Category: Philosophy of history

Heartland, 8

Editor’s note: I will not translate the entire book on Heartland that Eduardo Velasco published on the now defunct Evropa Soberana site in Spanish (here, here and here). I limit myself to translating only a few paragraphs from the final section:

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Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s The Closed Commercial State (1800) is a tedious book, utopian and pedantic in its rationalism, but it is worth our attention. On the one hand, it had a certain influence on the development of what Spengler would call ‘Prussian socialism’ or ‘Prussianism’, and on the other, it defends the exact opposite thesis to that of globalisation, i.e. that a country should seek autarchy to extricate itself from the network of international trade, becoming, so to speak, an endorheic state of exclusively internal (commercial, economic) flow. Thinkers of all political persuasions have seen interesting things in Fichte’s work, liberals as well as socialists, communists, anarchists, fascists and Nazis[1] so it is not a work to be dismissed lightly.

We return, then, to Prussia, the land that before the Second World War was home, according to Mackinder, to ‘one of the most virile races of mankind’, a race that was to suffer between 1944 and 1946 an ethnic cleansing of extreme brutality. While England was ruled by a cosmopolitan aristocracy of shipping, trade, commerce and banking speculation, Prussia was ruled by a provincial, military, land and productivity aristocracy. Fichte sent a copy of The Closed Commercial State (ECC) to Frederick William III, supposedly to influence his economic policy.

Fichte was inspired by the peasant society of the Germanic world and the economic organisation of the old German cities. It is impossible not to see in his work affinities with Lycurgus, Plato and Thomas More. The German philosopher’s economic ideal was a completely self-sufficient state, with ‘nothing to demand from its neighbours and nothing to cede to them’. Fichte says that in such a state, ‘the government does not aim at acquiring commercial predominance, which is a dangerous tendency, but at making the nation completely independent and autonomous. If a single nation has achieved supremacy in commerce, its victims must use every possible means to attenuate this supremacy and restore the balance’: a clear reference to the power of Great Britain.

The danger of the commercial supremacy of a single nation was that the international trade handled by that nation took over all the goods of a rival state until that state had only one commodity left to sell: itself. In this way, ‘the state sells itself, sells its independence, collects a permanent subsidy thus becoming the province of another state and a means to any of its objectives’.

In this regard, it is worth remembering that, although autarchy is today surrounded by taboos, in classical Greece it was the ideal to which people aspired, even if it was not always completely attainable. Aristotle, in his Politics, considered autarchy to be the ideal situation for a state. Hesiod went further and proposed autarchy for each family household. Tellurian Sparta, the most respected state in classical Greece, was a closed, autarchic economy thanks to its conquest of fertile Messenia. Thalassic Athens, by contrast, was heavily urbanised and had to rely on grain markets such as Egypt and southern Ukraine.

Fichte divided society into three strata: producers, merchants and craftsmen. Then came the military, teachers and statesmen. Of all these castes, the most dangerous for Fichte was the merchants since, through their possession of commodities and especially money, they tended to escape the authority of the state and ended up imposing their own rules.

The philosopher thought that Europe had a great commercial advantage over the other continents, tending to take over their labour power and goods. He considered that this state of affairs could not be perpetuated forever and that one day, a large state would have to leave the ‘European commercial society’ to form its own closed productive circuit.

What Fichte was criticising in these reflections was the explosion of Europe, and he advocated an implosion: Europe could not be eternally dependent on overseas ‘backyards’ in the Third World and must one day be able to stand on its own feet. Moreover, a planned economy cannot be planned, nor can a country be like a self-balancing and autonomous microsystem, if it depends on foreign goods and production, the supply, processing and transport of which it does not control, and is thus at the mercy of the whims of the markets: price fluctuations, trade embargoes, competition with the domestic product, etc. Such economic phenomena will tend to turn the country that is subject to them into a mere province in the network of international trade, tending to specialise in one economic sector rather than hosting all of them.

In the 1930s, autarky seemed to be gaining the upper hand over international trade. Three distinctly autarkic geopolitical blocs emerged: the European Axis (Germany, Italy and allied nations), the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (the vast conquests of the Japanese Empire from Manchuria to Indochina) and the Soviet Union.

With Europe, Asia and the Heartland closed to the US export market (except, in the case of the USSR, the substantial military, economic and oil aid it received from the US and the UK), all that remained on the planet was the British Empire and the impoverished colonial Third World: a de facto and imposed US autarchy. In The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959), William Appleman argued that the US ruling oligarchy went to war against Germany and Japan to protect global export markets from the effects of autarky. The dynamics of the autarkic blocs were neutralised with the establishment of the Bretton Woods system (1944), with its three pillars: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the dollar as the reserve currency of international trade. The only bloc that was spared to some extent was the USSR, which formed the economic organisation COMECON, formed in 1949, the same year that NATO was founded.

The COMECON bloc, of which the Warsaw Pact was to be the military arm. Red: Member states. Yellow: observer states. Pink: belonged to the organisation but did not participate. (`Editor's Note: Compare it with BRICS`).

Fichte—who believed that ‘in the beginning was action’ and that property emanates from labour and productive activity, that is, that the earth belongs to whoever pours his blood and sweat upon it—did not recognise the value of money, but the value of the commodities that such money is capable of buying. For him, ‘The total mass of money represents and is worth as much as the total mass of commodities’. No matter how much money is in circulation or is created out of thin air in the form of credit, its purchasing power will always be limited by the actual goods and services that can be bought.

Wealth does not depend on how much money one has, but on how large a fraction of the total existing money one possesses. It is clear that when there is, as today, much more money in circulation (especially electronic money and interest-debt-money) than real commodities, the excess capital floating in ‘the markets’ is devoted to inflating bubbles, opening new artificial markets (for example, by turning the emotions of the individual and human nature itself into a business), manipulating needs and demand with aggressive advertising and speculating to justify its existence. Not to mention that every time the money supply is increased, the creators of money (or rather, counterfeiters of money) increase the proportion of capital they own out of the total money supply, using this capital as if it were a commodity in itself. But ‘In the simple expression “to realise something in money”, the whole falsity of the system is already contained. Nothing can be realised in money because money itself is nothing real. The commodity is the real reality.’

To bring about the closure of the commercial state, Fichte advocated the ‘abolition of the world currency’ which he identifies with gold and silver (Editors’ Note: after the collapse of the British Empire, nowadays the dollar is still the reserve currency of international trade) and the ‘introduction of a national currency’. It is difficult not to see here the influence of Sparta, which forbade the possession of gold and silver by creating a new currency which was not accepted outside the territory of the Lacedaemonian state: rough iron bars, so that they could not be manipulated or moulded, were dipped in vinegar while still red-hot; the idea was to armour against the fluctuating and shifting influence of foreign trade.

In this situation, there is no longer any exchange with foreign states, except for one-off trade pacts based on direct barter, without monetary intermediaries. This is what Germany was doing before World War II in Eastern Europe and South America: a barter trade that did not need to use international currencies in the hands of its enemies. In contrast, initiatives for a world currency have always come from globalist individuals or entities, for example, the Rothschild family. (In this video, Mr. Evelyn de Rothschild proposes an ‘international currency’ to avoid conflict. What he does not say is who will have the power to issue such a currency—presumably himself, for example.)

Another of Fichte’s contributions to geopolitics is his idea that states should not overstep their ‘natural frontiers’, understood as those within which a state can achieve self-sufficiency. Towards the end of his writing, Fichte leaves us with a very politically incorrect reflection:

It is evident that a nation so closed, whose members live only with themselves and very few with foreigners; a nation which preserves by those measures its particular way of life, its institutions and customs; a nation which deeply loves its Fatherland and everything national, very soon a high degree of national honour and a very peculiar national character will emerge. It will become another nation, a completely new nation. That introduction of the national currency is its true creation…

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The power of High Finance has decided to base itself in the United Kingdom, North America and to a lesser extent the rest of Western Europe because among other things there is an excellent quality manpower there.

The American troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan have a fabulous genetic heritage, perfectly comparable to the Indo-European hordes of antiquity. Even in the faces of many white American convicts, we can discern a potential crusader knight, Viking, sailor, soldier, hard-nosed farmer or hard-headed labourer. These are people gone astray, uprooted by crossing the Atlantic, without the moral and spiritual foundations that only deep Asia, along with inspiring European history—based on heroic examples, war, art, culture, work, beauty and love—can provide.

What is currently being exported from Hollywood and MTV is not American culture, as the saying goes. ‘American culture’ is the love of family and country, the right to defend them with arms, civic sovereignty, religion, liberty and independence: the values of a people whose land was not given to them by a feudal lord, but won by blood and sweat. Neither Thomas Jefferson nor George Washington has anything to do with the toxic rubbish propagated from the meccas of the Yankee subculture, and the sphere of influence of the Pentagon and Wall Street is not an ‘American empire’ any more than the Vatican is the Roman Empire and the City of London is the British Empire.

We know—because we are not deluded or cultural Judeo-Christians, nor do we believe in globalisation or the religion of political correctness—what happens in countries that forget the fundamental laws of reproduction and race improvement: they become vulgarised, corrupt, unserious, undisciplined, disorganised, weakened and Third Worldised. The darkening of the race goes hand in hand with the darkening of the mind and spirit. Parasitic weeds take over the garden and eventually choke out the noblest and most productive trees and plants…

Deliberate and systematic ignorance of human reproduction, of the importance of race and genetics in geopolitics will only have the effect that the ‘myth of blood’ will resurface with greater force and violence. Globalisation pretends to make us believe that we are all equal while at the same time homogenising us racially, a clear proof that it does not consider us all equal. Genetic and anthropological-physical studies, i.e. recognising the difference between people, are therefore an anti-globalisation vector.

