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2nd World War Moscow Tischgespräche

The Führer’s monologues, 2

For the context of these translations click here,
for this monologue in German, here.

Führer Headquarters 5/6 July 1941, 11.30 a.m. – 1.50 a.m.

Conversation with [Nicolaus] v. Below[1] about whether we wouldn’t do well to publish pictures of the large-calibre gun, which had not yet been shown, now for once, for the moral shaking of the enemy. Long general discussion about car engines: the Führer’s first and later cars. [Hitler also said:]

The beauty of Crimea is made accessible to us by a motorway: the German south. Crete is hot and forestless. Cyprus would be nice, but we reach Crimea by road—Kiev. And our destination: Croatia. ‘I think there will be great joy after the war’.

Better than the railway, which is somewhat impersonal, the motor car will connect the peoples. What a factor on the way to the new Europe! Just as the autobahn [federal controlled-access highway system in Germany] made the inner-German borders disappear, the borders of the European countries will be abolished.

When asked whether it would be enough to have advanced as far as the Urals as a frontier, [I reply that] it will be enough to have advanced the frontier as far as there. Bolshevism must be eradicated; if necessary, to this end we would advance from there to wherever a new centre of resistance is forming. Moscow as the seat of this doctrine will disappear from the face of the earth as soon as the valuable goods are taken away. It won’t be possible for us to work with the Russians in the factories there. St. Petersburg [Leningrad] as a city is incomparably more beautiful than Moscow. This time, the art treasures of The Hermitage [Museum] would probably not have been transferred to the Kremlin—as in the [First] World War—but to houses in the countryside, unless they’ve been taken to the cities east of Moscow or by sea.


[1] Nicolaus von Below was Hitler’s Luftwaffe adjutant, last in the rank of Major General.


The Führer’s monologues, 1

For the context of these translations click here,
for this monologue in German, here.

Part One: Table talks # 1-74
– 5 July to 31 December 1941 –


Führer Headquarters Saturday, 5 July 1941

What we lack, he said, is a clear presentation of the will to live, the way of life of der Völker [the Germanic peoples]. The difference between the fascist and the Russian people’s movements is that the fascist involuntarily followed the path of the old Roman community formation, while the Russian tended in the direction of anarchy.

The Russian does not, by nature, strive for higher forms of community. The people can also live in such a way that there is no grouping of family units into a whole; if Russia has a state form in the occidental sense, it’s merely the result of coercion.

In a certain sense all human culture, the beautiful, is a result of coercion, of what we call education; but the Aryan peoples have a disposition to activity. A man like Krümel[1] is active from morning till night, another is always thinking; the Italian is industrious as a bee; for the Russian, the highest cultural creation is vodka, the ideal: to always do only what is necessary. Work in our sense and even more work, such as an Aryan might demand from him, are a nuisance to him.

It is questionable whether one can get along in Russia without the priest; the Pope has comforted the Russian about the fact that he is condemned to work; in return, he will be well off in the afterlife. The Russian will work if he is under an iron organisation, but he is unable to organise himself. Only the drop of Aryan blood in individual veins is what has given the Russian people inventions and state organisation.

A just regime belongs to the strong hand of rulership, who presupposes this in every leadership. But just as the horse, if it isn’t constantly kept in check, throws away all training in a flash—in America a few horses had run away and a few decades later the country had enormous herds of wild horses. The horse found its way back to nature so quickly, so the primal urge to return to nature is also always present in the Russian. For him, these are the forms of life in which the family exists. Like a mother hare, the Russian will care for her children with everything that belongs to motherhood. But that’s all the Russian wants. His rebellion against the coercion of state organisation—and it always means coercion because it curtails the freedom of the individual—is brutal and blindly cruel, as is always the reaction of the women. If he fails in this, he breaks down in self-recriminations; it is in these revolutions that he strives back to nature. Thus nihilism remains the form of his revolution.

The boss also said:

He believes that there was still oil in a thousand places; in the case of coal, we know how the coal reserves decrease: cavities form. When it comes to oil, we don’t know whether the cavities won’t fill up again from reservoirs invisible to us.

Man is perhaps the most dangerous microbe imaginable. He takes the whole earth without asking whether there might be substances of vital importance for life in another region, which he looks with the microscope for the cause of devastation that is felt on the surface of the earth.


[1] The cook in Hitler’s special train was known by this joking name.

Daybreak Publishing Lord of the Rings Racial right Richard Carrier Tischgespräche

A new translation of Adolf’s talks


The younger brother of Boromir

Before we begin translating each talk from Werner Jochmann’s 2000 edition, published in German, I must clarify a few points.

Hitler’s after-dinner talks have been repudiated both by some white nationalists (those who are Christian and sympathetic to National Socialism), and by anti-Christian liberals like Richard Carrier who resent the idea that Hitler might have harboured anti-Christian ideas. Both base their arguments on the botched English translation currently on the market. The way to shut them up is simply to translate into English a reliable edition of the original manuscript, which we will do for The West’s Darkest Hour.

Each Hitler after-dinner talk will be accompanied by a hatnote linking to this PDF: the translated introduction by Werner Jochmann and a very brief text by David Irving (the original in German can be read: here). Since Jochmann’s introduction consists of 34 pages, we have taken the liberty of adding some subheadings to make it less of a chore to read: Heim, Picker, Bormann, Hitler, Master Plan East, Final solution and Christianity (the subheading This edition does appear in Jochmann’s original text).

The Christian question is central to understanding not only the dark hour, but the resounding failure of white nationalists. Recently, some commenters and I made use of LOTR and the character Boromir to understand the problem. While I agree with what Krist Krusher said about Tolkien, the metaphor is splendid to illustrate why using the One Ring—Christianity—to save the race will always end in the destruction of whoever dons the ring.

The point is that ‘No one here can wield the ring: it only answers to its Master’. And the Master is none other than the Jew who wrote the Gospel! (even though he now only lives disembodied in the amorphous form of Sauron). The One Ring answers only to him and to him alone. When a racialist Christian wants to put on the ring to fight the dark hour he falls into the trap set by Sauron: precisely what I recently said about an old article published on this site: ‘Silly Christian apologetics on The Occidental Observer’.

I’d like to end this entry with what I said a couple of days ago in the comments section: ‘Even the toughest Americans are willing to put on the One Ring to fight Sauron rather than understand—as Frodo’s servant, Sam, finally made Faramir understand—that it was impossible to use it for Gondor’s purposes’.

In his private talks, Hitler understood what American white nationalists still fail to understand.

