exercising such force is far more subtle, and infinitely more difficult to detect than that of a classical tyranny. The reason for this is that the values of the majority surround us as much as the ocean surrounds the fish. The invisibility of this soft totalitarianism is the corollary of democracy, the rule of the demos: the omnipresent people or mass.

The mass, the ‘Neanderthals’, form their opinion through the school and the Jew-controlled media. Mill believed that the self-educated individual was the antidote to this new form of mass control. For example, no organisation denounced the Inquisition over the centuries of its existence. It was individuals, often isolated individuals, who saw the crimes of the Imperial Church; and from Mill’s century to ours only individuals like Solzhenitsyn have been able to expose, in a big way, other kinds of crimes. That’s why Mill loved the distinct individual so much and feared the blind masses, and he was suspicious of democracy as potentially the most oppressive form of government.

The predominant note in Mill’s writings is not utilitarianism. On Liberty is the clearest exposition of the views of those who desire a tolerant society for the different individual; for example, he who advocates race realism. Mill was the intellectual answer to Rousseau. What he came to value most was the spark of individual genius, the human anomaly; and in On Liberty, which he began writing in 1855, he loved the independent thinker, the solitary worker; the dissident, the eternal questioner of established values, the one who questions the dogmas of the masses and their prejudices; in a word, the outsider who today is personified in he who doesn’t subscribe to the dogma of egalitarianism of race, gender and sexual orientation.

I would like to end this comment with the words I addressed to Gaedhal on Monday: ‘One of the things that white nationalists have never understood is that Europe should already be under one German Reich. Neither the Europeans nor the Americans nor the Australians are capable of governing themselves without a good Führer, as seen with this triumph of democracy and Judeo-liberal values after WW2. Savitri taught me to see an inverted world like the inverted pyramids, which I even illustrated in her book with triangles on pages 172 and 177’.

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'Hitler' (book by Brendan Simms)

Hitler, 28

Hitler rejected the standard solutions to Germany’s predicament. He wondered whether Zionism might be a solution to the ‘Jewish Question’, but quickly came down against the idea. Hitler saw in Jewish aspirations for statehood proof of their sense of national identity, despite all their international rhetoric. ‘The Jews,’ he wrote, were ‘one people’, who ‘identified themselves as a people (Zionists)’. The ‘proof’ of this, Hitler continued, was ‘Palestine’.

Hitler was deeply sceptical, though, that the Zionist project could succeed, because it was completely inimical to the nature of Jewry. The ‘Aryan’ concept of the state, he claimed, was ‘territorial’, while the parasitic Jews could only feed off existing states, not establish one of their own. The Jew ‘cannot build a state’, he argued, because he was ‘incapable of building a state’. Moreover, even if such a state could be erected, Hitler believed that it would merely increase the Jewish threat. ‘The planned Zionist state “Jerusalem”,’ he argued, should not be regarded as an area of Jewish national settlement, but rather as ‘the headquarters for Jewish world power plans for exploitation and nefarious activity’.

For the rest of his life, in fact, Hitler stuck to the view that the establishment of a Jewish state, in Palestine or anywhere else, would simply create another focal point for world Jewry.