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[1] Dr. Carl Schmidt, associated with the power groups of Deutsche Bank, IG Farben and Siemens, defended the idea of a Closed Commercial State in Europe led by Germany.

Tags Economy, Germany, Materialism / capitalism, United Kingdom, United States

Eduardo Velasco Philosophy of history

Heartland, 6

by Eduardo Velasco

Antiquity

The first great empire of the Heartland, the Persians, arose after the irruption onto the Iranian plateau of various Aryan tribes from present-day Russia and Ukraine: the Medes, Persians and Parthians. Since then, Persia has been a country that has merely recycled itself as an empire over and over again throughout history, tending to project power across the five seas of Penthalasia (Mediterranean, Black Sea, Caspian, Persian Gulf and Red Sea) and to be a bridge between Europe-Esthasia, Stasia-Africa, Central Asia-Indian and the Eurasian and Arabian Heartland.

The 4th century saw an event that would have a decisive influence on the consolidation of the Silk Road as the backbone of international trade: the eastward thrust of Alexander the Great. Starting from their Balkan base in northern Greece, the Macedonians conquered Anatolia, the Levant, Pentalasia, Egypt and the Achaemenid Empire, reaching as far as India. The Greeks founded several Alexandrias in the Heartland: Alexandria of Aria (today’s Afghan city of Herat, through which passes a strategic gas pipeline and road, and near which there is a Spanish-Italian military base), Alexandria Eschate (today’s Jodzend, Tajikistan), Alexandria of Oxo (today’s Ai Khanum, Afghanistan), Alexandria Caucasus (probably present-day Bagram, Afghanistan, where there is a major NATO air base) and Alexandria Aracosia (present-day Kandahar, Afghanistan, where there is another US military base). According to Isidore of Carax, the Parthians called this region ‘White India’. North of these militarised and fortified Greek colonies, the Scythians and Masagetes—whom Alexander the Great never dared to attack—flowed freely across the steppe. The Macedonians had reached the gates of Gog and Magog.

Citadel of Herat (Afghanistan), the ancient capital of a Persian province described by Herodotus as ‘the granary of Central Asia’. Given the success of Macedonian conquests in the Greater East, it is understandable that Pompey, Trajan, the medieval Crusaders, Napoleon, today’s NATO armies and any Western power seeking to penetrate deep into Asia would look to Alexander the Great.

Greek expeditions from the Tajik valley of Fergana reached the city of Kashgar (present-day Uiguristan), home to an Indo-European tribe, the Tocaryans. The Dayuan (‘great Ionians’) of the Han Chinese chronicles are believed to be descendants of these Greek settlers of the Heartland. Alexander the Great was the first who, by stabilising a vast space between the Great West and the Great East, opened both domains to mutual trade. Thus, the most important and lasting effect of the Macedonian campaigns was the definitive opening of the Silk Road.

When Alexander the Great died in 323 b.c.e., the Diadoks (generals of the Macedonian army) divided up his empire, fighting for twenty years for regional hegemony. After his death, the epigones, his successors, reigned over the territorial units resulting from the fragmentation of the Alexandrian empire. The one that interests us most in this article is the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom, centred in Bactria (present-day Balkh, northern Afghanistan). The 3rd century b.c.e. saw the entry into this Greek domain of Buddhism from the Maurya Empire of India, with which the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom maintained numerous political and commercial relations. It is the beginning of an extraordinary Hellenistic-Buddhist civilisation, led by Greek monks and a Greek military aristocracy, descendants of the ancient Macedonian armies, in the heart of Central Asia, an episode rarely remembered in modern historiography.[1]

Approximate extent of the Greco-Bactrian kingdom in 180 b.c.e. By this time, Buddhism with pagan-Hellenic influences was already the dominant religion, to the extent that reliefs of the Hindu Buddha protected by the Greek Herakles were sculpted. Despite the problematic mountain barriers, the kingdom was mainly oriented towards India. It dominated an important segment of the Silk Road, controlling the exits from China to the West.

The earliest artistic depictions of the Buddha, which strongly influenced Buddhist imagery throughout Asia, occurred in this kingdom. It has even been reasonably speculated that Apollo influenced the early sculptures of the Hindu saint so that the legacy of the more typically Western god would have reached the Pacific—something the shepherd warriors of the Balkans could surely never have imagined. The entire Gandhara artistic current is of Greek and therefore European genesis. In the middle of the Silk Road, the colossal Buddha statues in Bamiyan (Afghanistan, demolished by the Taliban in March 2001), were clearly of Greco-Buddhist heritage. This cultural stream is a superb example of the extraordinary fruits that a healthy and positive interaction between the West and the East could bring.

Museum, Lahore, Pakistan. This 2nd-century Gandhara statue is the Greek Athena, sculpted in the Greek style and with facial features typical of the aristocracy of classical Greece. It is part of the legacy of the first European state in the Heartland.

Around 130 b.c.e., the Greco-Bactrian kingdom was overrun by the Toccharians, who eventually founded the Kushan Empire. For a time, however, the Indo-Greek kingdom survived, detached from the Greco-Bactrian when the latter conquered the Indus basin and part of the Ganges basin in an expansion reminiscent of the Indo-Aryan conquests fourteen centuries earlier.

Indo-Greek kingdoms in 100 b.c.e., in what are now Afghanistan and Pakistan. 14: Pushkalavati. 15: Taxila. 16: Sakala. They occupy a position straddling the Heartland and the fertile, overpopulated, rich plains of the Indus and Ganges. They include what are now the AFPAK frontier and the troubled tribal areas of Pakistan. These kingdoms, following in the footsteps of the ancient Indo-Aryans, will eventually conquer much of the Indus and Ganges basins. It will be noted that the regions of Nuristan (Afghanistan) and the Chitral and Hunza valleys (Pakistan), where European physical features have been best preserved to this day, fall within this area of Hellenistic influence.

The Macedonian push into the heart of Asia was merely the logical climax of the process initiated centuries earlier by the Greek colonies in Asia Minor, now western Turkey. By now it will have been appreciated that in Hindu civilisation, centred in North Hindustan, the influence of the Heartland predominates, even though India was later conquered by a typically maritime empire such as the British.[2] It seems that since then, the mountainous territories separating Hindustan from Central Asia have been a clear battlefront between thalassocracy and telurocracy. Inevitably, this reminds us of the role of Afghanistan and Pakistan on the international scene today.

Both Rome and China were mutually aware of the existence of the other empire and maintained to some extent essentially indirect relations. The Han Empire regarded Rome as a kind of Western counterpart, and Rome probably had the same image as China. However, between the two powers stood two states in the former Alexandrian conquests: the Parthian Empire and the Kushan Empire. Rome tended to push eastwards, eventually conquering the Caucasus and what is now Iraq, but problems in the Levant meant that Roman conquests in the rest of Pentalasia were rather short-lived. The Mediterranean was the only sea that Rome could call Mare Nostrum; neither the North Sea, the Atlantic, nor the Black Sea, nor the Red Sea—let alone the Caspian or the Persian Gulf—could be called fully Roman.

The Roman Senate even proclaimed several edicts prohibiting, in vain, the use of silk, since its trade bled the Empire of its gold reserves, which indicates that two millennia ago, what happened at one end of the Silk Road influenced the opposite end—an example of proto-globalisation. Pliny the Elder said in Natural History that ‘by the lowest estimate, India, Seres and Arabia cause our Empire to lose 100 million sesterces every year: this is what our luxuries and our women cost us’. There seems to have been phenomena in Rome comparable to the flow of silver to China before the opium wars, as well as the loosening of patriarchy in the West today.

In 56 b.c.e., Rome fights the Parthian Empire at the battle of Carras (modern-day Kurdistan). The feared Parthian cavalry manages to defeat the legion and Crassus, the Roman general, is executed. Ten thousand Roman soldiers were taken prisoner and deported to the far east of the enemy empire, to the Eurasian Heartland; specifically to Bactriana (Afghanistan). Plutarch and Pliny the Elder tell us that many of the Roman survivors were enslaved or sent to forced labour, but that some managed to make their way into the world of labour as mercenaries. These Roman troops were supposedly used by the Parthians to fight the Huns in the province of Margiana, which is now Turkmenistan. The Roman Empire and the Parthians signed a peace treaty in 20 b.c.e. and attempts were made to bring back the prisoners, but by then all traces of the ill-fated legion had been lost. Han chronicles from 36 b.c.e., describing a Chinese military campaign in western China, tell of a disciplined enemy army guarding the square of Zhizhi, present-day Uzbekistan. These chronicles mention a quadrangular wooden fortress and enemy soldiers entering the battle perfectly aligned and building a fish-scale-like formation with their shields: the ‘tortoise’ of the Roman legions had arrived in the Heartland. After finally being defeated, these soldiers were taken, again as mercenaries, to the southern frontier of the Gobi Desert, to protect China from barbarian raids. They were eventually settled at Li-Jien (present-day Liqian), a node on the Silk Road whose very name is a corruption of ‘legion’. The presence of the ‘lost legion of Crassus’ was brought up in 2001 and genetic analysis has confirmed the trace of European blood in this area, a presence that can be seen with the naked eye in the high frequency of more aquiline noses, wavy brown hair and light eyes.