Henry Picker Martin Bormann Tischgespräche

The Führer’s monologues (ix)

This edition

The texts published here are all part of Martin Bormann’s collection of Führergespräche (Führer talks). They are printed in unabridged form, retaining their chronological order. As a rule, Heim summarised the content in a note immediately after each conversation. Only in a few cases did he add statements to later notes, resulting in slight deviations in the chronology (e.g., table talk #91). Only the regularly recurring opening formulas were deleted: ‘The boss expressed himself at tea in approximately the following lines of thought’ or: ‘The boss expressed himself in the sense of, among other things, the following lines of thought’.

Spelling has been normalised; corrections of obvious spelling mistakes, especially in personal names, are not marked. The omissions in the text appear in the original. It is unclear whether Heim left the gaps because he did not remember the information correctly, or whether there are other reasons for the omissions.

The records of Heim’s conversations that Henry Picker transcribed and included in his edition of the Tischgespräche are all marked with an asterisk after the document number. Given the errors and oversights that Picker made in transcribing or printing his documents, these texts should in future be cited according to the edition available here. The editor did not consider it necessary to point out all the deviations and oversights, as this would have impaired the readability of the source and bloated the annotation apparatus.

Document 6 of 9 August 1941, which Picker included in his edition, is not in the collection of interview transcripts. Nor was it written by Heim, as Picker claims. Whether these Grundsätze der Offiziers-Ehrauffassung were formulated based on the keywords and guiding ideas given by Hitler himself must remain an open question. They do not belong in this collection and are not included in the first edition of Tischgespräche edited by Gerhard Ritter.

Four of Hitler’s monologues (#41, 61, 62 and 213) were recorded by Martin Bormann himself. In character, they are more file notes and were partly dictated as such. However, since the head of the Party Chancellery himself classified them as ‘Führer Talks’ and placed them chronologically in his collection, they have been included in this edition, as have documents #203 to 212, which were prepared by one of Bormann’s assistants after Heim’s departure.

All other documents were dictated and signed by Heim.

Our commentary on Hitler’s monologues has been kept deliberately brief. The editor has refrained from interpreting expressions of opinion on questions of history, politics, worldview or art, as this would have more than doubled the annotation apparatus.

Third Reich Tischgespräche

The Führer’s monologues (viii)

Given the uncompromisingness in the implementation of his ideological goals, Hitler encountered permanent resistance from all opposing forces in Europe. The struggle against communists, socialists and pacifists, waged from the beginning, became steadily tougher during the war. More complicated was the confrontation with the liberal and conservative forces of the bourgeoisie, who expressed more and more reservations as the war progressed and circumvented or delayed numerous orders. They could rarely be forced or ousted because they could not be replaced as experts in their fields of activity. Disgruntled by this, Hitler repeatedly criticised civil servants, teachers, professors and intellectuals who did not take into account the requirements of the time.

The intensification of the Weltanschauungskampf (worldview struggle) is particularly evident in the accusations against Christianity and the Christian churches. Since Christians fundamentally respect every human being as a creature of God, many of them rebelled against the practices of racial, ethnic and occupation policies when they realised that these were not temporary exaggerations or excesses, but a planned approach. Not only the small group of those who actively resisted became a danger for the National Socialist leadership, but also the constantly growing number of Christians who, out of conscientious objection, refused the regime in whole or in part.

The accusations against the churches and Christianity were so sharp not least because Hitler was by no means areligious and believed in a Creator, but in contrast to the Christians was convinced that he knew and could do His will. From his point of view, the churches were acting completely unnaturally by observing the commandment of love, which included the incurably ill, people of different skin colour and race, and unbelievers. For him, therefore, Christianity was ‘pre-Bolshevism’ (table talk #40). In Hitler’s view, Paul had transformed and used the teachings of Christ to undermine and bring down the Roman Empire from within. Through the demand for equality of all people, the uprising of the lowly and the inferior had been initiated: the ground was prepared for overthrow and destruction. ‘Pure Christianity’, Hitler concluded, ‘leads to the destruction of humanity, it is naked Bolshevism in metaphysical dressing’ (table talk #66).

The verbal radicalism of the attacks against Christianity was also determined by the fact that Hitler knew exactly that he could not wage a determined church struggle during the war. He was well aware of the power that the churches still represented. A great conflict, therefore, was bound to lead to deep anxiety among the population and evoke great dangers during the war. Therefore, it seemed advisable merely to register the opposition of the bishops, clergy and church laity and to postpone the reckoning until a later time (# 130).

Hitler’s sharp front against Christianity was by no means approved of by all, even within the NSDAP and its branches. Ministers who had gained their office through the party broke ranks. Even in the SS there were still leaders and members who had not left the church and who were bound to come into serious conflict in the event of a dispute. It was no different in the corps of political leaders up to the highest ranks. This example—others could be brought up—shows that the NSDAP was not a monolithic bloc, and that there was no basic consensus even on decisive questions. In the Weltanschauungskampf Hitler could not rely unconditionally on his party; rather, he was dependent on other forces and power-bearers to carry out his plans and orders.

______ 卐 ______

Editor’s Note: This wonderfully shows that it was not time to wage war! It was time to consolidate the Nazi state and educate the masses about Christianity: something that white nationalists across the Atlantic haven’t yet managed to do. (That’s why I consider them semi-normies, as I said yesterday.)

______ 卐 ______

But other groups of Germans were certainly not unreservedly prepared to make the goals of the National Socialist state their own. In Hitler’s national community (Volksgemeinschaft), the social contradictions and the old ideals were by no means overcome, as has been shown, but only pushed back; they broke out again when rapid rearmament and military expansion overstretched popular forces. Even before the war began, the enthusiasm of the national bourgeoisie that it had shown in the face of the reintroduction of universal conscription and the foreign policy successes of the Third Reich was waning. Regimentation, growing restrictions on economic, intellectual and cultural activity and the constant threat of external conflict led to a revival of faded principles. The working class, which to a large extent had recognised the efforts to revive the economy as well as the improvement of social benefits, increasingly rebelled against the restrictions on the choice of employment and the enforcement of their wage demands. The more powerless they felt in the face of decisions to extend working hours and worsen employment conditions, the more they became aware of the disintegration of trade union organisations.

In Hitler’s thinking, ideological goals had absolute priority, so he ignored the concerns and wishes of the population as soon as his rule was securely established. His regime became uncompromising, the subordinate leaders and generals were to be ‘ice-cold dog snouts’ and ‘unpleasant people’ (#98) when it came to accomplishing the tasks set. Convinced of the rightness of what he was striving for, he allowed no leniency or forbearance. He understood people with their faults and weaknesses, but forbade himself and others to take them into account. His regime was not in the service of the people, but the people were made to serve his worldview.

