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Christianity’s Criminal History, 159

 
Charles I, known as the Great or Charlemagne, and the Popes

‘His hair was grey and beautiful, his face radiant and cheerful; his appearance was always imposing and dignified; his health always magnificent’. ‘The Christian religion, in which he was instructed from a young age, he always cultivated with great sanctity and piety (sanctissime et cum magna pietate coluit). He visited the church assiduously, morning and evening, also at night and during mass’. —Einhard

His most important interlocutors throughout his life were the popes. The pivot of Carolingian politics, around which everything revolved, was the relationship with the Holy See’. ‘It is curious that while Charles lived he was able to avoid any conflict with the papal see. Charles certainly never won the confidence of the Italian population; there he continued to be an enemy’. —Wolfgang Braunfels

‘The Merovingian state had been predominantly profane; the Carolingian empire, by contrast, was a theocracy’. —Christopher Dawson

‘The image of the Carolingian theocracy harmonised impressively with the Carolingian idea of peace and with the conception of the empire as a corpus christianum’. —Eugen Ewick

‘Then the hour of the man of Providence sounded’. ‘With Charles the Great, the victorious arms of the Franks were the forerunners of Catholic doctrine’. ‘To keep his subjects in harmony and to establish among men concord pacis were the ideal aims of that mighty monarch, under whose reign scarcely a year passed without war. But these ideals fully correspond to a Christian conception of his office’. —Daniel Rops

‘I would rate Charlemagne well up in the top five most evil characters of European history’. —Arthur Kemp (*)

 

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Editor’s Note:

While it is true that I believe Hitler to have been the greatest man in Western history (and the fact that whites currently defame him and continue to worship Yahweh can only mean that they have signed their death warrant), that doesn’t mean that Hitler was infallible. Politically and militarily, he blundered in invading the Soviet Union. But ideologically he also erred, though not so catastrophically, insofar as his opinion was limited to one of his after-dinner talks. I am referring to that evening with his friends when he approved that Charlemagne tamed the Saxons (others, like Himmler and the SS, believed exactly the opposite).

Although Hitler had a much better awareness of the Christian problem than those Americans who since the mid-1990s have called themselves white nationalists, his understanding of Christendom was limited. As far as I know, it was only until this century that Christianity began to be understood as the primary cause, not a secondary cause, of white decline.

Although the syntax correction of my books will take time (I am about to finish Daybreak), only when I have completed the revision of all the books of our Daybreak Press, which includes one by Savitri Devi, will the formal presentation of the new paradigm be available in acceptable English. In the meantime, I must say that our reading of history is diametrically opposed to Kenneth Clark’s not only as far as Charlemagne is concerned (featured on the cover of his book), but in how Clark represented Christendom.

Fortunately, non-Christian authors such as Karlheinz Deschner have shown us a different history of Christendom in general, and Charlemagne in particular, that differs not only from the historical conception of the normies, but of American white nationalists and even Hitler himself.

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(*) This last quote doesn’t appear in the original. Deschner usually puts several epigraphs of theologians and Christian historians in favour of a specific character at the beginning of a chapter, and he adds in the end one or two quotes from dissidents who say the opposite. It doesn’t hurt that I take the liberty of adding one more critical quote here because Kemp is the only living historian of the white race.

5 Replies on “Christianity’s Criminal History, 159

  1. “Politically and militarily, he blundered in invading the Soviet Union.”

    Well, if what I read was correct the Soviets were planning to invade in any case. They had removed border obstacles, rebuild RR bridges and roads as well as stockpiling supplies at the frontier. The Wehrmacht fast advance at the beginning of the invasion was credited to the Soviets making all these preparations for their own invasion, but Germany caught them flat-footed. It’s truly a shame that National Socialism never had much time to develop before it was pushed into a war footing.

    Interestingly according to people well read in Military strategy/tactics, the Russians are using many German tactics to fight the Ukrainians in the current conflict. Oh, the irony.

    1. Even assuming the Soviets had planned to invade, it was a diplomatic mistake. The gringos had already intervened for good in World War I, and the British Empire still existed in the late 1930s. It would have been more astute to resist the invasion with a Marginot Line in the hope of receiving help against Stalin while the technology for the atomic bomb was being developed… in Germany.

      Operation Barbarossa was a military blunder: like losing the queen in chess.

      1. Everyone expected the Soviets to lose, especially after their shameful showing in the Winter War with Finland. But could you imagine telling a haughty German at the peak of European glory that they could not win that war? That the better strategy was to build a fortress, and wait a century until the Christians around them commit suicide? (In this regard, the Hitlerians were thinking in a heroic, messianic fashion, as opposed to fatalistic, cyclical.)

        What I would critique in the Germany of that time, however, is Hitler’s disparaging, hopeless attitude towards the upcoming generations. It is precisely the area of peace-time child-rearing that makes or breaks the nation. (And I do wonder whether Genoud forged that later Hitler’s realization of this in 1945.)

        I doubt atomic weapons were that relevant until the advent of ICBMs and mass-production in the 1960s. They were menacing in the 1950s only because both the Americans and the Soviets were becoming ever more cowardly and degenerate (with the “crusade” against Germany being a detour towards warfare only to commit suicide later).

  2. I agree that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was a diplomatic trap.
    However, if you imagine a world in which the Führer does not seize the opportunity to take half of Poland, then that Führer wouldn’t be Hitler. Adolf was a bold risk-taker.

    I cannot agree on a fortress strategy. That would only accelerate the downfall of Berlin.
    The Soviet Union was like Isengard, a corrupted country ruled by followers of Mordor – Murka – and the Red Army was an enormous horde of orcs bred for a single purpose: to conquer Europe.
    Help would never come for the Germans, while the Soviets were being helped in every way, except in manpower; so abundant in conscripts that they didn’t even need Western troops on Russian soil.

    Germany would not get the bomb before the Americans. Heisenberg’s nuclear fission technology was advancing at a much slower pace than Oppenheimer’s. He miscalculated the critical mass of uranium needed for a chain reaction. He couldn’t separate uranium isotopes. He was testing heavy water as a stabilizer instead of graphite.

    Barbarossa was inevitable. It was the ultimate decisive campaign, but it failed. Yes, it was like a chess gambit that sacrificed the White Queen for little gain. We could spend hours discussing why it failed, and further, how it could’ve hypothetically taken the Black Queen – Moscow – but that would be unproductive, serving perhaps as a morale booster.

    1. My guess is that if Hitler had not invaded the SU (unless he already had the bomb), the Reich would still exist in Europe. One thing is clear: Hitler would have had the bomb before Stalin.