The incursion of the Roman legions into the Levant catalysed a historical process of enormous importance. In the 1st and 2nd centuries, several ethnic cleansings of Greeks took place in the Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Crete, Crete, Sicily, Rhodes and elsewhere saw Jewish communities, taking advantage of the absence of Roman legions engaged in a military campaign against the Parthian Empire, rise in complete synchronicity against the hated Greek communities of the region. Although these Jewish revolts would be harshly put down by Rome, the Europeanisation of the Levant would never come to fruition, Jewish collaboration with the Parthian Empire would continue and, in the long run, the entire Roman Empire would be semi-ethnicised and would see the eradication of the Greco-Latin legacy, this time under a Christian sign, in a much more resounding way. These ethnic cleansings of European populations were a reaction to the will of the deserted, dry and infertile East, the effect of which was to break the continuity of Greek culture from the Roman Empire to India. The Greek pockets in India and Central Asia, deprived of the source of their culture and human capital, would gradually lose influence until they were swallowed up by the Heartland. It would be fourteen centuries before another power, this time Russia, would reintroduce the flame of Greek culture into the heart of the continent.

The Huns, who emerged from the Heartland in the latter days of the Roman Empire, are of nebulous ethnogenesis. We know that they were a society of pastoral warriors whose main foodstuffs were meat and milk, and whose military tactics were based on large formations of light cavalry masterfully employing the bow and javelin throw. The Huns were, rather than a specific ethnic group, a confederation of steppe horsemen, whose ranks included Ural-Uralic, Turkic, Mongol, Iranian, Germanic, Slavic and other peoples, probably dominated by a Turkic-Mongol aristocracy, although in the Hunnic territories of Eastern Europe, the lingua franca was Gothic. At Attila’s death, his confederation dissolved as quickly as it had appeared, but the effects of its brief existence—notably setting in motion the great migration of the Germanic peoples who were to constitute the medieval nobilities of Western Europe—were to endure for a long time.

The case of the Huns is comparable to that of the silk trade in terms of the repercussions at one end of the Silk Road of what happened at the other end, for if the Huns spilt over into Europe, it was because they could not spill over into China. Europe, unlike Stasia, lacked a state with a clear strategic doctrine that took into account the importance of the Heartland. On the contrary, the Chinese, who had already built dams to control the disastrous floods of the Yellow River (whose sources are in the Heartland), had decided to dam the human floods coming from the heart of the continent by building the Great Wall of China—again, to preserve their ‘political order’. The Great Wall is an impressive testimony to the importance of the Eurasian hinterland; in many sections, it coincides exactly with the boundaries of the Heartland. It seems that the Chinese emperors saw the Heartland as an impenetrable domain, a source of barbarians and a hornet’s nest best left alone. But the Great Wall was not merely a military barrier, it was also a transport corridor and a system of locks to extract taxes, fees and tolls from Silk Road trade, levy tariffs and control migratory flows.

The fact that the Great Wall is more like an infrastructure of countless different walls, built over eighteen centuries, shows that defending against the Heartland tribes was a constant obsession for successive Chinese dynasties. The Mongols had a diet based on animal products and were, as a people, more warlike than the Chinese, although China had the most effective martial traditions in the world.

In 431, Nestorian Christianity was condemned by the First Council of Ephesus, leading to a great exile of Nestorian Christians to Sassanid Persia. Henceforth, Baghdad and Seleukia-Ctesiphon were centres of Nestorianism, which sent large numbers of missionaries (or perhaps better said ‘agents’, mainly Syrians and Persians) to the far reaches of the continent, founding Christian communities throughout most of Asia. Cities such as Herat, Farah, Almalik (known to 14th-century Christians as Armalec), Samarkand, Kashgar and even Tang-era Beijing itself, were home to thriving Nestorian communities from the early Middle Ages onwards.

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[1] More information here.

[2] Conquerors of India from the Heartland include the Indo-Aryans, the Macedonians and the Mongols (Moghul dynasty, still active in the 18th century). Nor can the Persian influence be underestimated: Persian was in many parts of India the cultured language of the social elite until the arrival of the English.

Tags Geography

Eduardo Velasco Philosophy of history

Heartland, 4

Post author By C .T.
Post date September 13, 2024

by Eduardo Velasco

Previous Heartland entries: 1, 2 and 3.

‘The Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on Earth’. —Mackinder.

Heartland comes from heart and land, ‘cardinal region’. The Heartland is the sum of a series of contiguous river basins whose waters flow into bodies of water inaccessible to oceanic navigation. It is the endorheic basins of Central Eurasia plus the part of the Arctic Ocean basin frozen in the Northern Route with an ice cover of between 1.2 and 2 metres, and therefore impassable for much of the year—except for atomic-powered icebreakers (which only the Russian Federation possesses) and similar vessels. Although the word was first used in its specific meaning by James Fairgrieve (a Mackinderian disciple) in Geography and World Power (1915), the concept of Heartland was first defined by the English geographer Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947), one of the founding fathers of modern geopolitics, in his work The Geographical Pivot of History (1904), where he drew the first graphic representation of what he initially called the ‘Pivot Area’:

Mackinder says in his more comprehensive Democratic Ideals and Reality (1919):

The northern margin of Asia is an inaccessible coast, clogged with ice except for a narrow waterway which opens here and there along the beach during the summer, owing to the melting of the local ice formed during the winter between the floes and the land. It so happens that three of the world’s largest rivers, the Lena, the Yenisei and the Obi, flow northwards through Siberia to this coast, and are therefore divorced for practical purposes from the general system of ocean and river navigation. South of Siberia are other regions at least as extensive, drained into salt lakes with no oceanic outlet; such are the basins of the Volga and Ural rivers flowing into the Caspian, and of the Oxo[1] and Jaxartes[2] into the Aral Sea. Geographers usually describe these internal basins as ‘continental’. Taken together, the Arctic and continental flow regions occupy almost half of Asia and a quarter of Europe and form a large continuous patch in the north and centre of the continent. This entire patch, stretching from the icy, flat shores of Siberia to the torrid, rugged coasts of Baluchistan and Persia, has been inaccessible to oceanic navigation. Its opening by railways—for it had no roads beforehand—and by air routes shortly, constitutes a revolution in the relations of men with the greatest geographical realities of the world. Let us call this great region the Heartland of the Continent.

Sticking strictly to the Mackinderian definition of the Heartland, its exact extent would be as follows:

Mackinder describes the interior of this Heartland in these terms:

The north, centre, and west of the Heartland are a plain, rising only a few hundred feet at most above sea level. In that greatest lowland on the Globe are included Western Siberia, Turkestan, and the Volga basin of Europe, for the Ural Mountains, though a long range, are not of important height, and terminate some three hundred miles north of the Caspian, leaving a broad gateway from Siberia into Europe. Let us speak of this vast plain as the Great Lowland.

Southward the Great Lowland ends along the foot of a tableland, whose average elevation is about half a mile, with mountain ridges rising to a mile and a half. This tableland bears upon its broad back the three countries of Persia, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan; for convenience we may describe the whole of it as the Iranian Upland. The Heartland, in the sense of the region of Arctic and Continental drainage, includes most of the Great Lowland and most of the Iranian Upland; it extends therefore to the long, high, curving brink of the Persian Mountains, beyond which is the depression occupied by the Euphrates Valley and the Persian Gulf.

The Eurasian steppe is the most traversable and open part of what Mackinder called the Great Lowland. It can be considered the backbone of Eurasia and the cradle of pastoralism, the spirit of chivalry and land power. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Mongolia are the key countries for its domination, indeed control of the steppe is a strategic imperative for the Russian Federation—in the same way, Atlanticism ensures that the steppe is never under the control of a single superpower. The Dzungaria Gate, marked on the map, is a mountain pass that separates Uyghuristan from the rest of Central Asia. Mastering such a mountainous strait is as important to a tellurocracy as control of a sea strait is to a thalassocracy. Between the Great Western Steppe (from Hungary to Kazakhstan) and the Great Eastern Steppe (mainly Mongolia and Manchuria), there is only one major barrier: the Altai massif. Budapest, Bucharest, Odesa, Kiev, Volgograd (Stalingrad), Astana, Omsk and Ulan Bator are key cities in the structuring of the Eurasian steppe.

The basis of geopolitics is the contradiction between sea power (‘thalassocracy’ in Greek) and land power (telurocracy). Sea power tends to engender commercial and liberal states, and land power productive and autocratic states. Typical historical thalassocracies have been Phoenicia, Athens, Carthage, Venice, the Hanseatic League, the Republic of Ragusa, the Republic of Salé, the Ottoman Empire, Portugal, Holland, the British Empire and the United States after 1898. Clear telurocracies have been the Scythians, Sparta, the Holy Roman Empire, the Mongol Empire, the Russian Empire, Germany, Austria-Hungary, the USA before 1898 and the USSR.

Both types of power have their natural citadels and their spheres of influence in the terrestrial geography. The citadel of thalassocracy is the northern half of the Atlantic (Midland Ocean or Mediterranean Sea) and its sphere of influence is Oceania described in 1984 by George Orwell, who knew geopolitics. The citadel of the telurocracy is the Heartland and its sphere of influence is Orwellian Eurasia. The Eurasia of 1984 would, in reality, be, along with other regions of the globe, contested between the two archetypal powers, or have a mixture of both: Southeast Asia, Korea, South India and the Chinese coast would have strong oceanic influence, while Tibet, Uiguristan, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Manchuria and Northern India would have continental influence. According to Orwell, in a world where geopolitics has taken over, the contested areas of the globe—perpetually at war, changing hands and being conquered and reconquered again and again by the three superpowers—form a quadrangle with corners at Tangier-Hong Kong-Darwin-Brazaville, as well as the borders between Stasia and Eurasia. These disputed territories loosely correspond to the Muslim world.

Above, the natural citadels of the thalassocracy and the telurocracy. It will be noted that the shortest way between the two is Scandinavia and the Arctic Ocean, near the Russian-Norwegian border. Europe in general has the misfortune of being the natural battleground between thalassocracy and telurocracy. At present, a new thalassocratic space is forming in the Asia-Pacific, which, together with the Atlantic from the West, besieges the Heartland from the East.