In recent years, various attempts have been made to revise the image of Hitler. According to them, the leader of the Third Reich appears as the man of peace, the patron of the arts and the builder of a new, more beautiful Europe.[1] Evidence for these theses can certainly be found in the monologues published here. And there is no doubt that Hitler knew how to win over and inspire people for himself and his goals right up to the end. But anyone who reads these conversation notes carefully, cannot ignore the fact that he wanted to build the happiness of future generations on the misfortune of those whom he declared enemies or who did not act and believe as he did. On the way to his future, not only enemies but also enthusiastic followers and faithful followers were left behind as victims.


[1] I will mention here only one book, representative of many others, by the architect Hermann Giesler: Ein anderer Hitler. Erlebnisse–Gespräche–Reflexionen. Leoni am Starnberger See, 1978.

Final solution Holocaust Reinhard Heydrich Third Reich Tischgespräche

The Führer’s monologues (vii)

In his Anmerkungen zu Hitler, Sebastian Haffner argued that the character of the National Socialist leader was determined early on and ‘astonishingly always remained the same’. This is especially true of the basic ideological positions.[1] The proof was provided by Eberhard Jäckel in his study on Hitler’s Weltanschauung.[2]

Here we will only briefly touch on the thoughts that Hitler developed in the monologues recorded by Heim. The defeat of 1918, he thought, and the harsh terms of the peace treaty so wounded the national pride and self-confidence of the German people that they exerted all their strength to get out of the distress. Without the uncompromising attitude of the victorious powers of the First World War, it would never have been possible to inflame the national passions to such an extent, to achieve the will tension to regain the former world status. Hitler, in contrast to many of his followers and voters, sought it, however, only as a prerequisite for the establishment of a larger Reich, which at the same time was to become the organising power of a new Europe. To achieve this goal, no state should be in a position to oppose these aspirations. Hitler was deeply convinced that the land ‘according to eternal natural law’ belonged to the one who conquered it, ‘because the old borders did not offer sufficient possibilities for the growth of the people’ (table talk #117).

According to Hitler’s worldview, the first and most important prerequisite for the expansion of Germany’s sphere of power was the strengthening of the people’s vital energies, and the mobilisation of their readiness to fight. Since Hitler could not imagine history without war, he considered it necessary to educate the people to affirm the struggle for existence. He therefore consistently wanted the German people to wage war every fifteen to twenty years (table talk #17). Only in this way would they be able to summon up the utmost strength and maintain the necessary toughness. To get young and old, poor and rich, citizens and workers to identify with the National Socialist regime, to get them to unreservedly link their private existence with that of the state privileges were abolished, discrimination ended, and educational and promotional opportunities improved. Above all, the entire population was to be given access to the nation’s cultural assets. However, the National Socialist leadership reserved the right to determine what art was, and which works of music, poetry and painting corresponded to the consciousness of the people. In addition, Hitler expected everyone to take advantage of their opportunities, to make full use of the possibilities offered to them. If he failed to do so, if he deliberately withdrew from the struggle for life as demanded by the state, all support and tolerance would be withdrawn. The same applied to the people as a whole. Hitler spoke of them with appreciation and respect, and praised their diligence, loyalty and many other positive qualities. But he demanded that they accept the struggle and prove themselves in it. If they did not fight resolutely and bravely, if they showed symptoms of weakness, there was no excuse: ‘If the German people are not prepared to stand up for their self-preservation, fine: then let them disappear!’ (table talk #114)

Hitler himself spared no effort and no means to increase the strength and readiness to fight, but above all the inner unity of the nation. This was served by the attempt to bring as many people of German nationality as possible into the Reich from the occupied areas of Europe and other states, to have ethnic Germans or volunteers from related nations fight in units of the Wehrmacht or the Waffen-SS, and to enlist minorities or individual members of foreign nations, as far as they were considered assimilable, for cooperation.

The declared enemies of the regime were fought with the same uncompromising zeal that was used to select those who were considered useful and qualified according to ideological principles. These included, among others, Czechs, Poles, Russians and, first and foremost, the Jews. Hitler repeatedly emphasised with emphasis that there was no leniency for ‘aliens from the community’. It has recently been claimed that the deportation and murder of the European Jews took place without the knowledge of the German head of state.[3] According to another view, the order to kill them was only given after the conflict between rival forces had become so disastrous that there was no longer any alternative.[4] In my opinion, both theses are untenable. The assumption that the decision to the ‘final solution to the Jewish question’ in Europe was taken by Hitler in the face of the realisation that the war could no longer be decided militarily[5] is not confirmed either in these records or in other sources.

Hitler was the undisputed leader, he made or approved all essential decisions, including the most momentous of the whole war. The ‘removal’ of the Jews from Europe corresponded to the consistency of his worldview, as all his statements on this subject show. And the consequence of his actions from 1939 to 1941 can also be seen in the orders and measures he gave. The Einsatzgruppen that followed the German armies into Russia had clear instructions. On 31 July 1941, Heydrich was instructed to develop a concept for the removal of the Jews from the entire German sphere of power and influence. The fact that expulsion was no longer on the agenda is shown by the impediment and, from October 1941, the ban on all emigration. On 15 October the systematic deportation of Jews from Germany and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia began.

Ten days later, on 25 October, Hitler declared in the presence of Himmler and Heydrich at the Führer’s headquarters: ‘Before the Reichstag I prophesied to Jewry that the Jew would disappear from Europe if the war was not avoided. This criminal race has on its conscience the two million dead of the World War, now hundreds of thousands again. Don’t tell me: We can’t send them into the mire! Who cares about our people? It is good if we are preceded by the terror of eradicating Judaism. The attempt to found a Jewish state will be a failure’ (table talk #44). Without a doubt, all the fundamental decisions were made at this time. Heydrich then made the technical and organisational arrangements so that in November he could invite the state secretaries of all the ministries involved to the house on Wannsee for a meeting on 9 December 1941. The date for the conference had to be postponed given the events on the Eastern Front, but the ‘Final Solution’ was not. It began in December 1941.


[1] Sebastian Haffner, Anmerkungen zu Hitler. Munich 1978.

[2] Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler’s Weltanschauung. Entwurf einer Herrschaft. Tübingen 1969.

[3] David Irving believes that Bormann, Himmler, Goebbels and others ruled the Reich while Hitler waged his war (Hitler’s War, p. 251). However, he fails to provide any convincing evidence for this.

[4] Martin Broszat, Hitler und die Genesis der »Endlösung« (Hitler and the Genesis of the ‘Final Solution’). On the occasion of David Irving’s theses. Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 25, 1977, p. 746 ff.

[5] Haffner, Anmerkungen zu Hitler (op. cit.) p. 157.

David Irving Tischgespräche

The Führer’s monologues (vi)

A detailed discussion of the content of Hitler’s monologues can be dispensed with in this context given the extensive recent Hitler research. However, even in the context of a brief sketch, references to facts that belong to the secured state of knowledge cannot be avoided.

First and foremost, Hitler bears witness to himself in his discussions, especially during the long evening and night hours when he spoke his thoughts ‘into the impure’. The man who was at the zenith of his power, who dominated large parts of Europe and directed the deployment of his armies in Russia, who could look back on a series of steady successes lasting more than ten years until the crisis of the winter of 1941/42, undoubtedly possessed high intellectual abilities. With his present knowledge in the field of military affairs, armament and technology, he always made a strong impression on those around him. This was no less true for problems of art and especially history and politics. On the other hand, he showed much less interest, as a long-standing confidant confesses, in questions of the ‘humanistic field of knowledge’.[1] Thanks to his extraordinary memory and remarkable knowledge of literature, Hitler achieved insights and findings in specialised fields that commanded the respect of many experts. He was usually superior to them in his ability to grasp the core of a problem immediately and to reduce complicated relationships to a simple denominator. Above all, Hitler not only knew but, according to the testimony of Grand Admiral Raeder, ‘formed views and judgements from it that were often remarkable’.[2] He was able to think in large contexts and was in many respects far ahead of his advisers, for example on the question of motorizing the German army.[3]

Hitler’s monologues at his headquarters bear witness to these abilities only to a limited extent. Examples are his terse remarks on questions of environmental protection, the warning against the consequences of unrestrained exhaustion of the earth’s reserves of raw materials (Monologue 1), the demand for better utilisation of the countries’ natural resources (15, 16), or even the realisation, by no means common at the time, that the automobile would overcome borders and link peoples together more strongly than before.

For Hitler, motorisation was an important step ‘on the way to a new Europe’ (2). The correctness of these and other insights are not affected by the fact that he hindered this development through his policies. Knowledge, worldview and political practice collided.

The extent to which the ‘Führer and Reich Chancellor’ was aware of this tension will not be clear. Even during his monologues at the Führer’s headquarters, he never forgot the necessary restraint regarding his intentions and plans. Even in the smallest of circles he did not betray any secrets, did not reveal doubts or uncertainty. At no time did he weigh up the pros and cons with his advisors before making major decisions, nor did he make it clear what the motives were for his actions in concrete political and military situations.

Heim’s notes testify to Hitler’s great self-control, but also his suspicious reserve. The guests at the table were given no indication of the information coming from Germany and abroad, how the German people reacted to the sacrifices and deprivations, and what repercussions the severe crisis of the winter of 1941/42 had on the population of the occupied territories and the allied states. In general, Hitler’s thoughts were far more on the past or the future than the present. With great willpower, he repressed the problems and worries of everyday life at the dinner table and acted as an attentive host, casually talking about Bruckner and Brahms or appropriate nutrition or reporting on events or figures from the early days of the NSDAP.

In this behaviour, however, another trait of Hitler’s becomes visible. He was not a political pragmatist who concentrated on solving the issues of the day, but the representative of a world view that he wanted to help to achieve victory. That is why he looked to the future, especially in times when a lot was coming at him. Convinced that he knew the ‘eternal law of nature’ (117) and that his mission was to help it come to fruition, he made great efforts to free himself from burdens and difficulties, to defy resistance and often even facts that did not fit into his concept. He knew very well the limits imposed on human action, but believed that through energy, especially through an unshakeable and uncompromising belief in his mission, he could push them far out and force people as well as powers under his spell.

Hitler was convinced that the epoch of the bourgeoisie was over and that the bourgeois nation-states would not survive the war. In his opinion, in the world war of the present day, they would inevitably disintegrate—since they lacked inner strength and a unifying force—and the vital and unconsumed layers of the nations would then strengthen the camp that fought with particular determination and faith. Just as National Socialism had prevailed in the internal political struggle against far superior forces of the parties and the means of the power of the state, so it had to assert itself in the war with the utmost determination and readiness to believe. Not the superior weapons, but the more devout fighters would ultimately bring about the decision.

On 27 January 1944, Hitler very clearly and firmly told the field marshals and commanders that it was precisely this devout readiness of each soldier that mattered. ‘It is completely unknown to many’, he declared, ‘how far this fanaticism goes, which in the past moved so many of my party comrades to leave everything behind them, to allow themselves to be locked up in prisons, to give up a profession and everything for a conviction… Such a thing has only happened in German history in the time of the religious wars, when hundreds of thousands of people left their homes, farm and everything and went far away, poor as church mice, although they had previously been wealthy people—out of a realisation, a holy conviction. That is the case again today’.[4]

There is no doubt that the National Socialists had an advantage over the bourgeois parties of the Weimar Republic because of their readiness to believe and devote themselves. And Hitler certainly helped his party overcome defeats and serious crises by never giving up, showing confidence especially in difficult situations and thus lifting his followers. Part of his strength lay in this steadfastness and belief in his mission (32). In the same way, Hitler also tried to convey to the German people during the war the feeling of superiority and the conviction of final victory. This undoubtedly succeeded to a great extent, as long as the expectations did not contradict the realities. In the long run, however, willpower and strength of faith were not enough to withstand the growing pressure of the war opponents. Among the concrete power factors on the opposite side that became more and more apparent was the internal stability of the Soviet Union, the efficiency of the Red Army and the economic strength of the country, the unity and willingness to resist of the British population, the industrial potential of the USA, the will of the nations of Europe conquered by Germany to live and to be free.

______ 卐 ______

Note of the Editor: Free? Western nations today are slaves of an ethno-suicidal religion spawned by the Allies right after WW2!

______ 卐 ______

It cannot be assumed that Hitler failed to recognise these realities, as his statements in the Führer’s headquarters would lead one to believe. Even in the conversations in his inner circle, he did not lose sight of the psychological effect of his words. Remarks such as that the Americans are ‘the dumbest people imaginable’ (82), assertions about England’s growing difficulties (81, 88) or Germany’s perpetual superiority in weapons technology (84) were intended first and foremost to strengthen the self-confidence of those around him. He felt it necessary to counteract the sober assessments of the situation by his political advisers, who, in his opinion, inhibited the momentum of the soldiers and the population through their restraint and caution. Hitler was convinced that he had only achieved so much thanks to his ‘mountain-moving optimism’ (79).