Above, in George Orwell’s novel 1984, there is a fictional essay entitled The Theory and Practice of Oligarchic Collectivism, which explains how the USSR has conquered Western Europe to become Eurasia (red), the United States and the British Empire have united to form Oceania (blue), and Stasia (yellow) has emerged after a decade of confused struggles. None of the three superstates can be conquered even by the other two combined, as their military might be at the same level and their natural defences are too formidable. Within the Tangier-Hong Kong-Darwin-Brazaville quadrangle lie the contested zones of the planet. The borders between Eurasia and Stasia are not entirely clear, except for a reference to the unstable border in Mongolia.

Globalisation has its throne in ‘markets’ (mainly banks and multinationals) and in international trade, 90% of which is conducted by sea, even though rail and pipelines are cheaper, faster and more efficient—or would be if it were not for timely instabilities in the most strategic links of land routes. A landlocked state thus has a large vector of influence projection at its disposal and shares a de facto border with all countries with a coastline on the body of water in question.

Unlike the emerged lands, the planet’s seas constitute a single body (Panthalasa or World Ocean theory), so that whoever goes out into the World Ocean and dominates it will tend to envelop all the world’s emerged lands and infiltrate its power into them, especially through the valleys and plains of the great river basins. But despite this great advantage, the sea, changeable, capricious and shifting, serves only to transport things that come from the land and to lay siege to the land itself. If dominating the sea is merely a means to dominate the land, dominating the land is an end in itself so that a maritime superpower needs to besiege the land only confirms the importance of the land itself.

Halford J. Mackinder

This article will therefore take the point of view of the sea’s natural antagonist. The land represents the firm, stable, fertile, nourishing, productive, organised and disciplined, if the sea is very similar to the ‘becoming’ with its ups and downs, the land is close to the ‘being’ with its obstinate permanence. If the sea rises only in stormy moments, the land rises forever in the mountains, which could be defined as ‘concentrated land’. In the economic sphere, the telluric strategy is not to move goods from one place to another but to produce them and make them stay as close as possible to the soil from which they sprang.

Productivity and fertility thus replace trade and speculation to form a political, economic and social system very different from the one that prevails on the planet today. Likewise, the opening up of spaces of free navigation, which is the obsession of Atlanticism, is replaced by the tendency of the great land masses to strangle maritime traffic in delicate bottlenecks, to break up Panthalasa, turning the various seas into mere inland lakes under tight control. For, as we shall see in another article, the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Adriatic, the Aegean, the entire Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Andaman Sea, the South China Sea, the Sea of Japan, and even the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico and Hudson Bay, can be excised from the bosom of the World Ocean and turned into lakes as inaccessible as the Caspian, just by activating natural locks: sea straits like Gibraltar or Hormuz, or island barriers like Japan or the Andaman Arc.

_____________

[1] Oxo or Oxus was the Greek name for the Amur Darya (Pamir) river.

[2] The Greek name for the Syr Darya.

Tags Geography

Eduardo Velasco Philosophy of history

Heartland, 2

Post author By C .T.
Post date July 8, 2024

by Eduardo Velasco

If in the West we have inherited legends of Atlantis—a wealthy maritime trading state that, for its sins, was punished by the gods to perish beneath the sea—the East is also rife with mentions of lost lands. In the vast Buddhist regions of Central Asia, there are myths galore of underground cities and hidden valleys, such as Shambhala, where the ancient traditional and spiritual powers of the world would have retreated, waiting to manifest themselves in the final war between the spirits of good and the spirits of evil. The Mongols identify Shambhala with various valleys in southern Siberia, while in Altaic folklore, the gateway to the secret city is hidden in the Altai mountain range’s Mount Beluja, where legend has it that Genghis Khan was buried.

The Kalachakra, a Tibetan Buddhist tantric scripture with strong Hindu influences, states that when the world degenerates into a maelstrom of war and greed, out of Shambhala will emerge Kalki (‘white horse’, or ‘destroyer of filth’), a kind of messiah who will form an army and fight the demonic forces, killing by the millions the ‘barbarians’ and the ‘thieves who have usurped the royal power’. Gathering all the Brahmins of the world, he would find a new race to populate the golden age to come. In their shamanic past, the Turkic-Mongol peoples spoke of Ergekenon, an isolated valley supposedly located in the Altai, where their ancestors were imprisoned for four centuries until a blacksmith succeeded in melting the barrier that enclosed them. The myth of Ergenekon would later be used strategically by Turkish nationalism to promote pan-Turanianism.

From China, tradition had it that Lao Tse (‘wise old man’, the founder of Taoism) rode out of the country on a white buffalo to the West, i.e. to Central Asia, perhaps to the Kunlun Shan Mountains, where the sources of the Yellow River were located, a place considered holy by monks and hermits, where the air was pure and energising, where healing herbs grew and huge glaciers advanced, where schools of martial arts were born and in whose rivers long-lived fish lived. Taoist folklore explained that in this kind of spiritual Eden, in the ‘mountain at the centre of the world’, royal men found the drink of immortality in ancient times, and that King Mu (a millennium b.c.e.) found there the jade palace of the Yellow Emperor, the founder of Chinese civilisation. Mythologically speaking, the mountain range connected Earth with Heaven and somewhere in its bosom stood a jade palace where Xiwangmu, the ‘Queen Mother of the West’, dwelled. Like an Eastern version of the Greek myth of the garden of the Hesperides, a huge tree grew there, bearing peaches of immortality every three thousand years.

The Kunlun Shan mountain range.

In the West, the interior of Eurasia was also viewed through a prism of legend. In Histories, Herodotus speaks of a place ‘to the north-east’, beyond the Sea of Hyrcania (the Caspian) and the Scythians, where there are vast quantities of gold guarded by griffins. Buran (a strong winter wind from the north, equivalent to the Greek Boreas), blew there strongly from a mountainous cavern in the so-called Zungaria Gate, which separates Uiguristan (also called Chinese Turkestan or Xingjiang) from the rest of Central Asia. Beyond this domain was the ‘land of the Hyperboreans’, whose territory reached the sea (probably the Arctic Ocean). In the Byzantine myths, Alexander the Great found no other solution to the hordes of ‘Gog and Magog’ (barbarians from the continental interior, sometimes assimilated to the Scythians and destined to fall upon the rest of the world in the future) than to contain them with a wall of iron or adamantium. This is probably the Caspian Gates in southern Russia, where centuries later an army of Slavs and Vikings would annihilate the Khazar kingdom and found the first Russian state. The metaphorical content of the construction of the Caspian Gates was served—especially since, in Central Asian folklore, an ‘iron gate in a lake’ or a ‘hole in a mountain’ is considered the origin of the winds. After the ill-fated Macedonian campaigns in northern India, a Hellenistic story reached the West and circulated the idea that deep in Central Asia there was a valley carpeted with diamonds and patrolled by birds of prey and ‘deadly looking’ serpents. At the time of the silk trade, Rome knew of the existence of the Beings, a tall, long-lived and healthy people (possibly the Tocari) located in Serica, the ‘land of silk’, which would correspond to Uyghuristan. These myths and rumours somehow embodied Europe’s desire not to lose its connection with the East.

In medieval times, Rome, Byzantium and the Crusader states alike spoke of the kingdom of Prester John, a monarch who maintained order in the lands of Gog and Magog by ruling over a Christian country isolated between Muslim and ‘pagan’ (read Buddhist, Hindu and shamanistic and animistic ancestral religions) domains. Gnostic traditions considered that the Magi came from this country, where the Holy Grail, obtained by Parzival in Monsalvat and carried to the Great East in ships with white sails and red crosses, was to be found along with other holy relics of Christianity… ‘John’ was probably a corruption of ‘jan’ or khan: the title of the Tatar kings. The character in question was probably a Nestorian khan-bishop of Mongol origin eager to forge closer ties with the West, but the situation soon became enveloped in symbols and archetypes in the collective European imagination. Marco Polo, who could not be missing in this writing, would place Gog and Magog north of Cathay (China), i.e. in Mongolia or Siberia. In China itself, the imperial authorities did something similar to Alexander the Great, writing off the Heartland as impossible and settling for erecting the Great Wall to protect the kingdom from barbarian incursions from the North.

Still in the 19th century, Russian settlers in Siberia, men and women of outstanding human qualities in every sense, had the idea of Belovodye, a mythical place of ‘white waters’ in eastern Siberia, which played the role of the Promised Land in their religious imagination and probably had an important influence on the flow of ethnically European populations to the East, establishing colonies ever closer to the Sea of Japan and the borders with China and Mongolia. As Russia conquered Central Asia, Nikolai Fyodorovich Fyodorov, founder of the Russian philosophical trend of cosmism, located Shambhala in the Pamir, present-day Tajikistan. Central Asia would become increasingly popular in the West thanks to Jules Verne’s Michael Strogoff, the incipient geopolitical science, Ferdinand Ossendowsky’s Beasts, Men and Gods and the rise of occult currents that idealised Central Asia as a sanctuary of tradition and wisdom. In the 1920s, the Russian painter, archaeologist and esotericist Nikolai Roerich also did his bit by describing an extraordinary expedition throughout Central Asia, including his visits to more than fifty monasteries and his encounters with Buddhist lamas.

Mongolia.

As can be seen, the more recondite areas of Central Asia were seen as a source of mystery, fantasy and uncertainty by the societies that gathered their influence. They were also seen as a hornet’s nest of men and animals, which could be diked but should not be stirred. All the myths we have seen agree in presenting the heart of Eurasia as a place, to say the least, interesting and worth visiting for the brave and the noble. The present article will deal with this vast space inhabited by questions and infinite possibilities yet to be unveiled, a potential new world, a huge, closed, inaccessible, impregnable, jealously traditional fortress, folded in on itself in countless valleys, mountains, plains, forests, steppes and deserts, which could not be conquered by Alexander the Great, nor by Rome, nor by Byzantium, nor by the Chinese emperors, nor by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, nor by the Portuguese Jesuits, nor by Napoleon, nor by the British Empire, nor by Hitler, nor by Japan, nor by the mafia oligarchs of the ex-Soviet space, nor by the multinationals and banks of capitalist-neoliberal globalisation—in the long run not even by the Asian khans or the terrible Soviet Bolshevism—but only by two extraordinary peoples: the Vikings and the Cossacks, who, like Alexander the Great before them, brought Greek culture (Cyrillic characters, Byzantine heritage) to the heart of Asia.

Since the dawn of history, whoever possesses the Heartland moves in it like a fish in water, for it is an ocean of land, but whoever does not possess it will crash against its walls again and again, and can only content himself with besieging it…

Tags Asia, Geography

Eduardo Velasco Philosophy of history

Heartland, 1

Post author By C .T.
Post date July 6, 2024
7 Comments on Heartland, 1

The heart of the mainland

by Eduardo Velasco

The interior spaces of the Russian Empire and Mongolia are so immense, and their potential in population, wheat, cotton, fuel and metals so incalculably great, that it is inevitable that a vast economic world, more or less remote, should develop there, inaccessible to oceanic commerce.

—Halford J. Mackinder

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Part One

Introduction
Endorheic basins and the importance of river systems
What is heartland?
A brief history of the heartland
Prehistoric times
Antiquity
Middle Ages: Pax Mongolica
Ancient Regime: Cossacks and Tsars
Telluric Socialisms
The Cold War
Globalisation

Part Two

The red banana
The heartland theory
The world according to Mackinder
Extension of the Heartland and the importance of Eastern Europe
Germany according to Mackinder—Realpolitik, Kultur, Weltanschauung, the Munich School and Haushofer’s Geopolitik
Is the heartland theory obsolete?
Are there other heartlands?
The Arab heartland Nejd and the Devil’s horn
The African heartland
The Cerrado in Brazil has the heartland of South America
The Great Basin and other North American heartlands
Castilla la Vieja is the heartland of Spain

Part Three

The manpower theory globalisation against the white race
The struggle for the human mind: The human being as a battlefield
The rebellion of the Earth: dismembering the world ocean is widening heartland
Big Time versus Big Space
Potentials for Heartland: A new world, or the empire of closed land
Genesis of Atlanticism
The closed commercial state: Autarchy vs. globalisation
The Cossack example and the geopolitical and social importance of armed forces
New Vikings and Cossacks for Eurasia: the need for a demographic reproductive and ethnic biopolitics for the heartland
Spain in the context of the heartland from Iberia to Siberia

Tags Geography, History

Degenerate art Philosophy of history

Lost manhood

Post author By C .T.
Post date May 20, 2024
1 Comment on Lost manhood

Since the conflict in Ukraine, the lectures of John Mearsheimer, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, have become fashionable. I have seen quite a few of his interviews, including some recent ones. Despite co-authoring a book on the Israel lobby, Mearsheimer is a normie in every sense of the word, though he can see international relations in a much more realistic way than the vast majority of Westerners do. Mearsheimer’s insights have made me understand the dynamics of how states interact with each other. But his greatest contribution to my understanding of the West’s darkest hour was one of his pronouncements on Europe.

It had been a mystery why this site receives hardly any feedback from Germans, even though I touch profoundly on Germany as we recently saw in Crusade against the Cross. But it’s not just them: why have the men of the countries that in the past played crucial roles in Western history—besides Germany, England, France, Italy and Spain—lost their manhood?

Let it be clear that Mearsheimer is not only a normie, but a patriotard. In a recent interview, a Dutchman asked him whether Europe could become (again) a regional hegemon. Mearsheimer replied that no, that Europe would do well to remain subordinate to his country, the United States. However, thanks to that and another of his recent lectures, I believe it was the one in Australia, Mearsheimer, using very different words from mine, explained why the French and the Germans have lost their manhood.

This is a psychological phenomenon.

Readers of my anthology On Beth’s Cute Tits will remember a passage in which we said that, in an environment of great abundance, males tend to become feminised: what we might call the empire of yin, like the bonobo apes (as opposed to chimpanzees, in whose environment there is no such abundance of fruit and the more aggressive Yang reigns). The point is, and here Mearsheimer helped to enlighten me, that for seventy-five years NATO has served as Europe’s sole gorilla, and the once proud European nations have, since the end of World War II, accepted their role as vassals protected by NATO’s military umbrella so that they could devote the bulk of their GDP—oh heroic materialism!—to worshipping Mammon. As I said, Mearsheimer used very different words, but I am translating his message into a much rougher language.

Yesterday I was saying that my blood boiled when I saw ‘walking tours’ supposedly on Sparta and other ancient Greek cities. The human figures they put there to brainwash us—or rather: to aggressively lobotomize us—have skin the colour of the Mexicans I see every day on my walks. On today’s walk, I even saw a whiter and lighter-haired woman than the women with negroid features that they show us in those videos of the ‘classical world’ (and I live in an area of brown people!).

Those popular videos denote the level of the most abject psychological conquest to which the Europeans have been subjected. NATO dominance is the key, I said, because, parallel to the worship of Mammon, the explanation of why Europeans fail to protect their ethnicity is clarified by the presence of the gorilla.

If Mearsheimer is correct, and it seems to me that he is, we might deduce that when the dollar collapses and American military bases have to be dismantled and their men returned to the US, Europeans will be forced to rebuild their armies while NATO and its epigone, the European Union, disappear. That will be the beginning of Europeans regaining their manhood, and if Russia feels threatened in the Ukrainian war and gets tough by nuking bases in Poland or Romania that host menacing F-16s, much the better!

The punishment that future history has in store for Europeans who let themselves be castrated and lobotomised for the sake of a bourgeois life must be apocalyptic so that they wake up from the treacherous ultra-feminisation in the yin empire they have created for themselves. As we have already said, the sins of Westerners are such that only an Indo-European Kalki could save us.

I would like to end this entry with some words from the Spaniard Eduardo Velasco that I have quoted more than once:

Let us compare today’s Europeans with the Spartans. We are extremely dismayed when encountering such physical, mental and spiritual degeneration! Such stultification! The European man, who used to be the hardest and most courageous on Earth, has become a weakling rag and degenerated biologically as a result of comfort. His mind is weak; his spirit fragile, and on top of that he considers himself the summit of the creation! But that man, just because of the blood he carries, has enormous potential.

The rules on which Sparta was seated were eternal and natural, as valid today as yesterday, but today the dualistic mens sana in corpore sano has been forgotten: the physical form has been abandoned producing soft, puny, deformed monsters; and the mental poisoning has produced similar abominations in the realm of the spirit.

The modern European knows no pain, no honour, no blood, no war, no sacrifice, no camaraderie, no respect or combat; and thus he does not know the ancient and gentle Goddesses known as Gloria or Victoria.

Passages from ‘Sparta and its Law’, one of Velasco’s essays in The Fair Race’s Darkest Hour.

Tags Degeneracy, Feminized western males

Axiology Philosophy of history Tom Holland

The Appian way

Christian morality is the seedbed that makes today’s secular West what it is, and for contemporary American racialists the hardest pill to swallow is that their movement has failed because of Christianity. And it will continue to fail unless they become true apostates, not only apostates from Christian dogma but also of the axiological side of Christianity: the so-called secular side. After all, ‘secular’ is just the tricky term St Augustine chose for his theological system, used even in our modern world, when in fact the ‘secular’ and the ‘religious’ have always been two sides of the same cultural coin.

Any racialist movement was doomed from the start, is doomed and will be doomed to failure unless it is understood that Christianity, or more specifically Christian morality, has always been the Devil for the white man. This includes the morality of today’s atheists whose worldview we here call Neo-Christian.

Only by telling us the story of the white race as it really happened in the Greco-Roman world (and here we can think of some essays from The Fair Race), together with elementary historical facts such as the non-existence of Jesus that Richard Carrier talks about, and how the New Testament was authored by Jews as David Skrbina believes, will it be possible to modify the collective unconscious of the white man—especially if we add to that a few pages from Karlheinz Deschner’s Criminal History of Christianity and the history of the Holocaust committed by the Allies, so well described in Tom Goodrich’s Hellstorm. The psychohistorical work of Tom Holland, who has lost faith in traditional Christianity is also pivotal even if, as a typical British liberal, he is our ideological enemy. But let’s use him as a useful idiot!

Holland hit the nail on the head when he said that National Socialism has been the most radical movement since Constantine, especially because it rebels against St Paul’s idea that there is no difference between Jews and Greeks (transformed today in the religious belief that there is no difference between blacks and whites): the original mental virus that caused the inversion of values. Holland also points out that the National Socialists repudiated the very essence of the emblem of the Cross: that a crucified victim is more morally worthy than the crucifying Romans. This idea persists in our times during mass hysteria phenomena such as the Black Lives Matter (BLM) riots of 2020 surrounding the death of George Floyd when countless whites, even outside the US, bent the knee before primitive negroes in the most humiliating way!