More fundamental importance is attached to the statements on questions of domestic policy and worldview. The leader of the Third Reich was a bitter enemy of the revolution with its egalitarian and democratic driving forces. In his opinion, it was destructive and its bearers belonged to the negative selection of the people. Again and again one finds the assertion that the judiciary had nurtured criminality during the First World War, that in 1918 it was only necessary to open the prisons and already the revolution had its leaders (18, 52, 60). In other contexts, however, the achievements of the revolution are praised. It did away with the princes (20), broke up the class state, challenged the monopoly of the educated and propertied bourgeoisie and thus opened up opportunities for advancement to empower people from the lower classes (26, 50, 56). Sometimes even credit is given to the revolutionaries. Given the ‘stupid narrow-mindedness’ of the Saxon bourgeoisie, for example, the influx of workers to the KPD in that country was very understandable (13), just as communists like Ernst Thälmann generally elicited much more sympathy from him than aristocrats like the Austrian Prince Starhemberg (13), who had even taken part in the 1923 putsch in Munich in his entourage.

In all this, however, Hitler left no doubt in his discussions about how closely he felt bound to the nation-state tradition of the 19th and early 20th centuries and intended to complete what had been developed and propagated before him in the way of large-scale concepts and imperial ideas. However, he was convinced that he would only achieve this goal if he could rely on a broader, more powerful and more vital support class. The bourgeoisie and the old ruling classes seemed unsuitable for this. In unusually harsh terms, he criticised the former German ruling houses as well as the ruling princes of Europe (9, 20, 55), the nobility, the officer corps (13,28,31), the diplomats (121), civil servants and lawyers (14,48,130), the intellectuals and scientists. Again and again, the bourgeoisie in toto is accused of half-heartedness, cowardice and incompetence (13,20). The capitalist system is not spared either (15). ‘The economy’, Hitler declared bluntly, ‘consists everywhere of the same scoundrels, ice-cold money-earners. The economy only knows idealism when it comes to workers’ wages’ (39).

Well-known representatives of German industry and some bourgeois experts who heard such and even harsher statements by Hitler considered him a radical zealot or even a Bolshevik in disguise.[5] This view, however, does not get to the heart of the problem any more than the opposite view, which wants to conclude from words of appreciation for entrepreneurs and praise for the efficiency of the German economy and its promotion that Hitler was dependent on these circles. In these monologues there is no evidence that Hitler wanted to serve the interests of capital. He did not bind himself to any class, he hardly took into account the interests of certain groups and strata. In the National Socialist state, classes were to be eliminated and thus all the forces of the people were to be set free, and all sections of the population were to be given opportunities for advancement and activity. All groups were to be united in the Volksgemeinschaft, the national community a new higher unit.

However, since in the National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft the rights and functions of the social groups were not finally defined, nor were the NSDAP and its branches assigned any clearly defined tasks, it functioned as long as everyone derived advantage from it and saw part of their interests and demands realised. As the demands grew, there were signs of fatigue, resignation and communal refusals. Hitler increasingly found himself criticising state organs (107), civil servants (41, 59), judges (130, 177), party leaders and ministers for being too lenient towards individual and group interests. However, as long as there was still a basic consensus among the majority regarding the goals for which they were fighting, the state and party leader imposed his will unchallenged in all decisive questions.

That this succeeded so unreservedly was undoubtedly due to the dynamism that the leader of the NSDAP had unleashed in Germany. He did this based on the realisation that in times of social upheaval, economic and political change, authorities and institutions reacted too slowly and sluggishly, that experts in all fields had insufficient answers and solutions to offer, and that as a result of the confidence in the state and its organs was severely shaken. If unconventional methods were practised in such situations, if alternatives were developed with unused forces, then these would receive an advance of confidence from the outset. Hitler built on this. Through the establishment of special offices, the granting of special powers and special orders, the National Socialist regime gained a remarkable momentum, initially even a momentum that lasted in some areas into the first years of the war.
However, this process also caused considerable difficulties. A seemingly endless chain of competence disputes and rivalries developed, leading to friction, disorganisation and, in many cases, failure. Hitler, to secure the support of all forces for the speedy implementation of his plans, triggered this dynamic and held on to the system even when the disadvantages became openly apparent. David Irving concludes, therefore, that he was far from being the all-powerful leader and that his influence over those directly under him diminished, especially under the extreme stresses of war.[6] This thesis is correct insofar as Hitler’s will did not always and in all areas penetrate to the lowest state and party organs, and was also interpreted and understood differently due to a lack of ideological unity in the party. In the monologues presented here, he complains about the failure of the SA leaders (79), the high-handedness of individual Gauleiters, and the inadequate implementation of his orders. But it is wrong for Irving to conclude that the conduct of the war so absorbed Hitler’s strength and concentration that he left the areas of domestic and occupation policy to his responsible ministers and confidants, especially Himmler, Goebbels and Bormann. The reader of these monologues can convince himself of the opposite.

Without him, the Führer and Reich Chancellor believed, Germany could pack up (79), and important decisions had not been made (32). Hitler was also convinced of his indispensability at his headquarters; he was excellently informed and did not fail to intervene wherever he thought it necessary. He criticised clumsy formulations in an editorial by Reich Minister Goebbels, registered events in individual districts, paid attention to the promotion of the arts, forbade attempts at administrative simplification in the war, ordered the shooting of the arsonist of the ‘Bremen’, supervised and reprimanded the judgements of German courts, took note with indignation of the sermons of the Bishop of Münster. As the minutes of the Speer Ministry meetings and many other testimonies show, Hitler allowed himself to be informed down to the last detail and made his own decisions, especially in domestic matters. No one knew better than he that the war could only be fought if a majority of the people followed it, or at least accepted the inevitable. For this very reason, he devoted extraordinary attention to the tasks of domestic policy, especially domestic security.

Even more important is another consideration. Hitler waged the war because it was the consequence of his worldview: the living space of the German people was to be conquered and secured for many generations. He spoke about this very forcefully again and again in his headquarters. Only this gain of land would create the prerequisite for solving the social question. By offering each individual the opportunity to fully develop his abilities, the National Socialist programmer hoped to reduce or eliminate the tensions and rivalries in the community (140). In this war of worldviews, Hitler did not lose sight of the goals for which he was waging it. The most important was the consolidation of National Socialist supremacy in Europe and the expansion of German influence in the world. General questions of occupation policy in East and West, as well as cooperation with allied states and peoples, belonged in this context. In Hitler’s view, German rule could only be secured if it succeeded in winning over as many people of ‘Germanic blood’ in the world as possible (125). The prerequisite for strengthening one’s nationality, however, was the repression and elimination of all those who were considered inferior and alien to the community: Jews, Slavs, Gypsies and others. Finally, it was a question of suppressing the influence of those circles that did not recognise war as the ‘law of life of peoples’, that did not want to accept the ‘right of the strongest’ in social coexistence, nor race and descent as criteria in professional competition: Christians, Marxists, pacifists. In these areas Hitler never delegated responsibility, but reserved every fundamental decision for himself. Irving’s assertion that Hitler was not informed about essential measures precisely in this area, which was central to him, cannot be substantiated. An analysis of the monologues points’ in the opposite direction.