Holland has said in several interviews that the central emblem of Western civilisation, Christ on the Cross (now downtrodden negroes on ‘crosses’) provides a moral framework for understanding the Woke phenomenon. Before reading Dominion, in ‘On empowering carcass-eating birds’ in my book Daybreak I had already said that empowering transgender people was a kind of neo-Franciscanism, in reference to St Francis of Assisi (‘let’s love and kiss the new leper’), and quoted the biblical passage that the last shall be first and the first last. Analogously, speaking about whites bending the knee after the BLM riots, Holland has said that this grotesque self-debasement ultimately goes back to the Gospel narrative of the Passion, ‘to that very, very primal image of a man tortured to death by an oppressive state apparatus: Jesus on the cross.’ Not only at the end of Dominion but in his lectures this London historian has also said that a thoroughgoing rejection of Christianity would allow us to return to the ways of the blond beast. (As axiological enemies of Holland, we would add that the first thing this beast would do will be to drive the millions non-whites out of their lands and punish the recalcitrant as the Romans did in the Appian Way.) In a home interview with a conservative Australian, Holland added:

The modern who has more profoundly and unsettlingly understood just how radical that idea is—how radical the idea that the Cross, of all things, should become the emblem of the new civilisation—, was a man who was not just an atheist but a radical hostile, anti-Christian atheist: Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche said: this is a repellent thing. Nietzsche identified with the power and the glory and the beauty of classical civilisation; and he thought that Christianity, notoriously, was a religion for slaves. And he saw in the emblem of Christ nailed to the Cross a kind of disgusting subversion of the ideals of the classical world: a privileging of those who properly should be ground beneath the heels of the mighty. And he saw it as a kind of sickness that then, it kind of infected the blond beast as he called it: that the primordial figure of the warrior gets corrupted and turned into a monk, a monkish figure who is sick with poverty and sympathy for the poor and the oppressed…

Fascism, I think, was the most radical revolutionary movement that Europe has seen since the age of Constantine because unlike the French Revolution, unlike and the Russian Revolution, it doesn’t even target institutional Christianity: it targets the moral-ethical fundamentals of Christianity. The French Revolution, the Russian Revolution are still preaching that idea that the victim should be raised up from the dust and that the oppressor should be humbled into the dust; it’s still preaching the idea that the first should be last and the last should be first just as Christ has done.

The Nazis do not buy into that.

In the post-WWII world westerners culminated the inversion of healthy values that started with Constantine. They enshrined the privileges of the unprivileged and the universality of all human beings—orc immigrants included—because they now live in the shadow of what enshrined the opposite: Hitlerism; and, given their Christian programming, that scares them. As Holland said at the end of another interview, ‘to cling to the idea that, say, racism is the ultimate sin is still for deeply Christian reasons. It’s possible to imagine a different world in which the strong are powerful and in which the world is divided into the civilised and the barbarians because that’s what the Ancient World was like, and that’s what the Nazis enshrined. It’s perfectly possible. The fact that we regard them as abhorrent I think is testimony of how Christian we remain.’

What Angela Merkel did, opening the doors to two million refugees in anti-Nazi Germany, is ultimately an extreme form of following the parable of the Good Samaritan. Always keep in mind that Jesus didn’t exist but that some Jewish rabbis, the mythmakers, wrote the New Testament. No racialist movement that fails to see this can succeed because despite their rabid anti-Semitism racialists continue to, ultimately, obey the Jews who wrote the NT. They are jew-obeyers. They all live, atheists included, under the moral sky bequeathed to us by the mighty archetype of ‘God on the Cross.’ And outside racist forums, the attempt to make not only the dispossessed blacks but poor transexual people the first, and the healthy white man the last, is but the final metastasis of an inversion that began to take root in our collective unconscious as early as the 4th century of the Common Era.

For decades, in my soliloquies I have often said to myself: ‘A fish cannot criticise water.’ We live in a matrix. Without knowing it or recognising it, secular humanists have been swimming in Christian waters since what misleadingly they call the Age of Enlightenment (actually a ‘Dark Enlightenment,’ as some right-wing intellectuals have pointed out). Ultimately this whole issue of ‘human rights’ is nothing more than a transposition to the legal plane of the Pauline ideas that there is no difference between Jew and Greek, woman and man. In the Athenian democracy only the native males of Attica had the right to vote. Neither slaves nor women nor mudblood foreigners could do so. The assumption that we owe modern democracy to the Greeks is false: we owe it to Christian mandates. Furthermore, modern westerners commit what I call, again in my soliloquies, the psychological fallacy of ontological extension. They believe that all cultures share their humanitarian values when not even the ancient Greeks, the Romans or Norsemen did; let alone billions of contemporary Muslims, Chinese or Hindus. In Holland’s words, ‘the conceit of the West is that it has transcended Christianity to become purely universal; purely global, and therefore it can market itself in those terms. But its values, its assumptions, its ethics remain palpably bred of the marrow of Christianity.’

The term catholic derives from the Greek, katholikos. If we translate ‘universal human rights’ into the Greek of the first centuries of our era, we would be talking about ‘catholic human rights’ insofar as catholic means precisely universal in the sense of no longer making distinctions between Jew and Greek, woman and man, slave and free man: all are now equal in the eyes of a Semitic god. Human rights are catholic in this universal sense. Hitler targeted the idea there exists such a thing as universal human dignity, as well as the idea that the first should be last. From his viewpoint, our viewpoint, and I am talking to those who will read Savitri Devi’s Memories and Reflections of an Aryan Woman, or our books Day of Wrath and On Exterminationism, there is no such a thing as rights. Only the moral duty to dispose of the obsolete versions of Homo sapiens. This is the ultimate repudiation of the Christian heritage. And the horror that most westerners feel at the figures of Hitler and Himmler is nothing other than their continued enslavement to the archetype of the Jew on the Cross which they are still unable to exorcize from their psyches, even if this symbolic ‘Jew’ now takes other forms.

If we see Christianity and the French Revolution’s human rights as two sides of the same axiological coin, let us venture to say that the perfect symbol of our counter-revolution would be for thousands of blonde beasts starting to wear T-shirts emblazoned with Himmler’s face while burning churches, crucifying those who tried to destroy their race and wiping their asses with the remains of the pages of the now destroyed Bibles all over the West, but especially in the US. And the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, which symbolises the historic inauguration of Neo-Christianity, must be razed to the ground as well.

As Nietzsche would say, Umwertung aller Werte!

Tags Christian problem (CP)

Charlemagne Kriminalgeschichte des Christentums (books) Philosophy of history Racial right

Christianity’s Criminal History, 170

Post author By C .T.
Post date November 3, 2022
1 Comment on Christianity’s Criminal History, 170

Karolus serenissimus augustus a Deo coronatus magnus pacificas (Charles, most serene emperor, great and peaceful emperor, crowned by God). As the beginning of his prolix title already read in 801, that peacemaking Caesar, crowned by God and reigning also per misericordiam Dei (by the mercy of God), the one who from 802 was also called imperator christianissimus and who (supposedly) died with the words of Psalm 31: ‘Into thy hands, O Lord, I commend my spirit’, that man had prepared one slaughter after another, and in his forty-six years of rule—from 768 to 814—he had warred almost continuously with about fifty military campaigns. For only two years (790 and 807) he didn’t fight ‘A happy period for the Church’ (Daniel-Rops).

There is nothing strange about the fact that in the Chanson de geste—the French epic poems of the early Middle Ages—he is already ‘more than two hundred years old’, accompanied by his bravest paladins. He fought against the Lombards, the Frisians, the Bavarians, the Avars, the Slavs, the Basques and the Arabs in Spain, and the Byzantines in southern Italy, with offensive wars almost coldly planned and with which he inflicted death, often cruel and terrible death, on countless people.

And not only did he kill in the wars, but he also had 4,500 prisoners murdered and thousands of families banished. Or, as it is said in one of the oldest liturgical poems in honour of Charles: ‘He struck down thousands, cleansed the earth of the heathen weeds, converted the infidels, broke the statues of the gods, drove out the foreign gods’. For him, according to his biographer Einhard, the wars against the Saxons and the Avars were more important than all other political tasks. Moreover, for certain ecclesiastical circles in the 10th century, the Saxon wars were the most important work he did for the Christian mission.

It is not just that Charles ‘the Great’ in fact killed, subjugated and enslaved without pause (winters generally excepted); that he was nothing but a warrior, conqueror, murderer and predator on the grandest scale—which, as the most learned of scholars have long since taught us, was then so commonplace, so much a part of the ‘Saxon way of life’, was then so commonplace, so much the ‘good’ style of the time, that to criticise it would be a crass anachronism, from our ‘enlightened’ time as well as being arbitrary, rigorist, moralistic and square-jawed in the extreme. No, it is also about the fact that Charles ‘the Great’ carried out all this incredible bloodshed with the most intense participation of Christianity and the Church of his time (which, of course, were also ‘sons of their time’! according to the apologists). And that this Church never protested, but rather took full advantage of it all.

The point is that the Christian feudal state and the Christian feudal Church were one and the same thing—and the same thing in crime.

Charles, whose true ‘book of state’ was the Bible, and whose favourite works included Augustine’s City of God, not only ruled and acted as king of the Franks but also as an enlightened protector of the Church, as an interlocutor and ally of the pope, as evidenced by his legislation, his epistolary correspondence written by ecclesiastics and his closest collaborators. This monarch was a kind of priest-king, he was rector et devotus sanctae ecclesiae defensor et adiutor im omnibus (guide and devoted defender and helper of the Holy Church in all things).

Empire and Church became indissolubly intertwined in the imperium christianum, with hardly any difference between political diets and ecclesiastical councils. Charles convened synods, over which he presided; he chose bishops and abbots as he pleased, and in Saxony he instituted the bishoprics he needed. When he needed an archbishopric for his attacks on the miserly, he had the pope erect the archbishopric of Salzburg. He also disposed of church property, enriching popes and bishops with territories. He granted them numerous privileges of immunity and punished the violation of ecclesiastical immunity with the doubled royal penalty of 600 solids. He freed the bishops from taxes and granted them the right to mint money. He punished the plundering and burning of churches with capital punishment.