[1] Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler, wie ich ihn sah. Munich-Berlin 1974, p. 160 f.

[2] Erich Raeder, Mein Leben. Vol. 2, Tübingen 1957, p. 110.

[3] Fritz Wiedemann, Der Mann, der Feldherr werden wollte. Velbert and Kettwig 1964, p. 102.

[4] Excerpts from this speech can be found in the appendix to the collection of Bormann’s Führer Talks.

[5] Walter Rohland – Bewegte Zeiten. Erinnerungen eines Eisenhüttenfachmanns (Memories of an Ironworks Expert). Stuttgart 1978, p. 82 reports on a statement of displeasure by Hitler during a meeting. Afterwards he had declared, ‘If only I had destroyed the entire intelligentsia of our people like Stalin, then everything would have been easier!’

[6] David Irving,. London 1977, p. XV.

Henry Picker Martin Bormann Tischgespräche

The Führer’s monologues (v)

If this rather light-hearted handling of the texts—and the examples could be multiplied—already suggests restraint about Picker’s tradition, the critical reserve is reinforced by two marginal notes by Bormann. In Picker’s record of the conversation of 12 May 1942,[1] the head of the Party Chancellery complains: ‘This transcript is in many cases quite inaccurate, since Dr Picker, when he took notes during the very long conversation, did not add to them who held this or that view!’ Quite obviously, then, Picker does not seem to have been sufficiently successful in reliably distinguishing Hitler’s views from those of his dinner guests or of party leaders not present who were quoted during the conversation. Even if the validity of the statement can no longer be verified, it must in any case call for caution. There is no evidence in the available material for Picker’s assertion that Bormann ‘blatantly corrected’ his notes. The objections are measured rather than sharp and unobjective. For example, Bormann found the note of the conversation of 4 July 1942 ‘in many cases not quite accurate’, for in a conversation about the Concordat, Hitler had stated: ‘In the case of a Reich regulation, we would have to go by the area that was furthest behind ideologically, i.e. particularly favourable to the enemy’. Picker must have considered this correction by Bormann to be justified, because he included the sentence in his text in a slightly modified form—without, of course, marking it as an addition by another hand—which in no way made the passage in question more precise or unambiguous.[2] In other respects, too, Picker seems to have found notes dictated by Bormann worthy of attention, for he incorporated them very generously into his edition of the Tischgespräche and did not always mark them as someone else’s intellectual property.[3]

Since Picker considers his transcripts made for the NSDAP party chancellery to be private property, a historical-critical edition of all the records from the Führer’s headquarters, as Eberhard Jäckel and Martin Broszat have repeatedly called for, is not to be expected in the foreseeable future. Given the deficiencies of Picker’s records, such an edition would be urgently desirable in the interest of international research.

A discussion of the insightful value of the source must first start with the motives that determined Martin Bormann to have Hitler’s monologues recorded. When he took over as head of the party chancellery after Hess’s flight to England in May 1941, he was aware that the political influence of the NSDAP in the country had dwindled because it lacked ideological unity and a clear course. He wanted to remedy this. Since he knew the close ties between the National Socialist elite and Hitler and was well aware that even the Reichsleiter and Gauleiter had not developed an independent position, only the party leader himself came into question as an interpreter of the world view. Bormann hoped that by fixing Hitler’s statements he could create a kind of compendium for the intellectual-political orientation of the NSDAP. Based on the party leader’s comments on concrete events and his declarations of intent in connection with domestic and foreign policy decisions, he wanted to coordinate and activate party work. To secure for the NSDAP the role of the ‘will-bearer of the nation’, which was always aspired to but never achieved, Bormann tried to immediately translate Hitler’s thoughts and views into political practice and incorporate them into the decrees and directives of the Party Chancellery. In possession of clear directives, the political leaders in the country had to succeed, he hoped, in emphatically reasserting their claim to leadership vis-à-vis state authorities, offices of the Wehrmacht and influential business circles.

Martin Bormann, left.

In some cases, the head of the party chancellery passed on Hitler’s statements as directives. For example, Alfred Rosenberg, Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, received by letter on 23 July 1942 everything that Hitler had developed in conversation shortly beforehand in terms of views on Ostpolitik.[4] In another case, there is evidence that a note by Heim was made available to the responsible Reich Minister. Following the reception of the newly appointed Minister of Justice, Thierack, and his State Secretary at the Führer’s headquarters on 20 August 1942, Hitler abandoned the customary practice of not discussing at the table the matters under discussion. He criticised the administration of justice, which in his opinion was due to a lack of political insight, and then very firmly formulated his views and demands. Bormann gave the monologue transcript prepared by Heim to the minister so that he could familiarise himself in detail with his Führer’s thoughts and make them the guideline for his actions. This is what happened; in any case, Hitler’s formulations can be found in the speech that Thierack gave to the directors of the higher regional courts and the attorneys general on 29 September 1942.[5] What effect this speech had, whether it impressed or even influenced the judges, cannot be proven, however. Doubts are permitted here, because Hitler was repeatedly dissatisfied with the judiciary even later.

In general, the political effectiveness of the system should not be inferred from Bormann’s intentions and restless activity. The head of the party chancellery by no means immediately transformed every thought Hitler expressed into an order,[6] but kept precisely to the limits Hitler set for him. Thus, among other things, he was fundamentally forbidden to take a harder line against the churches, as he wished. The Reichsleiter also had no power of action in personnel policy. Hitler reserved the right to decide in all important cases. The Gauleiters of the NSDAP in particular, as well as the leaders of the branches and affiliated associations, knew this and therefore decided very high-handedly whether to heed or ignore Bormann’s directives. For example, the Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Hamburg, Karl Kaufmann, weakened Hitler’s criticism of the judiciary by explaining to the judges in his Higher Regional Court district that they had given no cause for complaint, that the criticism was primarily directed at the Ministry and not at the individual judge.[7] But precisely in this way he contradicted the opinion of the party leadership, without being reprimanded for it. He was not required to drop the considerations and steer a harder course.

Bormann’s intimate knowledge of Hitler’s views undoubtedly enabled him to reinforce the party’s influence in important decision-making processes at the highest level. However, he was not able to bring the party onto a unified and clear political course. The distance from the Führer’s headquarters to Berlin and the Gau capitals was too far for that, and the war in any case considerably narrowed the scope for action. Joseph Goebbels, the Gauleiter of Berlin, later gave vent to his growing annoyance in his diary: ‘Bormann has turned the party chancellery into a paper office. Every day he sends out a mountain of letters and files that the Gauleiter, who is now in the thick of the fight, can practically no longer even read through’.[8] Ultimately, precise knowledge of Hitler’s worldview was primarily to Bormann’s advantage in that he strengthened his reputation by expressing the same views. Despite his restless zeal and the comprehensive information he received, he remained Hitler’s first assistant until his death.