But above all, he imposed the universal obligation of tithes on the clergy and demanded tithes for the Episcopal churches at the state level. He also bequeathed three-quarters of his cash to the Church, which he took special care of in his last years (while he left only one-twelfth to his children and grandchildren as a whole, and one-twelfth to the palace servants). And the prelates were also entirely dependent on him, although their influence during his reign—considering him at least all the Frankish bishops as the universal head of the Church—grew considerably: under Charles, they marched to war, acted as judges alongside the counts and were at the head of the royal court.

A 1967 study lists no less than 109 places of worship of St. Charles. These include Aachen (where Charles’ death day, 28 January, is still celebrated in the cathedral today, and where I celebrated my name day as a child), Bremen, Brussels, Dortmund, Frankfurt (one of the main places of Charles’ cult), Fulgem (another of the main places of Charles’ cult), Falkirk (another of the main places of Charles’ cult’), Fulda, Halle, Ingelheim, Cologne, Constance, Lüttich, Mainz, Minden, Münster, Nuremberg, Regensburg, Strasbourg, Trier, Vienna, Würzburg and Zurich. It is also noteworthy that Charles received cultic veneration throughout Saxony. For centuries Charles ‘the Great’, Charlemagne, has been regarded as the ideal model ruler, and for many, for very many, he still is today.

Voltaire and Gibbon stigmatised his barbarism and denied him personal greatness.

At the beginning of the 19th century, Napoleon was exalted to the full extent of his power as a ‘Charlemagne redivivus’. After the founding of the German Reich in the 19th century, Germans rediscovered Charles’ Germanness and his bellicose spirit. In the fascist era, amid the Second World War, the 1200th anniversary of Charlemagne’s birth was celebrated on 2 April 1942, and he was presented as ‘Charles the Unifier’.

The Carolingian empire, the imperiun christianum, as Alcuin called it from 798, the regnum sanctae ecclesiae (Libri Carolini), stretched from the North Sea to the Pyrenees and the Adriatic. It covered what is now France, Belgium, Holland, western Germany, Switzerland, most of Italy, the Marca Hispanica and Corsica. It was approximately 1,200,000 square kilometres in area: almost as large as the Western Roman Empire.

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Editor’s Note:

I have been very critical of American white nationalism on this site, but hardly at all of German National Socialism.

It is time to realise that Hitler and the Nazis weren’t perfect. As I implied in my post yesterday, if they had become wise instead of, using chess imagery, gambit the Third Reich against General Winter in Russia, they would have devoted all their efforts to understand the root causes of the dark hour. Karlheinz Deschner, the author of the above text, wouldn’t have hung up his Nazi uniform and become a philo-Semitic liberal because Hitler would have kept his Reich. Deschner could have written his criminal history of Christianity from the point of view of a Germany that had already transvalued its values.

I have said it and it bears repeating: To win the war we must know what we are fighting against. Both the most populist Nazis, like Goebbels, and today’s white nationalists emphasise Jewry. I think Manu Rodriguez, quoted in my post yesterday, was right: the Semitic hydra also includes Christianity and Islam. From time immemorial, anything to do with the Semitic race has been the enemy. Recall that Republican Rome began to decline just after Hannibal and the Carthaginians decimated the flower of the Roman army. That created the spiritual degradation that resulted in the later Roman Empire’s citizens beginning to interbreed with mudbloods. Eventually, the Judeo-Christians took advantage of that opportunity and the rest is history.

After I finish proofreading On Exterminationism, I will start putting together other books-PDFs of the most important entries on this site that show this meta-perspective.

Tags Christian problem (CP), Karlheinz Deschner, National Socialism

Axiology Catholic Church Christendom Dominion (book) Painting Philosophy of history St Francis Tom Holland

Dominion, 1

Or:

How the Woke Monster originated

See what I wrote on Saturday about Tom Holland’s book Dominion, some of whose passages from the Preface I quote below. Holland contrasts the jovial spirit of the Greco-Roman world with the medieval spirit after the Church infected the minds of Europeans:

Something fundamental had indeed changed. ‘Patience in tribulation, offering the other cheek, praying for one’s enemies, loving those who hate us’: such were the Christian virtues as defined by Anselm. All derived from the recorded sayings of Jesus himself. No Christians, then, not even the most callous or unheeding, could ignore them without some measure of reproof from their consciences. [page 9]

Because the American racial right is ignorant of European history, they don’t realise that the Woke Monster—i.e., the inversion of Greco-Roman values—has been suffered by whites since the Middle Ages, not only in recent years:

God was closer to the weak than to the mighty, to the poor than to the rich. Any beggar, any criminal, might be Christ. ‘So the last will be first, and the first last.’ To the Roman aristocrats who, in the decades before the birth of Jesus, first began to colonise the Esquiline Hill with their marble fittings and their flowers beds, such a sentiment would have seemed grotesque. [page 9]

But Holland is similar to Kevin MacDonald in one respect. Although he has abandoned the faith of his childhood, he is still sympathetic to Christianity in some ways. Holland is a secular historian, and like most secular historians that makes him dangerous: he gives us the impression that he is objective, not what we have been calling a neochristian. For example, in the Preface Holland refers to Nero as a ‘malignant Caesar’ (page 10). If the visitor has read the masthead of this site, the Spaniard’s essay on the Judean war against Rome and how Christians wrote history, he will remember that from the ancient world these Judeo-Christians were engaged in defaming figures like Caligula and Nero because they took anti-Jewish measures. (Believing mainstream historians is akin to believing what CNN has said about Trump.)

In the middle of Dominion, the book contains splendid colour reproductions such as the following, in the context of the reversal of classical to Christian values, with St Peter, the very vicar of Christ on earth, depicted in this way:

No ancient artist would have thought to honour a Caesar by representing him as Caravaggio represented Peter: tortured, humiliated, stripped almost bare. And yet, in the city of the Caesars, it was a man broken to such a fate who was honoured as the keeper of ‘the keys of the kingdom of heaven’. The last had indeed become first… [page 10]

In the Middle Ages, no civilisation in Eurasia was as congruent with a single dominant set of beliefs as was the Latin West with its own distinctive form of Christianity. Elsewhere, whether in the lands of Islam, or in India, or in China, there were various understandings of the divine, and numerous institutions that served to define them; but in Europe, in the lands that acknowledged the primacy of the pope, there was only the occasional community of Jews to disrupt the otherwise total monopoly of the Roman Church. [page 11]

As we have often insisted in discussing the climax of the Spaniard’s essay, the incredible juggling act that the Judeo-Christians performed in a process that culminated with Emperor Theodosius II, was to allow only Judaism and Judeo-Christianity as the religions of the Roman Empire. No other—and under no circumstances the previous religions with Aryan gods!

Well might the Roman Church have termed itself ‘catholic’: ‘universal’. There was barely a rhythm of life that it did not define. From dawn to dusk, from midsummer to the depths of winter, from the hour of their birth to the very last drawing of their breath, the men and women of medieval Europe absorbed its assumptions into their bones. Even when, in the century before Caravaggio, Catholic Christendom began to fragment, and new forms of Christianity to emerge, the conviction of Europeans that their faith was universal remained deep-rooted. It inspired them in their exploration of continents undreamed of by their forefathers; in their conquest of those that they were able to seize, and reconsecrate as a Promised Land… [page 11]

Time itself has been Christianised. [page 12]

If today’s members of the racial right were not charlatans, the first thing they would want to do would be to proclaim that the coming new age is no longer to be measured by the birth of a non-existent Jew (pace Holland, Jesus didn’t exist), but of the Aryan man about whom Savitri Devi wrote: ‘To the god-like Individual of our times; the Man against Time; the greatest European of all times; both Sun and Lightning…’ (see the featured post).

How was it that a cult inspired by the execution of an obscure criminal in a long-vanished empire came to exercise such a transformative and enduring influence on the world? To attempt an answer to this question, as I do in this book, is not to write a history of Christianity. Rather than provide a panoramic survey of its evolution, I have sought instead to trace the currents of Christian influence that have spread most widely, and been most enduring into the present day. That is why—although I have written extensively about the Eastern and Orthodox Churches elsewhere, and find them themes of immense wonder and fascination—I have chosen not to trace their development beyond antiquity. My ambition is hubristic enough as it is: to explore how we in the West came to be what we are, and to think the way that we do… [page 12]

Today, at a time of seismic geopolitical realignment, when our values are proving to be not nearly as universal as some of us had assumed them to be, the need to recognise just how culturally contingent they are is more pressing than ever. To live in a Western country is to live in a society still utterly saturated by Christian concepts and assumptions. This is no less true for Jews or Muslims than it is for Catholics or Protestants. Two thousand years on from the birth of Christ, it does not require a belief that he rose from the dead to be stamped by the formidable—indeed the inescapable—influence of Christianity. Fail to appreciate this, and the risk is always of anachronism… [page 13]

Remember the negrolatric revolution (BLM riots) that surprised everyone less those who see recent history as the explosion of the Christian sun in its secular, incendiary form: a red giant that I have called neochristianity (although it’s more precise to see it as ‘neofranciscanism’)?