[1] Picker, Hitlers Tischgespräche, doc. 114, p. 283.

[2] Ibid., doc. 168, p. 414.

[3] Ibid., oc. 43 (24. 2. 1942), p. 135, clearly bears Bormann’s dictation mark.

[4] This was first pointed out by Alexander Dallin, Deutsche Herrschaft in Russland 1941-1945, Düsseldorf 1958, pp. 15 and 469/70. Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 23 July 1942, ND-NO 1878.

[5] Detailed references in Lothar Gruchmann, Hitler über die Justiz. Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 12, 1964, p. 91.

[6] Jochen von Lang, Der Sekretär. Stuttgart 1977, p. 229.

[7] Werner Johe, Die gleichgeschaltete Justiz. Organisation des Rechtswesens und Politisierung der Rechtsprechung 1933-1945, dargestellt am Beispiel des Oberlandesgerichtsbezirks Hamburg. Frankfurt/Main 1962, p. 176.

[8] Joseph Goebbels, Tagebücher 1945. Die letzten Aufzeichnungen. Hamburg 1977, p. 514. Similar complaints from other Gauleiters are also available from earlier times.

Racial right Tischgespräche

The Führer’s monologues (iv)

Editor’s note: In ‘The resurrected Jew’ I wrote: ‘With the characteristic symmetry of the Renaissance, Mantegna composed this Resurrection in which the resurrected Jew is the luminous axis of the scene… Always keep in mind that the doctrine of the Resurrection was plagiarised by the Jews who originated the Christian sect. They simply used the story of the founding hero-God of the Romans: Romulus. The idea of those who wrote the New Testament was simply to use the mythological biography of the white God to convince the Romans to better worship the god of the Jews’.

Below we continue the German-English translation of the preface to Monologues at the Führer’s Headquarters 1941-1944, the Records of Heinrich Heim edited by Werner Jochmann—a translation that we had suspended because of the other translation, that from French to English of Savitri’s book.

If there had been mobile phones in the 1940s, Hitler’s after-dinner monologues would have been recorded down to the intonation of his voice. But what we got is what we got.

However, the imperfect text of the table talks still reflects that the Führer wanted to solve the Christian problem (see my emphasis in red below). And it would have been solved if he had won the war. In that hypothetical parallel world, American white nationalists wouldn’t be celebrating the resurrected Jew, as they did yesterday. In the preface of the German edition we read:


______ 卐 ______


Picker’s selection and reproduction of the sources also give rise to objections. For example, he included a document under number 6 in his edition of the table discussions that is missing from Bormann’s collection. It does not belong to the conversation notes, nor was it recorded and handed down by Heim. Record 7—number 16 in the present edition—is incorrectly dated. Picker adds two sentences to the note of 21 July 1941 at the end which do not exist in the original. There is no space here to register all the carelessness that Picker committed in transcribing Heim’s texts. Henceforth, the originals from Bormann’s collection published in this volume should be used in any case, especially since Picker has occasionally even compromised the substance of the statement in his transmission. According to Picker’s text, Hitler declared on 13 December 1941: ‘The war will come to an end. The last great task of our time is then to be seen in still settling the church problem’. In Heim’s original, on the other hand, the passage reads: ‘The war will come to an end, and I shall see my last task in life in settling the church problem’. It is surely significant that Hitler himself still intended to fight the battle against the churches.

But Picker was not only negligent in transcribing other people’s texts; he also failed to take the necessary care in reproducing his notes. In the note of 2 July 1942, for example, he says: ‘After reviewing the report, the chief remarked that one could not, however, have expected such a rapid write-off of Egypt by the English’. The following sentence in Picker’s publication reads: ‘Besides, the lies show that once Churchill is dead, we will have to make sure that his unshakeable loudmouthedness does not live on’. This sentence is missing from the original version of the Bormann Collection signed by Picker. Finally, a trivial sentence is inserted at the end of the document, which is also missing from the transcript given to the client. It is also unacceptable that Picker occasionally mixes his observations and comments with the interview transcripts, so that Hitler’s statements are not clearly distinguished.

Update of April 25:

I completely forgot to add the footnotes—:

Ibid., doc. 11, 13. 12. 1941, p. 80.
Document 65 of this issue, see p. 150.
Picker, Hitlers Tischgespräche doc. 165, p. 406.
Ibid., Doc 49, p. 151; Doc 50, p. 154.

—that will be properly added in the book, once I can relaunch my Daybreak Press.

Charlemagne Destruction of Germanic paganism Heinrich Himmler Savitri Devi Schutzstaffel (SS) Souvenirs et réflexions d'une aryenne (book) Tischgespräche

Reflections of an Aryan woman, 71


Chapter 10

Hitlerian esotericism & the tradition

‘The fools scorn Me when I take on human form;
My essence, supreme source of beings, escapes them.’

Bhagavad-Gita, 9, verse 2

There were, of course, echelons among the elect. Curiously, the name of this elite of physical health and beauty, of warlike courage and, more or less, of secret knowledge, whose initials are known only to the vast public, means, as I said above, ‘echelons of protection’.

I believe I also mentioned this about the Ordensburgen (Order Castles), in which the military training, political and, to some extent, metaphysical education of the SS, and especially of its cadres, took place because Hitler’s Weltanschauung is inseparable from the metaphysics that underlies it. This is so true that a critic of National Socialism and René Guénon’s work could say that the latter was ‘Hitlerism minus the armoured divisions’,[1] and this without the Cairo insider ever having written a word about ‘politics’.

Not all the candidates—I should say ‘novices’—of the SS were trained and educated in the same Ordensburg. And not everyone in the same Ordensburg was taught the same way, especially in the higher echelons. It depended on the tasks for which they were considered suitable within the elite itself.