The West, increasingly empty though the pews may be, remains firmly moored to its Christian past. There are those who will rejoice at this proposition; and there are those who will be appalled by it. Christianity may be the most enduring and influential legacy of the ancient world, and its emergence the single most transformative development in Western history, but it is also the most challenging for a historian to write about. [page 13]

One thing I like about Holland’s prose is that he sprinkles his erudite treatise with personal vignettes:

…although I vaguely continued to believe in God, I found him infinitely less charismatic than the gods of the Greeks: Apollo, Athena, Dionysus. I liked the way that they did not lay down laws, or condemn other deities as demons; I liked their rock-star glamour. As a result, by the time I came to read Edward Gibbon and his great history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, I was more than ready to accept his interpretation of the triumph of Christianity: that it had ushered in an ‘age of superstition and credulity’. My childhood instinct to see the biblical God as the po-faced enemy of liberty and fun was rationalised. The defeat of paganism had ushered in the reign of Nobodaddy, and of all the various crusaders, inquisitors and black-hatted Puritans who had served as his acolytes. Colour and excitement had been drained from the world. ‘Thou hast conquered, O pale Galilean,’ wrote the Victorian poet Algernon Charles Swinburne, echoing the apocryphal lament of Julian the Apostate, the last pagan emperor of Rome. ‘The world has grown grey from thy breath.’ Instinctively, I agreed. [pages 15-16]

Then Holland says something that reminds me of Yockey’s words in Imperium: that Europeans claim to be based on the Greco-Roman world when in fact they are completely different civilisations:

Yet over the course of the past two decades, my perspective has changed. When I came to write my first works of history, I chose as my themes the two periods that had always most stirred and moved me as a child: the Persian invasions of Greece and the last decades of the Roman Republic. The years that I spent writing these twin studies of the classical world, living intimately in the company of Leonidas and of Julius Caesar, of the hoplites who had died at Thermopylae and of the legionaries who had crossed the Rubicon, only confirmed me in my fascination: for Sparta and Rome, even when subjected to the minutest historical enquiry, retained their glamour as apex predators. They continued to stalk my imaginings as they had always done: like a great white shark, like a tiger, like a tyrannosaur. Yet giant carnivores, however wondrous, are by their nature terrifying. The more years I spent immersed in the study of classical antiquity, so the more alien I increasingly found it. The values of Leonidas, whose people had practised a peculiarly murderous form of eugenics and trained their young to kill uppity Untermenschen by night, were nothing that I recognised as my own; nor were those of Caesar, who was reported to have killed a million Gauls, and enslaved a million more. It was not just the extremes of callousness that unsettled me, but the complete lack of any sense that the poor or the weak might have the slightest intrinsic value. Why did I find this disturbing? Because, in my morals and ethics, I was not a Spartan or a Roman at all. That my belief in God had faded over the course of my teenage years did not mean that I had ceased to be Christian. For a millennium and more, the civilisation into which I had been born was Christendom. Assumptions that I had grown up with—about how a society should properly be organised, and the principles that it should uphold—were not bred of classical antiquity, still less of ‘human nature’, but very distinctively of that civilisation’s Christian past. So profound has been the impact of Christianity on the development of Western civilisation that it has come to be hidden from view. It is the incomplete revolutions which are remembered; the fate of those which triumph is to be taken for granted. [pages 16-17]

And in the final words of the Preface, Holland tells us:

The ambition of Dominion is to trace the course of what one Christian, writing in the third century AD, termed ‘the flood-tide of Christ’: how the belief that the Son of the one God of the Jews had been tortured to death on a cross came to be so enduringly and widely held that today most of us in the West are dulled to just how scandalous it originally was. This book explores what it was that made Christianity so subversive and disruptive; how completely it came to saturate the mindset of Latin Christendom; and why, in a West that is often doubtful of religion’s claims, so many of its instincts remain—for good and ill—thoroughly Christian. [page 17]

Tags Christian problem (CP), Middle Ages, Transvaluation of all values

Bible Final solution Judaism Philosophy of history Racial right Who We Are (book)

How Yahweh conquered Rome, 3

Post author By C .T.
Post date October 12, 2022

Jews in Rome before the Jewish Wars

Long before it was repackaged for the Gentiles, the Big Lie was a Jewish self-delusion. As I have detailed at the end of my long article ‘Zionism, Crypto-Judaism and the Biblical Hoax,’ in the sixth and the fifth century BC in Babylon, a priestly elite from Jerusalem decided that Yahweh, the national god of Israel, although apparently vanquished, was in fact the only real god, and, by way of consequence, the Creator of Heaven and Earth. A laughable claim, but when the Persians conquered Babylon, those Jews, who found themselves in a favourable position after helping the Persians, set out to pretend that their theoclastic monotheism, based on the exclusion of all other gods, was identical to the tolerant monotheism of the Persians; in other words, that their tribal god Yahweh was Ahura Mazda, the God of Heaven. I have shown that the deception is clearly apparent in the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah, where only Persians are portrayed as believing that Yahweh is ‘the God of Heaven,’ while for the Israelites he is just ‘the god of Israel.’

What the priestly Jews achieved in Babylon in the fifth century BC was a preliminary stage for what another generation of the same priestly cast would start planning in the first century AD in Rome, after having been brought there in similar conditions of captivity. While Yahweh seemed again vanquished, he set out to conquer his victor from within. The conspiracy of Babylon’s Jews to fool the Persians with their phony monotheism was the blueprint for the more sophisticated conspiracy of Rome’s Jews to fool the Romans with Christianity.

Between those two stages, Jews seem to have convinced a portion of the Roman aristocracy that they were the first true monotheists, the worshipers of the true God. For Greeks and Romans, the supreme Creator was a philosophical concept, while religious cults were polytheistic by definition. That’s why, around 315 BC, the Aristotelian Theophrastus of Eresus thought of the Jews as ‘philosophers by birth,’ although he was troubled by their primitive holocausts. Some Jewish writers (Aristobulus of Paneas, Artapanos of Alexandria, or even Philo of Alexandria) had even succeeded in bluffing some Greeks with the wild claim that Homer, Hesiod, Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato had been inspired by Moses.[8]

Jews are mentioned in Rome as early as the second century BC. It has been surmised that they were mostly converted Phoenicians. Martin Bernal defends that thesis in Jews and Phoenicians, with the argument that ‘there is no evidence of Jews in the West Mediterranean before the destruction of Carthage [146 BC],’ but ‘after that date, they were widely reported there,’ while Phoenicians faded from the pages of history.

Phoenicians and Jews’ languages and cultures were virtually identical.[9] Peter Myers brings additional light in his well-sourced article ‘Carthaginians, Phoenicians & Berbers became Jews’, arguing that, ‘After the destruction of Carthage by Rome, many Carthaginians and Phoenicians converted to Judaism, because Jerusalem was the only remaining centre of West Semitic civilization.’

The Encyclopedia Judaica’s article on Carthage, quoted by Myers, supports that hypothesis, adding that the Phoenicians, by converting to Judaism after their political decline, ‘preserved their Semitic identity and were not assimilated by the Roman-Hellenistic culture which they hated.’ This theory, which also explains the mysterious origin of the Sephardim in Spain—a Carthaginian colony—, is of obvious importance to comprehend the attitude of Jews towards the Roman Empire, destroyer of the Phoenician civilization.

(Left, Flavius Josephus highlights the ancient affinity between Phoenicians and Jews.) In 63 BC, Rome’s Jewish community was enlarged with thousands of captives brought back from Judea by Pompey, and progressively freed (Philo of Alexandria, Legatio ad Caium, 156). It is believed that Julius Cesar introduced legislation to guarantee their religious liberty, and that the law was confirmed by Augustus, who also exempted them from military service. Emperor Claudius (41-54 AD) is said to have expelled the Jews from Rome (Suetonius, Claudius xv, 4; Acts 18:2), or at least forbidden them to congregate (Cassius Dio lx, 6). But they seem to have known favourable times under Nero (54-68), whose wife Poppaea Sabina is regarded as an Esther-type secret Jewess in Jewish tradition, because Jewish historian Flavius Josephus calls her ‘a God-worshipper’ (Antiquities of the Jews, xx, 195) and mentions her support for the release of Jewish priests prosecuted in Rome (Vita 16).[10]

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Editor’s note: When Greg Johnson criticised William Pierce’s Who We Are years ago, he argued that Pierce, with his suggestion that the ancient Aryans should have exterminated the non-Aryans, was saying something monstrous. Johnson even called ‘whites’ those mudblood Cauacsoids whom we now assume had Semitic, though not Jewish, blood.

White nationalism would be greatly enriched by admitting that the Judean war against Rome has been in reality a psychological war of the Semites (including non-Jews, such as the Phoenicians and the Carthaginians who survived the Third Punic War) against the Aryans. It is a great pathology that infects even white nationalism not want to see the macro-dynamics of the clash between Semites and Aryans that has been going on for millennia.

I blame Christian ethics for that. (Recall, for example, that a dozen years ago Johnson delivered homilies at his church in San Francisco. He has since abandoned Christianity and is now a pious neochristian—just read his The White Nationalist Manifesto.) If Christian ethics is to blame, for transvaluing Semitic values Pierce’s book should be the textbook of American racialists. But I understand that the copyright holders, the National Alliance, haven’t yet published it.

Or am I wrong?

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[8] Joseph Mélèze Modrzejewski, The Jews of Egypt, From Rameses II to Emperor Hadrian, Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 48-49, 66.

[9] Martin Bernal, Geography of a Life, chap. 45, ‘Jews and Phoenicians,’ pp. 386-394.

[10] Nahum Goldmann, Le Paradoxe juif. Conversations en français avec Léon Abramowicz, Stock, 1976, p. 36; Heinrich Graetz, Histoire des Juifs, A. Lévy, 1882 (on fr.wikisource.org), tome I, p. 413-428.

Tags Christian problem (CP), History, Jewish problem (JP)