For the elite consisted of several organisations, from the most visible, Waffen (Armed) SS—the most famous one too, because of the superhuman heroism it demonstrated so many times during the Second World War—to the most secret one, the Ahnenerbe (Heritage of the Ancestors), founded in 1935, and all the more difficult to know because many of its documents (also secret, it goes without saying) were destroyed ‘before the arrival of the Allies in Germany’, and because ‘the members of this organisation who survived the collapse of the Third Reich… remain silent with a strange resolution’.[2]

It is at least logical to think that it was probably the Ahnenerbe which, in Adolf Hitler’s ‘Black Order’, was the repository of Tradition—and more particularly, certain sections of the Ahnenerbe, for it included many, including fifty-two scientific sections[3] dealing with research, although not necessarily in the spirit and with the methods used in the experimental sciences. According to Wolfram Sievers’ statements before the victors’ tribunal in Nuremberg, to which we owe this precision, the same Institute ‘carried out or commissioned more than one hundred large-scale research missions’.[4]

The nature of some of these investigations reveals a clear interest in esoteric matters. Thus, the symbolism of the harp in Ireland was studied, as well as the question of the survival of true Rosicrucians: in other words, of initiatory groups still possessing the integral tradition of the Knights Templar (from which the first Rosicrucians are said to have inherited). Thus, the Bible and the Kabbalah were reconsidered, trying to derive their hidden meaning; asking, in particular, what role the symbolism of numbers might play in both. It was in this way that the physical and mental structure of human specimens of different races was studied—that of the Nordics, with the special care that one can guess—to ensure that the concept of heredity and race, so fundamental in Hitlerism, was given its full value. Thus, systematic and sustained efforts were made in all research aimed at revealing to the Germans the glory of their own historical or pre-historical antiquity, their Middle Ages, and at highlighting the importance of the corresponding sites.

Without denying that there is a part of esoteric truth in Christianity and Judaism itself, and in all religions or philosophies that are closely or even distantly related to Tradition, the emphasis was on the traditional form of the Germanic peoples. Traces of this can be found in the symbols engraved on rock from the earliest prehistoric times and, after the bloody eradication of the cult of Wotan by Charlemagne and his immediate successors, even in certain rites practised in the Middle Ages the Chivalric Orders or the Holy Vehm. It would be interesting to know whether the latter, which has not ceased to exist as a secret organisation, has, or has had at any time, any connection with the Thule Society.

Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS and the man whose career, so much decried outside Hitlerian circles, is marked more than any other by this detached violence that signifies a higher quality of being, albeit ‘in a veiled way’,[5] in his speech of January 1937, which contains his only public or semi-public reference to the Ahnenerbe, extols the high importance of archaeological discoveries by the Institute of that name in Altchristenburg, East Prussia: the uncovering of several layers of ancient Germanic fortifications, refuting the view that East Prussia was a Slavic land.

But there is more: he advocates the ‘restoration’ and ‘maintenance’ of cultural centres dedicated ‘to German greatness and the German past… in every region where there is an SS company’[6] and he gives examples of such centres. One is the Sachsenhain near Verden, where 4,500 boulders, each transported from a Saxon village, had been erected one after the other, on either side of the paths in the middle of the forest, in memory of the four and a half thousand Saxons who were beheaded there, on the banks of the Aller, in 782, by order of Charlemagne because they persisted in refusing to accept the foreign god he wanted to impose on them.

The other is the site of the Externsteine, impressive vertical rocks marking one of the world’s great spiritual centres near Horn, and the sacrosanct place of worship for the ancient Germans. On the top of the highest of the rocks, in place of the ancient golden Irminsul torn down in 772 by the soldiers of the same Christian conqueror, there now flew, victorious, liberating, a symbol of the reconciliation of all the opposing aspects of German history in the consciousness of its profound unity: the red, white and black swastika flag of the Third Reich.

And the examples show that it was not only a question of ‘culture’, but of knowledge, or, for the German in general, of national culture; and for the initiates of the SS Order and in particular of the Ahnenerbe, secret knowledge of the great cosmic truths, apprehended through the traditional symbolism such as the Germanic peoples knew it, and such as a silent minority has preserved it. For, and this is a point worth noting, despite the very strong ‘pagan’ current underlying Hitlerism, manifesting itself above all in the unreserved rejection of all anthropocentrism such as the whole personal God, there was never any question of rejecting or even underestimating anything in the ancestral German and European heritage which did honour to the Aryan genius.

The Führer had, says André Erissaud, ‘the feeling’—I myself would say, the certainty—that ‘everything in the most recent West that had taken the form of a religion, and the Christian religion in particular… pertains to the all too human’, and therefore had little to do with truly transcendent values and ‘offered a general climate scarcely compatible with its dispositions and vocation, situated beyond the truths and dogmas of the faith proposed to ordinary man’.[7] However, the whole of Western civilisation is at the same time ‘recent’ and ‘Christian’. We must never forget this.

That did not, however, prevent Adolf Hitler, who was impartial, as is necessary for any sage (and even more so for any human expression of the divine), from admiring Charlemagne: the Sachsenschlüchter or ‘terminator of the Saxons’, as Alfred Rosenberg, Johann von Leers, Heinrich Himmler, and a good number of other great dignitaries, thinkers and men of action of the Third Reich called him. He saw in him the conqueror with the immense will to power, and above all the first unifier of the German people; the one who, alone at that time, had had the idea of the Reich even if he had used the artificial unity of ‘faith’ to impose it, and if this ‘faith’ was the Christian faith, i.e. a foreign faith. It will be remembered that Adolf Hitler insisted on the dissolving action of Christianity on the Greco-Roman world, and that he called it ‘pre-Bolshevism’. But it does not matter what this faith was (and still is), if it was the cement of a conquering Germanic Empire and, later, the occasion for the whole flowering of art that we know. Insofar as this art is beautiful it presupposes, in any case, a certain knowledge of what is eternal. The Führer thus accepted with respect, as a German heirloom, a replica of the sword of the Emperor of West.

______ 卐 ______

Editor’s note:

I distinctly remember the first time I read Hitler’s Table Talk in an Ostara Publications edition. This was the only point on which I differed with the Führer.

Precisely Ostara has published a book, which I own, that shows that we could rate Charlemagne—as historian Arthur Kemp Kemp, publisher of Ostara told me—within the evilest characters of European history. We recommend Thomas Hodgkin’s The Life of Charlemagne to those who have swallowed the Christian version of this man that imposed a Semitic cult on the noblest race on Earth.

In a previous instalment, Savitri said that Hitler was closer to Wagner than to Nietzsche. That is quite true. If he had been closer to the philosopher than the musician, he would have realised the danger posed by the Anglo-Americans, so foolish in their Christian morality that they destroyed a miraculous revival of paganism: a 20th-century reincarnation of Charlemagne’s misdeeds!

As I have said, after I finish with Savitri’s book I’ll continue posting Deschner’s Christianity’s Criminal History. We shall see that even after the destruction of Greco-Roman culture by Christians, there were still many Germanic tribes who refused to worship the god of the Jews. Charlemagne forced these uncontaminated Nordids to worship the enemy god: a historical milestone related to the darkest hour we suffer today (see for example my post yesterday, ‘Liberalism as a heretical movement’).


[1] Louis Pauwels and Jacques Bergier: Le Matin des Magiciens, ed. Gallimard, 1960, p. 326.
[2] Brissaud: Hitler et l’Ordre Noir, page 283.
[3] Ibid., page 285.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., page 283.
[6] Ibid., page 284.
[7] Ibid, page 111.